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Access to finance is one of the most serious obstacles faced by companies. Financing
constraints lead to large opportunity costs, which translate into negative consequences for
economic growth, productivity, and welfare. In three studies, this dissertation examines the
mechanisms that can help to reduce financing constraints. The first study investigates the
costs and benefits of relationship lending – an essential financing instrument of private
companies. Using meta-analysis, this study reveals that relationship lending is generally
beneficial for companies, but lenders and companies face trade-offs in lending relation -
ships and lending outcomes. Borrower benefits are more likely in the US and in countries
where bank competition is high. They are not related to the importance of small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in an economy, suggesting that prevalence of relationship
lending does not necessarily come along with borrower benefits. The second study
develops a more complete conceptual framework of credit constraints. The new framework
describes the occurrence of credit constraints in sequential, conditional stages. The results
show that credit constraints vary with bank lending environment beyond the firm risk.
Bank lending standards are strongly related to credit constraints, but the direction and the
magnitude of the effect depend on the conditional stage. The conditional nature and the
stage-specific differences in the determinants provide an important guidance for economic
policies aimed at efficient allocation of credit. The third study examines the role of credit
information sharing systems. The analysis documents dichotomous effects of the infor -
mation scope (depth of information) and scale (information coverage). While the
information scope is associated with lower financing constraints, the information scale is
associated with higher financing constraints. These findings suggest that accurate and
deep information sharing systems, rather than the information coverage alone, contribute
to lower financing constraints. The empirical results from the three studies demonstrate
that promising new venues exist for improving firms’ access to finance.
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
This dissertation examines three crucial mechanisms that can help to reduce financ ing 
constraints of companies. The first chapter, based on Kysucky and Norden (2014), focuses on 
relationship lending as the most important financing technology of SMEs. Close bank-firm 
relationships can create benefits by reducing information asymmetries between the lenders and 
borrowers. However, banks might acquire informational monopoly over borrowers and extract 
rents. Using a meta-analytic methodology, we summarize the overall lending outcomes from 
relationship lending and explain the cross-country differences in outcomes by the structure of 
banking markets. We find that relationship lending technology is generally beneficial for 
companies, but lenders and companies face trade-offs in lending relationships. Long-last ing, 
exclusive and synergy-creating bank relationships are associated with higher credit volume and 
lower loan rates. These benefits are more likely in the U.S. and in countries where bank 
competition is high. They are lower the higher the deposits-to-GDP ratio and the higher the 
importance of SMEs in an economy, suggesting that a higher prevalence of relationship lending 
does not necessarily come along with higher benefits for borrowers.   
In the second, single-authored chapter, I develop a more complete conceptual 
framework of credit constraints. The new framework describes the occurrence of credit 
constraints in sequential, conditional stages. I examine the role of the institutional environment 
and analyze how bank lending standards affect the likelihood of occurrence of individual stages 
of credit constraints. I decompose credit constraints into loan application discouragement, 
rejection, and unfavorable loan terms. I find that credit constraints vary with bank lending 
environment beyond firm risk. Tighter lending standards lead to higher discouragement and 
rejection rates, but conditional on approval, tight lending standards make unfavorable loan 
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terms to borrowers less likely. The results document that the problem of credit constraints is 
significantly larger than the observed loan rejections. Moreover, the relationship among the 
key determinants and credit constraints vary across individual stages. This analysis 
demonstrates that understanding the sequential and stage-specific nature of credit constraints 
is crucial in developing effective solutions for facilitating access to finance.  
In the third chapter, based on Beck et al. (2015), we focus on credit information sharing 
systems. In a large sample of companies from developing economies, we document the 
relationship between credit information sharing systems and the occurrence of financ ing 
constraints. We analyze in detail the role of credit information sharing scope (information 
depth) and credit information sharing scale (information coverage). The evidence reveals a 
dichotomous effect of credit information sharing systems. While information scope is 
associated with lower financing constraints, information scale is associated with higher 
financing constraints. Greater credit information scope is more beneficial for small firms. The 
significance of credit information scope is unaffected by information sharing mechanism and 
content. Overall, these findings indicate that accurate and deep information, rather than 
coverage alone, contribute to lower financing constraints. 
This dissertation provides new insights on firms’ access to finance in a cross-country 
context. Drawing upon rich datasets from diverse institutional settings, the results show that 
research and policy interventions need to take into account a more complex system of factors 
that influence the availability of finance.  
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are based, respectively, on Kysucky and Norden (2014), Kysucky 
(2014), and Beck et al. (2015). The advisors for this dissertation are Lars Norden and Abe de 
Jong (until April 2014). The research was conducted at the Department of Finance, Rotterdam 
School of Management, Erasmus University, and Erasmus Research Institute of Management.  
 
1.1 The dark and the bright side of relationship lending 
Bank financing is the single most important source of external financing in most of the 
economies around the world. Relationships between borrowers and lenders play a key role in 
the provision of banking services based on multiple interactions between the two parties. As a 
result, building and maintaining lending relationships over time and across products should 
help to reduce information asymmetries, decrease financing constraints, and improve resource 
allocation. However, when lenders obtain information monopoly over borrowers, they may 
17_Erim Vlado BW stand.job
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exploit this position to “lock-in” their customers into existing lending relationships. 
Alternatively, they may extract additional rents by raising interest rates over time from init ia l 
low levels to the levels beyond the equilibrium price. Relationships may also exacerbate moral 
hazard problems when borrowers have incentives to violate soft budget constraints or take 
excessive risks, especially in distress situations. 
Empirical literature on the outcomes of relationship lending is mixed. Individual studies 
utilize different data samples, measurements, and methods. Since most empirical evidence is 
based on data from a single country, it is not clear which country-level determinants drive the 
differences in relationship lending outcomes across countries. In this chapter, we use meta-
analysis to systematically summarize and quantify the results from the empirical literature. We 
develop a multi-dimensional framework, which combines four dimensions of relationship 
lending measures (time, distance, exclusivity, and cross-product synergies) with four 
dimensions of relationship lending outcomes (price of credit, volume, collateral, and maturity).  
 Meta-analysis is a tool for systematic aggregation and analysis of empirical evidence.  
This method allows us to estimate the overall effect and to introduce new hypotheses to explain 
the country-level differences, which cannot be tested in the original studies. Controlling for 
publication- level characteristics, we can isolate the effect of a potential publication bias and 
increase the explanatory power by combining the outcomes from multiple studies.  
The empirical strategy proceeds in two steps. First, we quantify the overall outcome per 
each combination of relationship lending strength and outcome. Second, we explain the 
heterogeneity in the original results with country-level characteristics. Our data sample is based 
on 2,979 effects from 101 studies. The datasets from the original studies encompass more than 
4.1million firm observations from 28 countries.  
The findings show that lending relationships are generally beneficial for borrowers, but 
the outcomes differ across the relationship dimensions. Aggregate meta-analytic results reveal 
that 35% of all effects are beneficial for borrowers, 21% are not beneficial, and 44% are not 
significant. Longer, more exclusive, and synergy-creating relationships, are associated with 
lower loan rates and higher credit volume. However, borrowers with exclusive relationships 
are likely to post more collateral and those in close physical proximity to their lenders obtain 
credit at higher price. These results suggest that tradeoffs exist between the strength of 
relationships and lending terms.  
Second, meta-analytic regressions indicate that the likelihood of observing benefic ia l 
outcomes for borrowers is driven by the structure of banking markets. We show that more bank 
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competition monotonically increases the likelihood of beneficial effects for borrowers, which 
is consistent with the models by Boot and Thakor (2000), Hauswald and Marquez (2006), and 
the more general view that banks use relationship lending as a strategic response to cope with 
increased levels of competition. This result becomes even stronger when we account for 
possible endogeneity of relationship benefits and the structure of banking systems. We also 
find that the benefits for borrowers from relationship lending are more likely in the United 
States compared to other countries. This result is not contrary to the widespread view that 
relationship lending mainly exists in the bank-based financial systems in continental Europe 
and Japan (e.g., Allen and Gale, 2000). We show that benefits of relationship lending for 
borrowers do not necessarily arise from the prevalence of relationship lending. 
This chapter presents a novel approach to analyze relational financial contracting – an 
area which has become one of the focal points of modern research in banking and corporate 
finance. The meta-regressions with time-varying country-level characteristics provide 
explanations for the heterogeneity in the literature. The main result, the positive relation 
between bank competition and borrower benefits, is strong and robust and contributes to the 
ongoing discussion whether or not bank competition is conducive to relationship lending and 
its beneficial effects. Single country studies find evidence for negative effects of competition 
(e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1995) or u-shaped effects of competition on relationship lending 
benefits for borrowers (e.g., Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Elsas, 2005; Presbitero and Zazzaro, 
2011). The model of Boot and Thakor (2000) indicates positive effects of bank competition on 
relationship lending benefits for borrowers, as does our cross-country meta-analysis. This study 
provides a foundation for future research, and informs policy makers about the implications of 
bank market structure for banks and borrowers, especially SMEs.  
 
1.2 A more complete framework of credit constraints 
The second chapter focuses on financing constraints that are specific to credit instruments. 
These constraints arise when companies cannot access external credit financing, such as bank 
loans or credit lines, to undertake profitable investment projects. Since most SMEs are 
dependent on bank financing, credit constraints pose a major obstacle to their operations. 
Academic research and practice focus on credit constraints mainly as a measure of credit 
rejection rates. However, credit rejections do not represent the full extent of the problem.  
There are three stages at which credit constraints can occur. First, borrowers might not 
apply for credit because they are discouraged. Second, borrowers that apply might be rejected. 
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Third, approved borrowers might obtain less favorable credit terms than requested. In the 
sample of Euro-area companies, the proportion of credit constrained firms, accounting for 
discouragement and unfavorable terms, is four-times larger than the proportion of credit 
rejections alone. Taking together all three stages, credit constraints affect a substantially larger 
share of the productive economy. It is not understood how credit constraints occur in a 
sequential process and what factors contribute to the outcomes at each stage.  
 Empirical literature documents large cross-country heterogeneity in the occurrence of 
credit constraints. The differences arise due to the institutional environment (Djankov et al., 
2007; La Porta, et al., 1998; Pagano and Jappelli, 1993), the structure of the financial systems 
(Beck et al., 2004; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008; Levine, 1998), and the 
economic activity and monetary policy (Jiménez et al., 2012, 2014). Discouraged and 
informally rejected firms constitute a significant proportion of credit constrained firms, 
especially among SMEs (e.g., Brown et al., 2011; Cole, 2008; Popov and Udell, 2011). Little 
evidence is available about the occurrence of unfavorable terms and the interaction between 
the stages of credit constraints and the characteristics of the economic environment across the 
countries.  
In this chapter I develop a more complete conceptual framework of credit constraints 
and investigate a differential impact of firm, bank, and country-level factors on the likelihood 
of the occurrence of credit constraints. I decompose credit constraints into three stages: 
discouragement, rejection, and unfavorable terms. Using a large scale dataset on small 
businesses from Europe, I document the prevalence of credit constraints and investigate how 
the key determinants affect their likelihood of occurrence. 
My findings reveal that credit constraints vary with the bank lending environment 
beyond firm risk. Tighter lending standards lead to higher discouragement and rejection rates, 
but conditional on approval, tight lending standards make unfavorable loan terms for borrowers 
less likely. The effect is mainly due to higher loan volume rather than lower loan rates. 
Discouragement and rejections are more likely in countries with risky banking sectors. I find 
evidence that credit constraints occur at the firm level and are consistent across various credit 
instruments. In addition, I document that the availability of market financing for both banks 
and firms influences the outcomes at each stage. While firms are less discouraged in the 
presence of the firm market financing options, banks are more likely to offer larger loans when 
they have external bank market funding options.  
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This study develops a new framework for analyzing credit constraints. I document a 
differential relationship between the key bank lending factors and the occurrence of credit 
constraints at different stages of a loan granting process. The evidence suggests that the 
conditional nature and stage-specific differences in the determinants should be considered in 
economic policies that aim at reducing credit constraints. 
 
1.3 Information sharing and access to finance 
In the last chapter, we focus on the role of credit information sharing systems in reducing 
financing constraints of companies. Credit information sharing is a mechanism that enables 
multiple finance providers to share information about borrowers. Banking theory makes 
ambiguous predictions about the effect of credit information sharing on the availability of 
financing. On the one hand, greater credit information sharing can reduce information 
asymmetries and lead to greater availability of finance. On the other hand, an increase in credit 
information sharing can lead to credit rationing if higher quality borrowers attract higher 
financing volume at the expense of lower quality borrowers.  
 Credit information sharing mechanisms arise due to a number of benefits for both 
finance providers and firms. In addition to greater information availability, information sharing 
systems can reduce adverse selection. By reducing uncertainty about the quality of firms, lower 
quality firms are not able to pool with higher quality firms (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993). As a 
result, finance providers can set more accurately the financing terms. Credit information 
sharing also mitigates potential hold-up problems (Sharpe, 1990; von Thadden, 2004). If 
information is shared and readily available, firms can more easily switch to competition if 
financing terms are not favorable. Finally, information sharing motivates firms to fulfill their 
financial obligations and maintain sustainable debt levels. Since potential lenders can access 
adverse information about credit behavior, borrowers are motivated to maintain their good 
credit standing (Klein, 1992; Padilla and Pagano, 1997; Vercammen, 1995). The potential 
downside of credit information sharing is a credit redistribution effect. If banks exchange more 
information about borrowers while the quality of borrowers remains the same, the overall 
increase in lending due to better information may not compensate for the decrease in lending 
to lower-quality or riskier borrowers (Jappelli and Pagano, 2000). 
 We investigate the role of credit information sharing scale (credit information coverage) 
and scope (depth of the information), and examine the components of credit information 
content. Using micro-data from 45 emerging economies from the period 2006-2012, we present 
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evidence of a dichotomous effect of credit information sharing. While information scope is 
associated with lower financing constraints, information scale is associated with higher 
financing constraints. Greater credit information scope is more beneficial for small firms. The 
significance of credit information scope is unaffected by information sharing mechanism and 
content. We find that financing constraints are less likely in countries with lower credit 
regulation, safer and more competitive banking systems, and in countries with higher economic 
growth. Overall, these findings indicate that accurate and deep information, rather than 
coverage alone, contribute to lower financing constraints. 
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Chapter 2  
The Benefits of Relationship Lending* 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The theory of financial intermediation suggests that relationship lending has a bright side and 
a dark side (e.g., Boot 2000). Strong bank-borrower relationships help reduce asymmetr ic 
information between lenders and borrowers, the bright side. But, at the same time, these 
relationships can create hold-up problems whereby the lender captures the borrower to extract 
rents, the dark side. Hence, the overall effect of strong bank relationships is a trade-off in costs 
and benefits between lenders and borrowers through interactions across time, space, and 
financial products. The empirical evidence on the effects of relationship lending is mixed 
because of substantial differences in data sources, measurement approaches, dimensions of the 
relationships, and research methods. In particular, research has neither documented nor 
systematically analyzed cross-country differences in relationship lending yet. It is not clear 
what underlying country-level factors drive the differences in relationship benefits across 
economies and in what way these factors affect the outcomes of relationship lending. In this 
paper, we conduct the first meta-analysis on the benefits of relationship lending to quantify the 
heterogeneity in the results and provide country-level explanations for differences in 
relationship lending outcomes. 
 Relationship lending is one of the most important lending technologies and for many 
private firms, especially SMEs, it is the key source of external financing (e.g., Beck et al. 2005; 
                                                                 
 
* This chapter is based on Kysucky and Norden (2014). 
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Berger and Udell 1995; Berger and Udell 2006; Bharath et al. 2011; Petersen and Rajan 1994). 
Close bank-borrower relationships might create benefits for both sides if informationa l 
problems are reduced. The effects of a strong bank-firm relationship are not necessarily a zero-
sum game. On the one hand, banks can better assess the risk of default for existing borrowers, 
while the latter might benefit from improved credit availability and more favorable borrowing 
terms over time. On the other hand, banks might follow an intertemporal pricing strategy by 
offering attractive lending terms at the beginning of a relationship to win over a customer and 
then raising the loan rates and fees on subsequent business. A close bank-borrower relationship 
might create a lock-in effect (hold up, ex-post information monopoly) if the borrower does not 
have sufficient alternative banking relationships (e.g., Degryse and Ongena, 2005), or if 
switching costs are high (e.g., Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010). But, borrowers might have 
incentives for moral hazard in both strong and weak bank relationships. A large borrower that 
is in distress has incentives to rely on a “too-big-to-fail” effect if the relationship is strong. 
Instead of making an effort to improve its financial conditions the borrower might gamble on 
getting more funds from the bank. Or, a relatively risky borrower has incentives to hide private 
knowledge about its default risk in a weak bank relationship, as long as the possibility exists to 
benefit from lending terms that are more favorable compared to the true default risk.  
 Empirical studies on relationship lending have produced evidence that focuses 
primarily on the benefits from a banking relationship. However, there is no clear consensus on 
whether, and under which conditions, relationship lending is beneficial for the borrower, the 
bank, or both. To investigate this issue we use meta-analysis, which has several advantages 
over field evidence-based empirical research or qualitative surveys. Meta-analysis provides a 
set of formal quantitative tools to summarize the results on a common topic and explain 
differences in study-to-study variation in outcomes. It offers objective perspective and avoids 
potential biases of individual judgment. This method is especially useful in our setting for 
several reasons. The data from empirical studies on relationship lending range from country-
specific firm surveys to samples of proprietary credit file data from banks. The original single -
country studies cannot identify and test country-level determinants of the relationship lending 
outcomes. Meta-analysis allows us to quantify the overall effect of relationship lending, 
increase the number of observations from different sources and time periods, reduce the impact 
of sampling errors within individual studies, and control for the unobserved between-study 
heterogeneity. We identify the sources of disagreement among the studies and introduce new 
institutional factors to test hypotheses on the economic drivers that account for the differences 
in relationship lending outcomes among the economies. One limitation of meta-analysis is the 
reliance on inputs from the original studies. If the original studies are misspecified in a 
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systematic way, the resulting biases may carry over to the meta-analysis. To reduce this 
possibility, we account for the precision of the input, control for observable systematic 
heterogeneity, and conduct a bootstrapping analysis of our meta-analytic results.  
 We develop a multidimensional conceptual framework that considers key dimens ions 
of the strength of bank-borrower relationships and key lending relationship outcomes. First, we 
summarize the overall effect from the perspective of the borrower, decompose the effects into 
a matrix of relationship dimensions and lending outcomes, and examine the variation of the 
benefits. Second, we estimate meta-analytic regressions with country characteristics to explain 
the heterogeneity in the results. Our sample consists of 101 studies that report multivar iate 
empirical results on relationship lending and lending outcomes using 2,979 effects based on 
4.1 million firm-year observations from 28 countries. 
 
2.2 Conceptual framework 
Our conceptual framework combines lending relationship dimensions with lending outcomes. 
The key dimensions of the strength of the relationships are: time, distance, exclusivity, and 
cross-product synergies. The lending outcomes are: loan rates, credit volume, collateral, and 
maturity. The transmission channel of relationship effects is the information, which affects 
lending outcomes by the choice of the communication mode, lending technology, and incentive 
structure (e.g., Agarwal and Ben-David, 2013; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2009). We consider the 
source of the information (public and private) and the type of information (soft and hard). What 
matters for relationship lending is private information, both hard and soft. Whereas soft 
information is conducive to relationship lending that comes at a higher price, the opposite is 
found for hard information and arm’s length lending (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2009). Figure 
2.1 summarizes our conceptual framework. 
 Time represents a dimension that is characterized by repeated interactions between 
contracting parties, validation of the interactions, potential learning, and collection of public 
and private information. Time is conducive to the production of both public/private and 
hard/soft information. The age of the borrower is a proxy for public information about a firm. 
Older firms are more likely to pay lower interest rates and obtain more credit. The duration of 
the relationship is a proxy for private information about a firm. Lenders obtain more private 
information about the borrower the longer the relationship. 
26_Erim Vlado BW stand.job
 
12 
 Distance between the bank and borrower has important implications for the type and 
usage of private information produced by banks. We consider physical, organizational, and 
personal distance. Smaller distance facilitates more intense personal connection and leads to 
greater soft information production, resulting in a negative (positive) correlation between 
physical distance and loan rates (loan volume). However, the overall outcome depends on the 
proximity of competing banks and the availability of soft and hard information (Agarwal and 
Hauswald 2010; Degryse and Ongena 2005). Moreover, technological change and 
organizational structure of banks also affect distance and thereby the strength of bank 
relationships. 
 Exclusivity denotes the extent to which a firm concentrates its borrowings on a single 
lender. Information might be more complete, more accurate and easier to interpret the more 
exclusive a bank relationship is. Relationship exclusivity promotes primarily private 
information production, both hard and soft. Firms with a relatively large number of lending 
relationships tend to be riskier in the sense that leverage and the share of unsecured bank debt 
are higher. More exclusive relationships are associated with beneficial credit terms for 
borrowers although exclusive banks might be prone to take advantage of their monopoly 
position. 
 Cross-product synergies represent the scope of the financial services provided by the 
bank. Lenders and/or borrowers may benefit from increased information production and shared 
costs of multiple services. A key source of informational synergies for commercial banks might 
be the simultaneous provision of lending, payment services, and deposit taking. In the retail 
context, relationship customers exhibit higher credit utilization, and lower default and attrition 
rates. Information about customers’ other bank products helps to predict borrower credit quality 
over time (e.g., Agarwal et al. 2009).  
 
2.3 Hypotheses 
The empirical literature on relationship lending draws conflicting conclusions, in part, because 
of different data sources, time periods, methods, or relationship lending measures. In the first 
step we summarize the evidence and test whether it supports the view that the bright side of 
relationship lending prevails over its dark side.  
HYPOTHESIS 1 (H1). Strong bank-borrower relationships are associated with beneficial lending 
outcomes for the borrower. 
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 In the second step, we investigate several factors that explain the benefits of relationship 
lending for borrowers in a cross-country context. We expect that more competition in the 
banking sector creates incentives for banks to use relationship lending as a device to 
differentiate (and shield) themselves from their competitors (Boot and Thakor, 2000). Single 
country studies find negative effects of competition (Petersen and Rajan, 1995) or u-shaped 
effects of competition on relationship lending benefits for borrowers (Degryse and Ongena , 
2005; Elsas, 2005; Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2011). In bank-based systems, characterized by a 
relatively high ratio of bank deposits over GDP, banks can commit more resources to 
relationship lending and thereby provide more benefits to borrowers (e.g., Allen and Gale , 
2000; Krahnen and Schmidt, 2004). We further expect that borrowers benefit from higher bank 
efficiency and from reduced information asymmetries in SME lending. Legal system, law 
enforcement, and property rights influence outcomes of financial intermediation (La Porta et 
al., 1998). On the one hand, countries with strong legal foundations develop efficient and stable 
financial markets and intermediaries, which improve the financing of the corporate sector. On 
the other hand, relationship lending may serve as an (informal) mechanism to offset a weak 
legal system and enforcement, and improve allocative efficiency. We hypothesize that close 
bank-borrower relationships might be more important in the developing economies and in the 
environment of weak institutions, high corruption, low transparency, and high inflation.  
HYPOTHESIS 2 (H2). The likelihood of beneficial effects of relationship lending for borrowers 
is greater in countries with high bank competition (H2a), bank-based financial systems (H2b), 
high prevalence of relationship lending (H2c), developing countries (H2d), weak legal 
institutions (H2e), high level of corruption (H2f), high inflation (H2g), and high cost efficiency 
in the banking sector (H2h). 
 
2.4 Data 
We use two search strategies to collect the results from the original studies. First, we look for 
the terms “relationship lending” and “relationship banking” in the following six databases: ISI 
Web of Knowledge, Scopus, ScienceDirect, JSTOR, ABI/Inform, and SSRN.1 Specifically, we 
search in the fields “title”, “abstract”, “keywords”, or their equivalents. This strategy results in 
                                                                 
 
1 These databases comprise journal articles (ISI Web of Knowledge, Scopus, ScienceDirect and JSTOR), 
working papers (SSRN), or both (ABI/Inform). In the ABI/Inform search, we add Econlit and Banking 
Information Source. 
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a total of 850 matches as of May 2012. Second, as common in meta-analyses, we perform a 
reverse lookup of references in the literature survey articles on relationship lending by Boot 
(2000), Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004), and Degryse and Ongena (2008). From the reverse 
lookup we obtain additional 438 matches. After eliminating missing records, both strategies 
yield a raw sample of 1,258 studies. We search the above databases for more recent or 
published versions of all unpublished papers and make replacements wherever appropriate.  
 We then apply several filter rules to arrive at the final sample. We exclude papers with 
no empirical results and those with no information on relationship lending and lending 
outcomes. Next, we eliminate studies that are written in language other than English, and 
historical studies with data prior to the year 1970. Since we focus on corporate borrowers we 
also remove the studies that deal with consumer lending. In the next step, we analyze the 
empirical strategy of all remaining papers and keep those that meet criteria for consistent meta-
analysis: (i) empirical results contain at least one multivariate regression model with one of the 
lending terms as the dependent variable and a proxy for the lending relationship’s strength as 
the explanatory variable, (ii) the relationship strength proxies and lending outcomes fall into 
one of the above categories (as shown in Figure 1), and (iii) information about the effect size 
(i.e., the regression coefficient that indicates the relation between the dependent and 
independent variable) and its statistical significance are available, complete, and comparable 
within each category. Applying these filters yields a final sample of 101 studies, consisting of 
75 published and 26 unpublished papers. Table A2.1 of the appendix shows a list of all studies 
included in our analysis. 
 We ensure that our selection criteria do not create a systematic bias by checking three 
potential sources of biases: language selection, time period, and inclusion of 
published/unpublished studies. We find that studies conducted in languages other than English 
do not influence our analysis because their number is very low. Before applying content-related 
filters there are only three non-English studies in our raw sample of 1,258 studies. There are 
two studies from the period prior to the year 1970, both from the industrialization era. We do 
not consider these two banking history studies because the socio-economic, legal and 
regulatory environment has significantly changed afterwards. In addition, consistent with the 
current practice in meta-analysis (Cooper et al., 2009, pp. 118), we include unpublished studies 
in our meta-database and in empirical tests we control for observed publication- level variables 
that might create a systematic bias. 
 For each study, we manually collect information on the link between relationship 
lending and loan terms from all of the tables in a study, including the appendices. This data 
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collection leads to a sample of 2,979 estimation results (hereafter “effects”). The basis of the 
selected studies is 4.1 million firm-period observations. We collect key characteristics of the 
selected studies and corresponding country-level variables from publication sources (e.g., ISI 
Journal Citations Reports, Web of Science, The World Bank Country Indicators, etc.). Table 
A2.2 of the appendix shows the variables and their definitions. Table 2.1 reports the summary 
statistics. 
 The studies in our sample are based on data from Europe (43 studies), the US (35), Asia 
(18), and Latin America (5), and span the period from 1970 to 2008. Published papers come 
mainly from journals on banking, finance, economics, and business. The total number of unique 
firms in the original papers is around 60,000 from the US and 161,000 from other regions. 
 We obtain country-level data from external sources, primarily the World Bank 
database. For each sample period of the original study we calculate the average indicator of 
country-level variables in overlapping periods where the country-level data is available. Across 
all country-level variables, on average 11% of observations fall into time periods in which 
country-level series are available but no time overlap exists between the original sample period 
and the available country indicator. In these cases we use the closest available country-year 
observation, majority of which fall within two years of the original sample availability. We 
note that these indicators are persistent and do not have effect on our analysis when we estimate 
the empirical models without the filled data.  
 
2.5 Empirical analysis 
2.5.1 Method 
This study employs meta-analysis as a statistical tool to systematically combine individua l 
results and to quantify differences across the studies. This method has been successfully used 
in medical sciences and finds increasing application in social sciences (e.g., Stanley, 2001). It 
provides tools to correct for statistical artefacts and to obtain an estimate of the true relationship 
between the variables of interest that are not directly comparable in the original studies. 
Furthermore, meta-analysis allows researchers to identify possible determinants of differences 
and to test new theories by exploiting systematic patterns of heterogeneity. Empirical testing 
in meta-analysis consists of 4 main steps: 1) literature search and data collection; 2) 
computation of comparable effect sizes; 3) estimation of the magnitude and the direction of the 
true relationship; and 4) explanation of systematic heterogeneity (if present). The total variance 
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in the observed results is comprised of the true variance across the studies and the sampling 
error. Meta-analytic procedures weight the contribution of each individual result by its 
sampling error and thereby increase the accuracy of the overall estimate of the true relationship. 
Our study employs state-of-the art meta-analytic methods (Borenstein et al., 2009; Lipsey, 
2001). 
 The term “effect” in our analysis refers to the measure of significance, direction, and 
magnitude of a regression coefficient that quantifies the link between one of the relationship 
strength proxies and one of the lending outcome variables shown in Figure 1. We calculate 
three measures (one discrete and two continuous) of effect sizes. The first measure is a discrete 
indicator that classifies reported effects into positive, negative, and nonsignificant ones at the 
10% significance level. The second measure is the one-tail p-value as a continuous 
interpretation of the direction and the significance of an effect size. The values range from zero 
to one where values approaching zero are significantly unfavorable to the borrower, but values 
approaching one are significantly favorable. We confirm that discrete and continuous measures 
are consistently closely related (Spearman’s rank correlation 0.94). The third measure is the 
continuous Fisher’s z-score which is a partial correlation corrected for skewness. This measure 
reports the degree of association between the relationship dimensions and the lending 
outcomes, and accounts for the effect of other explanatory variables included in the origina l 
regression models. We obtain partial correlations from regression statistics using the procedure 
by Greene (2003, Ch. 3). To reduce the effect of potential outliers we winsorize extreme 
observations at the 1 percent and 99 percent quantile. Based on these three measures we obtain 
the information on the relative significance, the direction of the effects, and the magnitude of 
the strength of the association. Because these indicators are unit-free, we can meta-analyze the 
effects in a consistent and comparable way across a heterogeneous set of studies (examples of 
our selected effect size applications in economics are Card et al. (2010) and Koetse et al. 
(2009)). In order to increase the precision of the estimates we follow Bijmolt and Pieters (2001) 
and collect a complete set of effects from all studies in our sample. This means that there are 
multiple observations from each study that are not independent. We account for this 
dependence as described below.  
 To test Hypothesis 1 we estimate the overall effect using the three types of individua l 
effect sizes. First, we report discrete relative frequencies of significantly positive, significantly 
negative, and nonsignificant effects. Next, estimate the continuous pooled meta-analytic effect 
size. We calculate the overall one-tail p-value (Edgington, 1972), and pooled meta-analyt ic 
mean correlations (Borenstein et al., 2009; Hedges and Olkin, 1985; Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). 
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We employ random effects model, which assumes that the true effect varies between the 
studies. This is a common approach in social sciences where studies are typically significantly 
heterogeneous and vary in empirical strategies and samples. Random effects models apply 
weighting scheme based on heterogeneity of precision and heterogeneity of effect sizes. We 
confirm the between-study heterogeneity by Cochran’s Q-test for all relationship-outcome 
combinations. The overall continuous result weights effect sizes by their precision. Namely, 
we weight each input by the inverse of its squared errors and weight the study clusters by 
between-study variance (Hedges and Olkin, 1985). The statistical power of estimating the 
pooled effect, and the confidence in interpreting the overall estimate, is positively related to 
the number of studies and the precision of the individual effect sizes. By combining all of the 
effects (both significant and insignificant), we reduce the probability of a type-II error and 
improve the accuracy of the significance estimation for the overall effect.  
 We test Hypothesis 2 with meta-regressions that allow us to investigate the relationship 
between country characteristics and the reported results in the original studies. We run four 
sets of meta-analytic regressions, in which we introduce country-level variables as the main 
explanatory variables and control for observed differences in study-level characteristics. First, 
we estimate a pooled binary Logit model with dependent variable indicating whether the effect 
is significant at 10% level. This regression includes only significant effects. Second, we 
estimate a random effects Tobit model using all of the results with one-tail p-value as the 
dependent variable. Because multiple observations within a study are not independent, in the 
pooled regression models we use robust standard errors clustered by studies, and in random 
effects models we group observations by studies. Third, we estimate a mixed-effects mult i-
level regression. Using this method, one or more estimated slopes are allowed to vary from 
study to study. This solution is a less restrictive estimation of the aggregate evidence with an 
excess between-study variation. The dependent variable is Fisher’s z-score as the measure of 
the strength of the association between relationship lending and lending terms. Fourth, we 
employ random effects robust variance regressions with estimates of the dependent effect sizes. 
This method is based on Hedges et al. (2010) and provides a robust method for estimating the 
meta-analytic regressions where effect sizes are correlated. Because we include in our analysis 
all reported effects, our methods account for a potential bias arising from correlated estimates 
within the studies.  
 To address systematic pattern of publication-level heterogeneity, we follow Koetse et 
al. (2009) and construct variables for four possible sources of systematic variance, includ ing 
the sources of potential misspecification in the primary studies: data, model specificat ion, 
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estimation method, and publication characteristics. We add controls for each category to all 
meta-regressions. 
 
2.5.2 Direction and significance of the effects 
To assess the direction and significance of relationship benefits, we first estimate the overall 
pooled effect based on all individual effect sizes. Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of the 
continuous one-tail p-values. The effects cluster near zero (adverse effects for the borrower) 
and one (beneficial effects for the borrower), but the frequency is significantly larger near one, 
which indicates that benefits for the borrower prevail. Of the significant effects (i.e., leaving 
the nonsignificant effects aside for a moment), 62% are beneficial for the borrower, while 38% 
are not beneficial for the borrower. This difference is significant at 1% level, which is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1.  
 In the next step we decompose the effects into lending relationship proxies and lending 
outcome proxies. Panel A of Table 2.2 shows the relative frequencies of the effects. Positive 
sign (+) denotes positive and significant regression coefficients, (-) denotes negative and 
significant coefficients. “B” designates cells with significant borrower benefits; “N” is for 
significant borrower “anti-benefits”.  
 We find that longer, exclusive and synergy-creating bank relationships are likely to 
result in higher credit volumes and lower loan rates. Moreover, firms pledge less collateral the 
longer they maintain the relationship. These findings indicate that the benefits of relationship 
lending are of a more general nature since they exist for multiple combinations of lending 
outcomes and relationship strength proxies. For comparison, the empirical study of Petersen 
and Rajan (1994) suggests that strong bank relationships primarily help increase the availability 
of financing to firms but have little impact on the financing costs. The table shows a potential 
hold-up problem whereby higher exclusivity is related to more collateral. This problem means 
that borrowers are either willing to pledge more collateral to an exclusive lender as a signa ling 
device, or lenders accumulate collateral to capture their clients. Close distance is typically 
associated with more soft information production which enables lenders to more accurately 
assess the borrowers as well as the collateral. The effects on distance, however, are mixed and 
based on a relatively small number of studies, which does not allow us to identify a systematic 
pattern.  
 Panel B of Table 2.2 reports the pooled effects on the continuous scale. We find results 
in line with the discrete analysis. The largest likelihood of obtaining lower rates and higher 
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volume is related to borrower’s age and the exclusivity of the relationship (one-tail p-values 
approaching 1). The magnitude of the association ρ reveals a possible trade-off in lending terms 
in exclusive relationships. We observe that reduction in interest rates is 55% greater relative to 
the increase in the collateral, although the increase in credit volume is lower by 40%.  
 Our results suggest that strong bank-borrower relationships are beneficial for the 
borrowers as suggested by Hypothesis 1 but the effects differ across the relationships’ 
dimensions. The relationship benefits mainly stem from repeated interactions over time and 
from cross-selling of multiple financial services from the same lender. These benefits are 
realized mostly through higher credit availability and lower loan rates.  
 
2.5.3 Multivariate analysis of relationship lending benefits for borrowers 
We now test Hypothesis 2 which makes predictions about the impact of country characterist ics 
on the likelihood of beneficial effects for the borrower. Countries and regions exhibit 
substantial variation in the lending environment. Financial systems in continental Europe and 
Japan are bank-based and concentrated. In the US capital markets dominate and the banking 
system is more fragmented, which is reflected by a large number of small banks that provide 
relationship lending to small businesses (Allen and Gale, 2000). We posit that the differences 
in relationship lending benefits for borrowers across countries can be partially explained by 
differences in the structural economic variables. In unreported bivariate analyses we find that 
the borrower benefits are more likely by 33% in countries with competitive banking markets. 
Specifically, when the competition is high, 76% of all effects are beneficial for the borrower. 
For comparison, when the competition is low only, 43% of effects are beneficial. This finding 
is consistent across all relationship dimensions. Figure 2.3 illustrates the link between the 
extent of banking competition and the average relationship benefits per country. We find a 
significantly positive and robust linear relationship between the two variables. A simple 
bivariate cross-sectional OLS regression has a slope coefficient of 0.59 (p-value<0.01 based 
on robust standard errors) and an R2 of 41%. The largest benefits accrue to borrowers in the 
US, Argentina, and Taiwan where the bank competition is highest. The smallest borrower 
benefits are observed in Europe, especially in countries with low levels of bank competition.  
 We proceed with multivariate meta-regressions in Table 2.3. Model (1) reports results 
with simple region effects. The purpose of this analysis is to capture the aggregate unobserved 
heterogeneity across the regions. We find that the relationship lending benefits for borrowers 
are stronger in the US compared to Europe, Asia and Latin America. The contrast is largest for 
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Japan. This result does not indicate that relationship lending is less prevalent in these regions, 
but that the benefits for borrowers are, ceteris paribus, lower in these regions. As illustrated in 
Figure 3, this is likely due to higher bank competition in the US, especially for small businesses. 
Moreover, lending to small businesses in the US comes from a large number of community 
banks, relatively small commercial banks, and credit unions with the mandate to serve local 
businesses and/or their members. 
 In Models (2) – (5) we explain the results of the studies with country-level variables 
(Hypothesis 2). The meta-regressions confirm the strong positive relation between bank 
competition and benefits (consistent with Hypothesis 2a). The coefficient is strongest both in 
magnitude and significance across all specifications. This finding is in line with the argument 
that banks use relationships to retain customers in the face of competition from other banks 
(e.g., Boot and Thakor, 2000; Degryse and Ongena, 2005). Banks exert effort in borrower-
specific and/or industry-specific information production and reward their relationship 
borrowers with more credit and/or better lending terms to prevent them from switching to 
competitors. Our result is also consistent with the evidence provided by Black and Strahan 
(2002) who document the impact of policy changes fostering competition in the US banking 
sector on new incorporations and entrepreneurial activity. At a first glance, this finding seems 
to contradict studies that show that borrowers can benefit from limited competition by having 
exclusive bank relationships (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994). However, we believe that there 
is no contradiction since we measure competition at the level of a country’s banking system in 
cross-country context (and we later show that this effect remains robust if we use alternative 
measures) but not at the individual firm level. In our test of Hypothesis 1 we have already 
shown that more exclusive bank relationships exhibit lower loan rates and a higher credit 
volume. We argue that a firm can maintain a value-creating exclusive relationship with a lender 
in a country with high bank competition. The meta-regression results on competition indicate 
a monotonic positive relationship, while single-country studies have found u-shaped effects of 
local or national competition on relationship lending (e.g., Elsas, 2005; Degryse and Ongena, 
2008; Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2011). We believe that both effects may coexist and can be 
reconciled – but at different levels of aggregation. 
 We also find that the borrowers in bank-based economies are less likely to obtain 
relationship benefits (not consistent with Hypothesis 2b). The magnitude of the effect is 
approximately half the size of the bank competition. This suggests that banks’ advantages from 
deposit funding liquidity do not necessarily translate into borrower benefits as hypothesized. 
This finding hints at the possibility that larger capital markets (lower bank orientation) exert 
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competitive pressure on the banks to maintain relatively larger borrower benefits. A related 
hypothesis concerns the importance of SMEs in the economy, considered as lower bound proxy 
for the prevalence of relationship lending in the country (Hypothesis 2c). We do not find a 
significant relationship between the SME employment and the benefits. The two findings lead 
to a surprising implication that both the bank orientation of the economy and the prevalence of 
relationship lending do not come along with relationship lending benefits for borrowers.  
 The rest of the lending environment characteristics are not significantly related to the 
relationship benefits. Specifically, we do not find evidence that relationship benefits for 
borrowers consistently differ in developing countries (Hypothesis 2d), in countries with more 
developed legal systems, higher level of corruption, or in inflationary environment (Hypotheses 
2e, 2f, 2g). Furthermore, we do not find that a higher level of aggregate bank cost-efficiency is 
related to relationship lending benefits for borrowers (Hypothesis 2h).  
 While Models (1) and (2) of Table 2.3 are based on Logit analysis that considers only 
the significant effects, we include both significant and insignificant effects in the subsequent 
analyses. Considering all effects increases the number of observations in meta-regressions and 
allows us to meta-analyze the effects with continuous measures. The results remain robust 
when we repeat the analysis using a Tobit estimator with random effects (Model 3), mixed -
effects meta-regression (Model 4), and robust variance meta-regression (Model 5).  
 All of the models include controls to capture publication- level heterogeneity. The 
coefficient of the indicator variable for published studies is negative across all models. Taking 
into account the between-study variance in the random effects and mixed-effects model, the 
coefficient becomes significant. This finding implies that published studies are less likely to 
report beneficial relationship lending effects. We recognize that loan terms might be 
determined simultaneously but evidence on this issue is mixed and difficult to interpret 
economically (e.g., Brick and Palia, 2007; Dennis et al., 2000). However, some studies show 
that in banking practice the loan terms are determined sequentially (Bharath et al., 2011; 
Kirschenmann and Norden, 2012; Standard & Poor’s, 2011). The loan purpose determines the 
amount and maturity, then bank and borrower agree on the collateral to be pledged, and fina lly 
the loan spread is set, considering the borrower risk and all other loan terms. We take possible 
interaction and the endogeneity of the loan terms into account by categorizing and controlling 
for the estimation methods used in the original studies to address the potential endogeneity 
problem.  
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 A potential concern is that our dependent variable, the relationship lending benefits for 
borrowers, and two explanatory variables, bank deposits / GDP as well as bank competition, 
are determined endogenously. First, bank deposits / GDP might be endogenous because banks 
exploit funding and/or informational synergies between deposit taking and lending (e.g., Berlin 
and Mester, 1999; Norden and Weber 2010). This occurs because banks can use inelasticity in 
deposit taking and provide relationship borrowers with loan rate-smoothing. The endogeneity 
of this measure, however, is not warranted because the use of particular lending technologies 
is not necessarily related to the volume of deposit taking (e.g., Acharya et al., 2006). Second, 
bank competition and relationship benefits may be driven by the same unobserved underlying 
information and market frictions. Third, there might be a reverse causality between relationship 
benefits and bank competition. Banks invest in acquisition of proprietary information with 
expectations of internalizing the relationship benefits. Greater benefits captured by the bank 
thus attract more competition. In the presence of more competition it is easier for borrowers to 
switch lenders, which in turn leads to declining incentive for lenders to collect costly 
proprietary information.  
 We address this potential endogeneity by estimating instrumental variable regressions 
in which we use as instruments country’s legal origin and latitude. Legal origin shapes the 
structure of financial markets and exerts long-term influence on the real economy, includ ing 
the degree of competition in financial markets (e.g., Beck et al., 2005; La Porta et al., 1998). 
Since legal origin is a historical heritage, it is exogenous relative to the outcomes of modern 
relationship lending. The second instrument is country’s absolute latitude as a proxy for 
geographic location. Several studies show that geographical endowments affect the structure 
and the development of economies and their institutions (La Porta et al., 1999). Legal origin 
and latitude provide countries with legal framework and resource endowments that determine 
the economic, financial, and institutional development, but affect the outcomes of the 
relationship lending only indirectly. Table 2.4 presents the results.  
 We find that the positive effect of bank competition holds robustly across all three 
specifications. The estimated coefficient of bank deposits / GDP is negative but not significant. 
Although in this case we cannot reject the null hypothesis in the IV setting, this finding supports 
the previous result that the bank-based systems (and higher SME lending) is not associated 
with outright benefits. In sum, the IV models confirm that more competitive banking markets 
are ceteris paribus associated with higher likelihood of beneficial relationship lending 
outcomes for borrowers after accounting for the potential endogeneity of bank competition.  
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2.5.4 Further empirical analyses 
The following analysis differentiates the lending outcomes by lending terms (except for loan 
maturity due to a relatively low number of observations for this term). Table 2.5 reports the 
results.  
 As shown in Models (1) – (3), borrowers in the US generally reap higher benefits across 
the loan terms compared to the other regions. While relationship borrowers in Europe tend to 
pay higher interest rates, borrowers in Japan pledge more collateral. In both regions, the 
borrowers are likely to obtain less credit relative to the US. Models (4) – (6) show that 
relationship lenders in competitive banking markets are more likely to compete on lower 
interest rates and higher credit volume. We do not find evidence that relationship lenders 
require less collateral when the bank competition is high or in countries with more soft 
information production in SME lending. Conversely, more collateral is required in bank-based 
and developed economies.  
 In another test we examine a possible ambiguity in the overall direction of the 
relationship benefits. The overall beneficial effect might be due to the straight benefits for the 
borrower, or due to the absence of “anti-benefits” that have adverse effect on the borrower. To 
investigate this issue, we follow the studies by Card et al. (2010) and Koetse et al. (2009) and 
estimate multinomial Logit with three-outcome variable as the dependent variable: one (the 
relationship effect is significant and beneficial for the borrower), zero (the relationship effect 
is nonsignificant), and minus one (the relationship effect is significant and unfavorable for the 
borrower). The results are reported in Table 2.6. Bank competition is directly related to 
beneficial outcomes of lending relationships. There is no evidence of adverse effects of bank 
competition. In contrast, bank orientation is positively related to unfavorable outcomes for the 
borrower. This analysis confirms our earlier findings and supports the interpretation that the 
effect of bank competition is driven by its direct association with positive borrower benefits, 
as shown in Figure 2.3. 
 To examine the robustness of our results we run a random sample analysis and derive 
bootstrapped estimates from our meta-analysis. We generate a random-draw sample with 
replacement of size N equal to the sample size, stratified at the study level. We repeat the 
resampling 200 times and estimate the coefficients and significance for each random sample 
with the pooled Logit model. We plot the distribution of the resulting coefficients and the p-
values in Figure 2.4. The results of the bootstrapping analysis confirm our original findings 
and document robustness of the effect of bank competition and bank system development, both 
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in terms of the size of the coefficient and its significance. In line with the earlier results, the 
other coefficients cluster around zero with wide significance intervals.  
 We conduct several additional tests to further study the robustness of our results and 
their sensitivity to variable definitions, methods, underlying structural forms, sample selection 
and time variance. The results of these additional tests are reported in the online appendix.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we conduct a meta-analysis to summarize and explain the heterogeneity of the 
results in the literature on relationship lending in a cross-country context. We find that strong 
relationships are generally beneficial for the borrowers, but the lending outcomes differ across 
the relationship dimensions. The dimensions time, exclusivity, and cross-product synergies are 
associated with lower loan rates and higher credit volume. However, borrowers with exclusive 
relationships are likely to post more collateral and those in close physical proximity to their 
lenders pay higher rates. Our results indicate that the beneficial effects of relationship lending 
go beyond an improvement in credit availability to firms as suggested by Petersen and Rajan 
(1994), and that banks trade-off the costs and benefits across different relationship dimens ions 
and lending terms.  
 The meta-regressions show that the likelihood of borrower benefits has a significant 
relation to the structure of the banking markets. The benefits of relationship lending for the 
borrowers are more likely when bank competition is high. We document a strong and positive 
monotonic link between bank competition and relationship lending benefits for borrowers. We 
further find that the benefits for the borrowers are more likely in the US compared to the other 
regions. The prevalence of relationship lending, as found in the bank-based financial systems 
in Europe and Japan with a large fraction of SME borrowers, does not necessarily come along 
with benefits for these borrowers.  
 We note that the inferences of the meta-analysis depend on the inputs from the origina l 
studies. Systematic heterogeneity in the original studies might create biases in the overall meta-
analytic estimates and meta-regressions. We address this point in three ways. First, we weight 
individual effects by precision in order to reduce the impact of misspecified studies. Second, 
in all models we account for possible sources of observed systematic heterogeneity. These 
sources are related to data, methods, model specifications, and publication characterist ics. 
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Third, we perform a random sample analysis using bootstrapping technique, which confirms 
the robustness of our original estimates.  
 Our meta-analysis represents the first attempt to provide a systematic and quantitat ive 
assessment of the evidence on relationship lending in a cross-country context. Our findings 
also point at several interesting avenues for future research. For example, we do not yet fully 
understand the role of supply and demand, including the impact of bargaining power on 
outcomes of bank-firm relationships. Therefore, to assess the overall value of relationship 
lending, it is important to understand the conditions under which relationship lending emerges 
along with the benefits for the lenders and/or the borrowers. Moreover, the occurrence of 
financial crises gives rise to the question whether and how relationship lending amplifies or 
alleviates the transmission of shocks to banks on individual firms (and vice versa) and how this 
mechanism varies between countries. 
 
40_Erim Vlado BW stand.job
 2
. 7
 A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
 
T
a
b
le
 A
2
.1
 S
tu
d
ie
s in
clu
d
e
d
 in
 th
e
 m
e
ta
-a
n
a
lysis 
Id
 
A
u
th
o
r(s) 
T
itle 
Y
ear 
P
u
b
licatio
n 
#
 effects 
#
 o
b
s. 
1
 
A
garw
al, R
., an
d
 J. A
. E
lsto
n 
B
an
k
–
firm
 relatio
nship
s, fin
an
cin
g an
d
 firm
 p
erform
an
ce in
 G
erm
any
 
2
0
0
1
 
E
co
n
o
m
ics L
etters 
5
 
N
A
 
2
 
A
garw
al, S
., an
d
 R
. H
au
sw
ald 
T
h
e C
h
o
ice b
etw
een A
rm
's-L
en
gth an
d
 In
side D
eb
t 
2
0
0
9
 
 
3
9
 
3
3
,8
5
5
 
3
 
A
garw
al, S
., an
d
 R
. H
au
sw
ald 
D
istan
ce an
d
 p
riv
ate in
fo
rm
atio
n
 in
 len
din
g 
2
0
1
0
 
R
ev
iew
 o
f F
in
an
cial S
tud
ies 
8
4
 
2
5
,4
8
7
 
4
 
A
lem
, M
. 
In
su
ran
ce m
o
tiv
es in
 len
d
ing relation
sh
ip
s: E
v
iden
ce fro
m
 A
rgen
tin
a 
2
0
0
3
 
 
9
 
6
4
9
 
5
 
A
lessan
d
rin
i, P
., A
. F
. P
resb
itero
, an
d
 A
. 
Z
az
z
aro
 
B
an
k
s, d
istances an
d firm
s' fin
ancin
g co
n
straints 
2
0
0
9
 
R
ev
iew
 o
f F
in
an
ce 
1
2
0
 
7
,8
4
4
 
6
 
A
lessan
d
rin
i, P
., A
. F
. P
resb
itero
, an
d
 A
. 
Z
az
z
aro
 
G
lo
b
al b
an
k
in
g an
d
 lo
cal m
ark
ets: A
 n
atio
nal p
ersp
ectiv
e 
2
0
0
9
 
C
am
b
rid
ge Jo
u
rn
al o
f R
egio
n
s, E
co
n
o
m
y
 
an
d
 S
o
ciety
 
6
 
7
,8
4
4
 
7
 
A
n
gelin
i, P
., R
. D
i S
alv
o
, an
d G
. F
erri 
A
v
ailab
ility
 an
d co
st o
f cred
it fo
r sm
all b
u
sin
esses: C
u
sto
m
er relatio
nship
s 
an
d
 cred
it co
o
p
erativ
es 
1
9
9
8
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f B
an
k
ing an
d
 F
in
an
ce 
5
0
 
2
,2
3
2
 
8
 
B
eb
cz
u
k
, R
. N
. 
W
h
at d
eterm
ines th
e access to
 credit b
y
 S
M
E
s in
 A
rgen
tin
a? 
2
0
0
4
 
 
6
 
1
3
9
 
9
 
B
ecch
etti, L
., an
d
 M
. M
. G
arcia 
In
fo
rm
al co
llateral an
d
 d
efau
lt risk
: d
o
 G
ram
een-lik
e b
an
k
s w
o
rk
 in
 h
igh
-
in
co
m
e co
u
n
tries? 
2
0
1
1
 
A
p
p
lied
 F
inan
cial E
co
no
m
ics 
3
 
1
,0
0
9
 
1
0
 
B
erger, A
. N
., R
. J. R
o
sen, an
d
 G
. F
. U
d
ell 
D
o
es m
ark
et size structu
re affect co
m
p
etitio
n? T
he case o
f sm
all b
u
sin
ess 
len
d
in
g 
2
0
0
7
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f B
an
k
ing an
d
 F
in
an
ce 
3
 
5
2
0
 
1
1
 
B
erger, A
. N
., an
d
 G
. F
. U
d
ell 
R
elatio
n
ship
 len
d
in
g an
d
 lin
es o
f credit in
 sm
all firm
 fin
an
ce 
1
9
9
5
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f B
u
sin
ess 
1
8
 
8
6
3
 
1
2
 
B
erger, A
. N
., N
. N
. M
iller, M
. A
. P
etersen, 
R
. M
. R
ajan
, an
d
 J. C
. S
tein 
D
o
es fu
n
ctio
n fo
llo
w
 o
rgan
ization
al form
? E
v
id
ence from
 th
e len
d
in
g 
p
ractices o
f large an
d
 sm
all b
an
ks 
2
0
0
5
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f F
in
ancial E
co
n
om
ics 
6
 
5
4
6
 
1
3
 
B
erger, A
. N
., S
. W
. F
ram
e, an
d
 V
. 
Io
an
n
id
o
u
 
T
ests o
f ex an
te v
ersu
s ex p
o
st theo
ries o
f co
llateral u
sin
g p
riv
ate an
d 
p
u
b
lic in
fo
rm
atio
n 
2
0
1
1
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f F
in
ancial E
co
n
om
ics 
6
 
3
2
,2
8
6
 
1
4
 
B
h
arath
, S
., S
. D
ah
iy
a, A
. S
au
n
d
ers, an
d
 A
. 
S
rin
iv
asan
 
L
en
d
in
g relatio
n
ship
s an
d
 lo
an co
n
tract term
s 
2
0
1
1
 
R
ev
iew
 o
f F
in
an
cial S
tud
ies 
6
3
 
1
5
,6
3
6
 
1
5
 
B
lack
w
ell, D
. W
., an
d
 D
. B
. W
in
ters 
B
an
k
in
g relatio
n
sh
ip
s an
d th
e effect o
f m
o
n
ito
ring o
n
 lo
an
 p
ricing 
1
9
9
7
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f F
in
ancial R
esearch 
1
0
 
1
7
4
 
1
6
 
B
o
n
fim
, D
., an
d
 Q
. D
ai 
T
h
e n
u
m
b
er o
f b
an
k relatio
n
ship
s, b
o
rrow
ing co
sts an
d
 b
an
k
 co
m
p
etition
 
2
0
0
9
 
 
8
3
 
3
8
,7
6
4
 
1
7
 
B
o
n
gin
i, P
., M
. L
. D
i B
attista, an
d E
. 
Z
av
arro
n
e 
T
h
e v
alu
e o
f relation
sh
ip
 len
d
in
g: S
m
all b
an
k
s in
 an
 era o
f co
n
so
lid
atio
n
 
2
0
0
7
 
E
co
n
o
m
ic N
o
tes 
5
 
1
9
5
 
1
8
 
B
o
p
aiah
, C
. 
A
v
ailab
ility
 o
f cred
it to
 fam
ily
 b
usinesses 
1
9
9
8
 
S
m
all B
u
sin
ess E
co
n
om
ics 
7
 
1
,5
0
0
 
1
9
 
B
rick
, I. E
., an
d
 D
. P
alia 
E
v
id
en
ce o
f jo
in
tness in
 the term
s o
f relatio
nship
 len
din
g 
2
0
0
7
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f F
in
ancial In
term
ed
iatio
n
 
3
9
 
7
6
6
 
2
0
 
C
alo
m
iris, C
., an
d
 T
. P
ornro
jn
an
gk
oo
l 
R
elatio
n
ship
 B
an
kin
g an
d
 the p
ricing o
f fin
an
cial serv
ices 
2
0
0
9
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f F
in
ancial S
erv
ices R
esearch 
9
6
 
1
4
,4
3
9
 
2
1
 
C
astelli, A
., G
erald
 P
. D
. Jr., an
d I. H
asan
 
B
an
k
 relatio
n
sh
ip
s an
d
 sm
all firm
s’ fin
an
cial p
erform
ance 
2
0
0
6
 
 
1
2
 
9
,9
9
6
 
2
2
 
C
av
allu
z
zo
, K
. S
., L
. C
. C
av
alluzzo
, an
d
 J. 
D
. W
o
lk
en
 
C
o
m
p
etitio
n
, sm
all b
u
siness fin
ancin
g, an
d
 d
iscrim
in
ation
: E
v
id
en
ce from
 
a n
ew
 su
rv
ey
 
2
0
0
2
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f B
u
sin
ess 
1
6
 
2
,6
0
9
 
2
3
 
C
erq
u
eiro
, G
., H
. D
egry
se, an
d
 S
. O
n
gen
a 
R
u
les v
ersu
s d
iscretio
n in
 lo
an
 rate setting 
2
0
1
1
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f F
in
ancial In
term
ed
iatio
n
 
2
2
 
3
,9
0
1
 
2
4
 
C
h
ak
rab
o
rty
, A
., an
d
 C
. X
. H
u
 
L
en
d
in
g relatio
n
ship
s in
 lin
e-of-cred
it an
d
 n
o
n
lin
e-of-credit lo
an
s: 
E
v
id
en
ce fro
m
 co
llateral u
se in
 sm
all b
u
sin
ess 
2
0
0
6
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f F
in
ancial In
term
ed
iatio
n
 
2
8
 
1
,6
3
2
 
2
5
 
C
h
ak
rab
o
rty
, A
., an
d
 R
. M
allick
 
C
red
it gap
 in
 sm
all b
u
sin
esses: S
o
m
e n
ew
 ev
id
ence 
2
0
1
2
 
In
tern
atio
nal Jo
urnal o
f B
u
sin
ess 
1
1
 
4
,3
4
8
 
 
 
41_Erim Vlado BW stand.job
 T
a
b
le
 A
2
.1
 (continued) 
Id
 
A
u
th
o
r(s) 
T
itle 
Y
ear 
P
u
b
licatio
n 
#
 effects 
#
 o
b
s. 
2
6
 
C
o
le, R
. A
. 
T
h
e im
p
o
rtance o
f relation
sh
ip
s to
 th
e av
ailability
 o
f cred
it 
1
9
9
8
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f B
an
k
ing an
d
 F
in
an
ce 
5
0
 
2
,0
0
7
 
2
7
 
C
o
le, R
. A
., L
. G
. G
o
ldb
erg, an
d
 L
. J. W
h
ite 
C
o
o
k
ie cu
tter v
s. ch
aracter: T
h
e m
icro structu
re o
f sm
all b
u
siness len
d
ing 
b
y
 large an
d
 sm
all b
an
k
s 
2
0
0
4
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f F
in
ancial an
d
 Q
uan
titativ
e 
A
n
aly
sis 
4
8
 
1
,1
0
2
 
2
8
 
C
o
lem
an
, A
. D
.F
., N
. E
sho
, an
d I. G
. S
h
arp
e 
D
o
es b
an
k
 m
o
n
ito
rin
g in
flu
ence lo
an
 co
ntract term
s? 
2
0
0
6
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f F
in
ancial an
d
 Q
uan
titativ
e 
A
n
aly
sis 
8
 
3
,6
9
4
 
2
9
 
C
o
sci, S
., an
d
 V
. M
eliciani 
M
u
ltip
le b
an
kin
g relatio
n
sh
ip
s: E
v
id
en
ce fro
m
 th
e Italian exp
erien
ce 
2
0
0
2
 
M
an
ch
ester S
ch
o
o
l S
u
p
plem
en
t 
3
 
3
9
3
 
3
0
 
C
o
w
lin
g, M
. 
T
h
e in
cid
en
ce o
f lo
an
 co
llateralization
 in
 sm
all b
u
siness len
d
ing 
co
n
tracts: E
v
iden
ce from
 the U
K
 
1
9
9
9
 
A
p
p
lied
 E
co
n
om
ics L
etters 
2
 
2
7
2
 
3
1
 
D
'A
u
ria, C
., A
. F
oglia, an
d
 P
. M
. R
eed
tz 
B
an
k
 in
terest rates an
d cred
it relation
sh
ip
s in
 Italy
 
1
9
9
9
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f B
an
k
ing an
d
 F
in
an
ce 
4
 
1
2
0
,0
0
0
 
3
2
 
D
e B
o
d
t, E
., F
. L
o
b
ez, an
d J. S
tatn
ik
 
C
red
it ration
ing, cu
stom
er relation
sh
ip
 an
d
 the n
u
m
b
er o
f b
an
ks: A
n
 
em
p
irical an
aly
sis 
2
0
0
5
 
E
u
ro
p
ean
 F
inan
cial M
an
agem
en
t 
3
3
 
2
9
6
 
3
3
 
D
egry
se, H
., an
d
 S
. O
n
gen
a 
D
istan
ce, len
d
in
g relatio
nship
s, an
d co
m
p
etition
 
2
0
0
5
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f F
in
ance 
7
1
 
1
5
,0
44
 
3
4
 
D
egry
se, H
. an
d
 P
. V
an
 C
ay
seele 
R
elatio
n
ship
 len
d
in
g w
ith
in
 a b
an
k-b
ased sy
stem
: E
v
id
en
ce from
 
E
u
ro
p
ean
 sm
all b
u
sin
ess d
ata 
2
0
0
0
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f F
in
ancial In
term
ed
iatio
n
 
2
4
 
1
7
,4
29
 
3
5
 
D
en
g, Y
., M
. H
u
, an
d A
. S
rin
ivasan 
H
o
ld
-u
p
 v
ersu
s b
en
efits in
 relatio
n
sh
ip
 b
an
kin
g: A
 n
atu
ral exp
erim
ent 
u
sin
g R
E
IT
 o
rgan
izatio
nal fo
rm
 
2
0
1
1
 
 
3
2
 
1
,4
0
4
 
3
6
 
D
en
n
is, S
., D
. N
andy
, an
d
 I. G
. S
h
arp
e 
T
h
e d
eterm
in
an
ts o
f co
n
tract term
s in
 b
an
k
 rev
olv
ing cred
it agreem
en
ts 
2
0
0
0
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f F
in
ancial an
d
 Q
uan
titativ
e 
A
n
aly
sis 
6
 
2
,6
3
4
 
3
7
 
E
lsas, R
., an
d
 J. P
. K
rah
n
en 
Is relatio
n
sh
ip
 len
d
in
g sp
ecial? E
v
id
ence fro
m
 credit-file d
ata in
 G
erm
any
 
1
9
9
8
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f B
an
k
ing an
d
 F
in
an
ce 
1
2
 
1
,0
7
9
 
3
8
 
E
w
ert, R
., G
. S
ch
en
k
, an
d
 A
. S
zczesn
y
 
D
eterm
in
an
ts o
f b
ank
 len
d
ing p
erfo
rm
an
ce in
 G
erm
any
 
2
0
0
0
 
S
ch
m
alen
b
ach
 B
u
sin
ess R
ev
iew
 
1
0
 
6
8
2
 
3
9
 
F
ern
an
d
o
, C
., an
d
 A
. C
h
ak
rab
orty
 
T
h
e im
p
o
rtance o
f b
ein
g k
n
o
w
n: R
elatio
nship
 b
an
kin
g an
d
 cred
it lim
its 
2
0
1
0
 
Q
u
arterly
 Jo
urn
al o
f F
in
ance an
d
 
A
cco
u
n
ting 
2
1
 
2
2
6
 
4
0
 
F
erri, G
., an
d
 M
. M
essori 
B
an
k
-firm
 relatio
nship
s an
d
 allo
cative efficiency
 in
 n
o
rth
eastern
 an
d
 
cen
tral Italy
 an
d
 in
 the so
uth
 
2
0
0
0
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f B
an
k
ing an
d
 F
in
an
ce 
1
8
 
3
3
,8
08
 
4
1
 
F
erri, G
., T
. S
. K
an
g, an
d
 I.-J. K
im
 
T
h
e v
alu
e o
f relation
sh
ip
 b
an
k
ing d
u
rin
g fin
an
cial crises: E
v
id
en
ce from
 
th
e R
ep
u
blic o
f K
orea 
2
0
0
1
 
 
6
 
6
,9
3
6
 
4
2
 
F
raser, D
. R
., S
. G
h
o
n R
h
ee, an
d G
. H
w
an S
h
in
 
T
h
e im
p
act o
f cap
ital m
ark
et co
m
p
etition
 o
n
 relation
sh
ip
 b
an
k
ing: 
E
v
id
en
ce fro
m
 th
e Jap
an
ese exp
erien
ce 
2
0
1
2
 
Jo
u
rn
al o
f E
m
p
irical F
in
an
ce 
1
3
 
1
1
,7
80
 
4
3
 
F
red
rik
sso
n, A
. 
T
h
e effect o
f relation
sh
ip
 in
ten
sity
 o
n lo
an
 p
ricing 
2
0
0
7
 
 
9
 
5
9
9
 
4
4
 
G
am
a, A
. P
. M
., an
d F
. D
uarte 
T
h
e ro
le o
f co
llateral an
d
 relation
sh
ip
 len
d
in
g in
 lo
an
 p
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m
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f b
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d
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p
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 o
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b
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g m
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 d
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g d
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 d
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, C
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f co
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in
ancial E
co
n
om
ics 
1
8
 
4
2
6
,1
1
2
 
5
7
 
Jim
én
ez
, G
., V
. S
alas, an
d
 J. S
au
rin
a 
O
rgan
iz
ation
al d
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ev
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 o
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, b
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, b
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 b
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 b
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 b
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 D
. N
eub
erger 
D
o
 len
d
in
g relatio
n
sh
ip
s m
atter? E
v
id
ence fro
m
 b
ank
 surv
ey
 d
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rgan
iz
ation
 
4
5
 
3
8
9
 
6
3
 
L
eh
m
an
n
, E
., D
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 m
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f b
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 D
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d m
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b
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 p
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b
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 m
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f p
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 b
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d
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 d
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 m
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 p
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n p
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b
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e o
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 b
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e b
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 b
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d
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 b
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 C
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 b
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 o
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. D
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s b
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d p
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, D
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m
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 b
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 p
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2.8 Figures 
 
Figure 2.1 Dimensions of the strength of lending relationships and their lending outcomes  
This figure displays the multi-dimensional conceptual framework. The effects of relationship lending are represented by the 
impact of the four dimensions of the strength of bank-borrower relationships on their lending outcomes shown in the center of 
the figure. 
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Figure 2.2 Distribution of the one-tail p-values 
This figure shows the frequency distribution of one-tail p-values from all selected studies. Values approaching zero represent 
results with significantly adverse effects for borrowers at the 10% level; values approaching one represent results with 
significantly beneficial effects for borrowers at the 10% level. Values in the range of 0.05-0.95 indicate results for the borrower 
benefits that are not significant at the 10% level. The distribution is based on the total number of 2,979 observations. 
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Figure 2.3 Relationship lending benefits and bank competition 
This figure shows the means of bank competition (0=perfect monopoly; 1=perfect competition) and borrower benefits 
measured by one-tail p-values (0=significant adverse effect for the borrower; 1=significant beneficial effect for the borrower). 
The means are calculated as equal-weighted averages of observations per country over the sample period within each study. 
Effect sizes from multi-country studies are excluded. Countries: ARG=Argentina, BEL=Belgium, BOL=Bolivia, CHL=Chile, 
GER=Germany, ESP=Spain, FIN=Finland, FRA=France, ITA=Italy, JPN=Japan, KOR=South Korea, PRT=Portugal, 
THA=Thailand, TWN=Taiwan, UK=United Kingdom, US=United States. 
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Bootstrapped coefficients 
 
Bootstrapped p-values 
 
Figure 2.4 Box plots of bootstrapped coefficients and p-values 
This figure reports bootstrapped coefficients and corresponding p-values using pooled Logit model where the dependent 
variable is a binary indicator of significance, which takes value of 1 if the effect  is significant and beneficial for the borrower, 
and value of 0 if the effect is significant and unfavorable for the borrower. The bootstrapping is based on a random sample 
generation with replacement using the full sample of all effect sizes (2,979) and 200 repetitions. 
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Table 2.2 Pooled effect sizes – discrete and continuous effects 
Panel A shows the number and the direction of the effect sizes. In each combination of the relationship’s strength and lending 
outcome, (+) denotes positive and significant regression coefficients, (-) denotes negative and significant coefficients, and (ns) 
denotes coefficients that are not statistically significant in the original studies at the 10% level. *, **, *** indicate significance 
according to a two-tail binomial sign test at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The sign test is estimated for pairs of 
relationship lending strength-outcome where the number of observations is greater than 30, otherwise we fill the significance 
cell with ‘---‘. Indicator “B” denotes significant pooled effects that are beneficial to the borrower; “N” denotes significant  
pooled effects that are not beneficial to the borrower, both at 10% level. Panel B reports the estimates of the overall continuous 
effects per combination of relationship lending dimension and the lending outcome. The pooled estimate of the overall one-
tail p-value (p) is calculated using Edgington's normal curve method, based on the contrast of the p-value average (Edgington, 
1972). Values range from 0 (adverse effect for the borrower) to 1 (beneficial effect for the borrower). One-tail p-value is a 
significance indicator by design, stars next to the one-tail p-value are added for visual purposes. The overall correlations (ρ) 
are meta-analytic pooled estimates of random-effects mean correlations (Borenstein et al. 2009, Lipsey and Wilson 2001). The 
ρ estimate is based on partial correlations, which are obtained from the t-values of the regression coefficients according to 
Greene (2003, Chapter 3). “#” is the total number of studies that contain at least one effect size for the combination of the 
relationship lending dimension and a lending outcome. The overall one-tail p-values and ρ are derived from the first 
occurrences of an effect size per each relationship-outcome combination per each study (no interdependent effect sizes within 
a study). Star indicators next to ρ correspond to the null test that the true pooled effect ρ is zero, where the number of studies 
is greater than 2, otherwise we fill the significance cell with ‘---‘. In Panel B, we report indicator “B” or “N” if either the 
overall pooled one-tail p-value or pooled ρ are significant at 10% level. Cochran’s Q value is significant at 1% for all 
combinations of the relationship lending dimension and a lending outcome (where the number of studies is at least 5). Variables  
are defined in Table A2.2 of the appendix. 
 
Panel A: Discrete effects 
      Relationship lending outcomes 
Strength of  
relationship lending  
Coeff 
sign 
RATE VOL COLL MAT 
T
IM
E
 
TIME - DURATION 
+ 67 
** 
B 76 
*** 
B 17 
** 
B 2 
--- - 101  27  33  11 
ns 114   56   58   10 
TIME - AGE 
+ 17 
*** 
B 74 
*** 
B 17 
  
    
--- - 48  20  21    
ns 135   93   37   13 
TIME - OTHER 
+ 7 
 
 31 
 
   
--- 
 7 
 - 14  20  6    
ns 39   36   3   1 
E
X
C
L
 
EXCLUSIVITY 
+ 137 
*** 
B 132 
** 
B 46 
*** 
N   
--- - 225  99  22  2 
ns 188   177   49   9 
C
R
O
S
S
 
P
R
O
D
 
CROSS-PRODUCT 
SYNERGIES 
+ 4 
*** 
B 74 
*** 
B 9 
  
  4 
--- - 114  15  12    
ns 86   61   17   11 
D
IS
T
A
N
C
E
 
DISTANCE - 
PHYSICAL 
+ 5 
*** 
N 29 
  
    
--- 
    
--- - 29  21       
ns 27   44       5 
DISTANCE - 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
+ 1 
--- 
  31 
** 
N 2 
--- 
    
  - 1  14  9    
ns 4   22   1     
DISTANCE - 
PERSONAL 
+   
--- 
 7 
--- 
   
--- 
   
 - 4          
ns 1   2         
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Panel B: Continuous effects   
      Relationship lending outcomes   
Strength of relationship lending  RATE VOL COLL MAT 
T
IM
E
 
TIME - DURATION 
p 0.20     0.98 ** B 0.45     0.18  
ρ 0.007   0.024 ***  0.000   0.026  
#  43     31     27     3   
TIME - AGE 
p 1.00 *** B 0.99 *** B 1.00 *** B 0.77  
ρ -0.020   0.019 ***  -0.018 **  0.020  
#  29     31     18     2   
TIME - OTHER 
p 0.87   0.85   0.99 *** B 0.95  
ρ -0.020   0.055   -0.082 *  0.031 --- 
#  3   4   2   1   
E
X
C
L
 
EXCLUSIVITY 
p 1.00 *** B 1.00 ***  B 0.02 ** N 0.12  
ρ -0.031 ***  0.012   0.020 **  -0.022  
#  46     40     24     2   
C
R
O
S
S
 
P
R
O
D
 
CROSS-PRODUCT 
SYNERGIES 
p 0.91 * B 0.88   0.57   0.59  
ρ -0.024 **  0.009   -0.015   0.041  
#  18   15   6   2   
D
IS
T
A
N
C
E
 
DISTANCE - 
PHYSICAL 
p 0.42     0.94 * B        0.72  
ρ -0.007   -0.107       -0.014 --- 
#  7     11           1   
DISTANCE - 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
p 0.50   0.96 ** B 0.00      
ρ 0.031   -0.073 *  -0.031      
#  4     6     4         
DISTANCE - 
PERSONAL 
p 0.01 *** N 0.01 *** N        
ρ -0.045 ***  0.043 ***         
#  3     2               
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T
a
b
le
 2
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 In
s
tru
m
e
n
ta
l v
a
ria
b
le
 re
g
re
ssio
n
s 
T
h
is tab
le co
n
tain
s estim
ates fo
r th
e p
ro
b
ab
ility
 o
f o
b
serv
in
g relatio
n
sh
ip
 len
d
in
g b
en
efits fo
r b
o
rro
w
ers u
sin
g th
e in
stru
m
e
n
tal v
ariab
le regressio
n
s. In
stru
m
en
ted
 v
ariab
les are B
an
k
 d
ep
o
sits / 
G
D
P
 an
d
 B
an
k
 co
m
p
etitio
n
; in
stru
m
en
ts are legal 
o
rigin
 an
d
 latitu
d
e. M
o
d
el (1
) rep
o
rts tw
o
-step
 IV
 p
ro
b
it w
ith
 b
o
o
tstrap
p
ed
 stan
d
ard
 erro
rs clu
stered
 b
y
 stu
d
ies. T
h
e d
ep
en
d
en
t v
ariab
le is a 
d
iscrete b
in
ary
 in
d
icato
r, w
h
ich
 tak
es th
e v
alu
e o
f 1
 if th
e effect is sign
ifican
tly
 b
en
eficial 
fo
r th
e b
o
rro
w
er an
d
 th
e v
alu
e o
f 0
 if th
e effect is sign
ifican
tly
 u
n
fav
o
rab
le fo
r th
e b
o
rro
w
er. . M
o
d
el (2
) 
rep
o
rts tw
o
-step
 IV
 T
o
b
it w
ith
 b
o
o
tstrap
p
ed
 stan
d
ard
 erro
rs clu
stered
 b
y
 stu
d
ies. T
h
e d
ep
en
d
en
t v
ariab
le is a o
n
e
-tail p
-v
alu
e. M
o
d
el (3
) rep
o
rts tw
o
-step
 IV
 G
M
M
 w
ith
 b
o
o
tstrap
p
ed
 stan
d
ard
 
erro
rs clu
stered
 b
y
 stu
d
ies. T
h
e d
ep
en
d
en
t v
ariab
le is F
ish
er’s z-sco
re. T
est o
f exo
gen
eity
 in
 M
o
d
els (1
) an
d
 (2
) is W
ald
 χ
2
 test o
f exo
gen
eity
, in
 M
o
d
el (3
) th
e test is G
M
M
 C
 (d
ifferen
ce-in
-S
argan
) 
statistic. V
ariab
les are d
efin
ed
 in
 T
ab
le A
2
.2
 o
f th
e ap
p
en
d
ix. T
h
e *
, *
*
, *
*
*
 in
d
icate th
e co
efficien
ts th
at are sign
ifican
tly
 d
ifferen
t fro
m
 z
ero
 at th
e 1
0
%
, 5
%
, an
d
 1
%
 lev
els, resp
ectiv
ely
. 
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o
d
: 
IV
 P
ro
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e b
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b
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T
a
b
le
 2
.5
 D
e
c
o
m
p
o
sitio
n
 o
f re
la
tio
n
sh
ip
 le
n
d
in
g
 b
e
n
e
fits b
y
 lo
a
n
 te
rm
s
 
T
h
is tab
le d
eco
m
p
o
ses len
d
in
g o
u
tco
m
es in
to
: lo
an
 rates (M
o
d
els (1
) an
d
 (4
)), cred
it av
ailab
ility
 (M
o
d
els (2
) an
d
 (5
)), an
d
 c
o
llateral req
u
irem
en
ts (M
o
d
els (3
) an
d
 (6
)). T
h
e tab
le rep
o
rts th
e m
eta-
an
aly
tic regressio
n
s th
at exp
lain
 th
e h
etero
gen
eity
 o
f relatio
n
sh
ip
 len
d
in
g b
en
efits fo
r th
e b
o
rro
w
ers b
y
 regio
n
 effects an
d
 co
u
n
try
-lev
el ch
aracteristics. T
h
e estim
atio
n
 is p
an
el T
o
b
it w
ith
 ran
d
o
m
 
effects gro
u
p
ed
 b
y
 p
u
b
licatio
n
s. T
h
e d
ep
en
d
en
t v
ariab
le is a o
n
e-tail p
-v
alu
e. T
h
e o
m
itted
 referen
ce fo
r regio
n
s is “
U
S
”. V
ariab
les are d
efin
ed
 in
 T
ab
le A
2
.2
 o
f th
e ap
p
en
d
ix. T
h
e *
, *
*
, *
*
*
 in
d
icate 
th
e co
efficien
ts th
at are sign
ifican
tly
 d
ifferen
t fro
m
 z
ero
 at th
e 1
0
%
, 5
%
, an
d
 1
%
 lev
els resp
ectiv
ely
. 
M
eth
o
d
: 
T
o
b
it, ran
d
o
m
 effects 
T
o
b
it, ran
d
o
m
 
effects 
T
o
b
it, ran
d
o
m
 effects 
T
o
b
it, ran
d
o
m
 effects 
T
o
b
it, ran
d
o
m
 effects 
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b
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o
m
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e-tail 
p
-v
alu
e 
C
o
n
tin
u
o
u
s / O
n
e-
tail p
-v
alu
e 
C
o
n
tin
u
o
u
s / O
n
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T
a
b
le
 2
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 T
h
re
e
-o
u
tc
o
m
e
 m
u
ltin
o
m
ia
l L
o
g
it m
o
d
e
l a
n
d
 m
o
n
o
to
n
ic
ity
 o
f th
e
 e
ffe
c
ts 
T
h
is tab
le rep
o
rts th
e resu
lts fro
m
 th
e m
u
ltin
o
m
ial lo
gistic m
o
d
els w
ith
 th
e th
ree catego
rical 
v
ariab
les: 
-1
 d
en
o
tes th
e effect siz
es th
at are sign
ifican
t an
d
 u
n
fav
o
rab
le fo
r th
e b
o
rro
w
er; 0
 d
en
o
tes 
th
e effect siz
es th
at are n
o
t sign
ifican
t; an
d
 1
 d
en
o
tes th
e effect siz
es th
at are sign
ifican
t an
d
 b
en
eficial 
fo
r th
e b
o
rro
w
e
r. C
o
lu
m
n
s (1
) an
d
 (3
) sh
o
w
 th
e estim
atio
n
 fo
r th
e o
u
tco
m
e -1
, th
e effects 
siz
es th
at are sign
ifican
t an
d
 u
n
fav
o
rab
le fo
r th
e b
o
rro
w
er, relativ
e to
 th
e n
o
n
-sign
ifican
t resu
lts. C
o
lu
m
n
s (2
) an
d
 (4
) sh
o
w
 th
e estim
atio
n
 fo
r th
e o
u
tco
m
e 1
, th
e effect siz
es th
at are sign
ifican
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an
d
 b
en
eficial fo
r th
e b
o
rro
w
er, relativ
e to
 th
e n
o
n
-sign
ifican
t resu
lts. T
h
e o
m
itted
 referen
ce fo
r regio
n
s is “
U
S
”. M
o
d
els tak
e in
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u
n
t th
e clu
sterin
g o
f o
b
serv
atio
n
s at th
e p
u
b
licatio
n
 lev
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p
en
d
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h
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 in
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 d
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Chapter 3  
The Conditional Nature of Credit Constraints* 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Credit constraints continue to pose significant obstacles to small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Firms that cannot access financing forego profitable investments, reduce employment, and 
restrict innovation (Campello et al., 2009). The total funding gap of SMEs worldwide 
represents over 30% of all SME credit outstanding, or around 5% of worldwide GDP (IFC, 
2011). Notwithstanding the severity of the problem, it is not clear how large is the extent of 
credit constraints and what underlying factors drive their occurrence. While policy 
interventions and research focus mainly on credit rejections, a substantially larger portion of 
credit constraints remains unaccounted for. First, borrowers might not apply for a loan in 
anticipation of rejection. Second, borrowers that apply might be rejected or, third, they may 
obtain unfavorable credit terms. Hence, credit constraints occur in stages and the outcome at 
each stage is affected by firm, bank, and country characteristics. In this paper I decompose 
credit constraints into the three conditional stages and investigate large cross-country 
heterogeneity in the prevalence of credit constraints by differential impacts of firm- and bank-
level factors.  
Large cross-country variation in credit constraints arises due to differences in legal and 
information environments (Djankov et al., 2007; La Porta et al., 1998; Pagano and Jappelli, 
1993), financial and banking systems (Beck et al., 2004; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
                                                                 
 
* This chapter is based on Kysucky (2014).  
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Maksimovic, 2008; Levine, 1998), economic activity and monetary policy (Jiménez et al., 
2012, 2014). Across firms, smaller and informationally more opaque borrowers face higher 
barriers to operations and access to finance (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2005a). 
Empirical studies focus largely on formally rejected firms, but discouraged or informally 
rejected firms constitute an important group of constrained firms (e.g., Brown et al., 2011; 
Cole, 2008; Popov and Udell, 2011). There is little evidence about credit constraints that occur 
due to the unsatisfied loan demand of approved borrowers. Further, it is not known how the 
individual stages of credit constraints depend on banking markets, and how bank lending 
standards affect lending outcomes at each stage.  
To provide a more complete picture of credit constraints, I classify constrained 
borrowers into three conditional stages: discouragement, rejection, and unfavorable terms. The 
three stages of credit constraints consist of non-overlapping sets of outcomes, but they are 
conditional because each outcome depends on the result of the previous stage. The 
discouragement and unfavorable terms occur at the firm level because the decision to proceed 
or to drop out from the application process rests with a firm. Rejection occurs at the bank level, 
since lenders decide about the outcomes of the formal loan application and propose lending 
terms. Firms and banks have different incentives with respect to the provision and repayment 
of credit. While firms have an incentive to minimize the cost of obtaining and servicing a loan, 
banks have an incentive to minimize risk and maximize income from providing a loan. In the 
presence of market frictions and information asymmetries, the occurrence of credit constraints 
depends on the lending stage and the lending party, which makes the choice about the outcome 
at the given stage. Due to these differences it is likely that the key firm and bank determinants 
have a differential impact on the loan provision in each stage.  
Using a dataset with over 58,000 firm-level observations from 14 Euro-area countries 
in the period 2009-2013, I explain the variation in credit constraints with three sets of factors: 
firm, bank, and country characteristics. I document how credit constraints relate to firm risk 
and bank lending standards and investigate strategic behavior of borrowers and banks. To 
understand the boundaries of credit constraints, I examine whether their occurrence is specific 
to a credit instrument, or whether credit constraints exist at the firm level regardless of credit 
instrument requested. I check the consistency of credit constraints across different instruments 
and estimate the probability of loan application timing in response to the expectations of credit 
availability. At the bank level, I analyze the spillover effect of bank lending standards on 
different credit instruments and investigate the transmission channels through which banks 
implement their bank lending policies. In the last step, I study the effect of non-bank 
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competition and the availability of market financing to firms and banks. In all analyses I control 
for the structure of the economic environment and banking markets. The empirical methods 
take into account the conditionality of credit constraints and correct for a sample selection bias. 
My key findings are as follows. Stages of credit constraints vary with bank lending 
environment beyond firm risk. I show that the stages of credit constraints have differentia l 
relationships with the key determinants and document a more complex effect of bank lending 
standards on lending outcomes. While tight bank lending standards are associated with more 
discouraged borrowers and higher rejection rates, approved borrowers are likely to obtain more 
favorable credit terms in spite of tight standards. The effect is mainly due to a larger loan 
volume, rather than lower interest rates. Loan covenants are associated with increased 
constraints at all three stages, but the requirements on collateral have an opposite effect. I find 
that discouragement and rejections are more likely in countries with higher risk in a banking 
system.  
Second, I provide evidence that the boundaries of credit constraints encompass the 
whole firm. Credit constraints exist at the firm level and are consistent across the credit 
instruments. Individual stages of credit constraints are strongly related to the stages of credit 
constraints reported for other credit instruments, and bank lending standards applied for bank 
loans tend to spill over to other credit instruments 
Third, I show that borrowers are not likely to time their bank loan applications 
strategically according to their expectations of the availability of external finance. However, I 
find evidence that borrowers trade-off bank loans and trade credit applications in the 
expectation of changes in their availability in the future. The availability of market financ ing 
serves as a moderating factor that further influences the lending outcomes. On the demand side, 
if the availability of market finance to firms is high, borrowers are less likely to be discouraged 
and rejected in spite of higher lending standards. On the supply side, the availability of market 
finance to banks facilitates higher loan volumes for approved borrowers.  
Overall, this paper documents more completely the extent of credit constraints and 
provides a differential explanation of large heterogeneity in the occurrence of credit constraints 
in a conditional framework. The results suggest that lending standards may induce ineffic ient 
lending. Banks with high lending standards excessively reject (and discourage) borrowers, but 
approved borrowers obtain higher loan volume. This implies a possibility of a distorted loan 
allocation whereas banks substitute higher rejection rates at the application stage with higher 
loan volume for approved borrowers.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of 
related literature. Section 3.3 describes data and empirical strategy. Section 3.4 presents the 
results and robustness checks, and section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Related literature 
Access to finance is an important factor related to the economic activity and growth of 
companies (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). In many countries, SMEs account 
for a large share of the economy and significantly contribute to the employment and economic 
growth (Ayyagari et al., 2003; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2005b). At the same time, 
SMEs consistently face higher barriers to operations and access to finance (Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Levine 2005; Berger and Udell, 1998). The main firm-level factors responsible for 
greater difficulties of SMEs in accessing finance include higher information asymmetries, less 
favorable economies of scale, and higher entry costs  (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 
2005b; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008; Klapper et al., 2006). Literature on 
financing constraints analyzes a wide array of factors that impose barriers for companies to 
access external funding. Among various financing technologies, bank lending represents a key 
instrument for SMEs (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005). Bank lending to SMEs 
is specific in resolving information asymmetries through lending relationships, but it can also 
lead to negative externalities in the form of hold-up problems and moral hazard (Berger and 
Udell, 1995a; Boot, 2000; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Credit rationing of SMEs is further 
related to information and incentive problems (Kirschenmann, 2014). This paper focuses on 
credit constraints specifically related to bank lending of SMEs in the Euro-area countries. I 
document the prevalence of the individual stages of credit constraints and offer new evidence 
on the differential impact of factors that influence the outcome at each stage.  
 Firm characteristics alone do not fully explain the cross-country variation in financ ing 
constraints (Djankov et al., 2007). At the country level, the key explanatory factors are related 
to the strength of the institutions (e.g., Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2006; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998; La Porta et al., 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Legal environment affects 
the enforceability of financial contracts and influences the provision of credit, whereas 
regulatory environment affects the availability of finance by imposing restrictions on financ ing 
activities and potentially distorting capital allocation in favor of specific stakeholders or 
financing instruments (Altman, 2005; Berger, 2006). Countries with weak legal environment 
and low protection of property rights are less likely to experience SME growth and new 
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business creation (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2005a; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2006). The 
efficiency of the legal environment determines the availability of tools that banks can deploy 
to provide and secure credit, such as collateral, covenants, or the use of personal recourse 
(Berkowitz and White, 2004; Sharpe, 1990). More efficient bankruptcy laws and higher debt 
enforcement improve the availability of credit and facilitate the development of credit markets 
(Djankov et al., 2008). Another important factor is the information environment. Sound 
accounting standards and credit information sharing systems reduce the cost of resolving 
information asymmetries (Kallberg and Udell, 2003; Miller, 2003). Empirical evidence 
confirms that credit information depth helps to increase the access to finance by reducing the 
adverse selection problem, facilitating more accurate pricing of financial instruments, and 
improving the alignment of incentives between lenders and borrowers (Jappelli and Pagano, 
2000, 2002; Love and Mylenko, 2003). Overall, the cross-country evidence confirms the 
importance of the institutional environment for SME finance availability. Many of the above 
studies are concerned with the finance-growth nexus, especially in the developing economies.  
However, the problems of SMEs to access finance remain acute in the developed countries, 
where many of the SMEs rely on bank financing. I extend this strand of literature by analyzing 
the role of the institutional environment in the context of the conditional stages of credit 
constraints. My empirical analysis is set in the post-crisis period 2009-2013, which is marked 
by dislocations in credit markets and provides a testing ground for analyzing credit constraints 
and the strength of the institutions in the times of distress.  
Access to SME finance is further affected by the structure of a banking sector (Berger 
and Udell, 2006). There is conflicting evidence about the role of bank competition and the 
availability of credit (Berger et al., 2004). Studies find positive (Boot and Thakor, 2000), 
negative (Petersen and Rajan, 1995), or U-shaped relationship (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; 
Elsas, 2005; Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2011) between the availability of credit and bank 
competition. Recent studies describe the implications of a complex oligopoly and its 
differential impact on loan terms (Heffernan, 2006; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006). The 
effects of bank competition also depend on institutional development (Beck et al., 2003). 
Regarding the bank regulation, most studies report overall positive effects of imposing fewer 
restrictions. For instance, Berger and Udell (1995b) and Ramirez (1995, 2002) show that fewer 
restrictions are associated with lower cost of capital and lower cash-flow constraints. Barriers 
to banking services are higher in countries with more restrictions (Beck et al., 2008), whereas 
credit constraints decrease after a credit market  liberalization takes place (Gelos and Werner, 
2002; Laeven, 2003). Low efficiency of a banking system may signal unwarranted manager ia l 
perquisites and market power. Barth et al. (2008) find that private monitoring is associated with 
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greater bank efficiency. In this paper I study the effects of bank lending standards and the 
transmission mechanism through which bank lending standards relate to the stages of credit 
constraints. High level of bank lending standards may signal a prudent bank lending policy at 
the loan approval stage, but it is not known whether and how these policies translate into 
discouraged lending or unfavorable loan terms.  
Availability of non-bank finance influences the financing choice of borrowers. While 
larger participation in the market finance leads to smaller banking sectors (Diamond, 1997), 
banks and stock markets tend to develop together (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 1996). Rajan 
and Zingales (2003) suggest that more market-oriented financing system should be benefic ia l 
in Europe. Smaller firms are more likely to obtain larger share of alternative informal finance 
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008). It is unclear how the stages of credit 
constraints depend on the availability of non-bank competition and market finance. I conduct 
analyses to estimate the moderating effect of alternative finance on the occurrence of credit 
constraints.  
Literature on credit constraints is based mainly on the analysis of credit rejections. 
However, this measure underestimates the full extent of credit constraints (Brown et al., 2011; 
Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 2005; Cole, 2008; Cox and Jappelli, 1993; Léon, 2014; Popov and 
Udell, 2012). Observed loan applicants may consist of a systematically truncated subsample of 
all firms, which results into biased estimates. In other words, in a full sample, a discouraged 
borrower and a borrower that does not need a loan are observationally identical. Empirica l 
evidence shows that discouragement represents a sizeable component of credit constraints, but 
the level of discouragement varies across economies (Brown et al., 2011; Ongena et al., 2013; 
Popov and Udell, 2012; Popov, 2013). While the literature establishes discouragement as the 
first stage of credit constraints and rejection as the second stage, there is little evidence about 
loan terms. I introduce the third stage of credit constraints, which corresponds to the occurrence 
of unfavorable terms. Borrowers whose application is approved, but who receive unfavorab le 
terms are effectively credit constrained. With an unsatisfied loan demand these borrowers 
cannot fully undertake their intended investment projects. Without accounting for the third 
stage of credit constraints, borrowers with unfavorable terms are observationally identical to 
approved borrowers.  
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3.3 Data and empirical strategy 
3.3.1 Data sources 
The empirical strategy is based on a sample of 58,845 semi-annual observations of firms 
located in 14 Euro area countries in the period 2009-2013. The data comes from two main 
sources.  
First, ECB SAFE (Survey on the access to finance of enterprises) contains firm-leve l 
micro-data on SME access to finance. The survey covers mainly micro, small, and medium-
sized enterprises, but also includes large firms to facilitate comparison among the size groups. 
The firms are selected randomly from Dun & Bradstreet database. The selection is stratified by 
firm size, economic activity, and country. Data is collected at semi-annual frequency (ECB, 
2014a).  
Second, ECB BLS (Bank lending survey) contains country-level data on Euro area bank 
lending standards, factors that affect the bank lending standards, and supply and demand 
conditions in the credit markets. The survey is addressed to senior loan officers and covers a 
representative sample of approximately 90-140 banks from all Euro area countries (ECB, 
2014b). Data from the survey is available as diffusion indices collected at a quarterly frequency. 
The diffusion index values are aggregated across the banks per each country. The following 
Euro area countries are not available in the dataset: Belgium, Greece, and Finland. I merge the 
firm level data from ECB SAFE dataset with the ECB BLS. Further data on country-leve l 
banking sector and economic environment come from the World Bank Global Financia l 
Development Database and other sources as indicated in the Appendix, Table A3.1.  
 
3.3.2 Main variables 
This study focuses on credit constraints related to bank loans (both new loans and renewals). 
It does not include credit lines or overdrafts. The main dependent variable consists of the three 
conditional stages of credit constraints. Each stage is represented by a binary variable, which 
takes the value of 1 if a firm is constrained, 0 otherwise.  
The first stage of credit constraints represents discouraged lending. A firm is 
discouraged if it needs a loan, but does not apply because of a possible rejection. For a firm 
that has to forego a profitable investment, the discouraged lending corresponds to an effective 
credit constraint. A firm is considered to be in need of a loan if it does not belong to a group of 
firms that do not apply because of sufficient internal funds or for other reasons. The survey 
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does not provide further information about the latter group of firms (0.9% of all observation) 
and the reasons why these firms do not apply. Using a consistency check of credit constraints 
across various credit instruments, I confirm that these firms are not likely to be constrained. 
Unlike credit constrained firms, there is no significant relationship with the stages of credit 
constraints of other credit instruments.  
The second stage, loan rejection, occurs if a firm needs a loan, submits a loan 
application, and a bank declines the application.  
Finally, the third stage represents unfavorable terms of an approved loan application. 
There are two possible outcomes from the loan approval: a) a firm obtains favorable terms (a 
firm obtains 75% or more of the requested amount and accepts the loan terms and conditions); 
b) a firm obtains unfavorable terms. In the latter case, the survey provides information on two 
possible outcomes. Either a firm obtains only a limited part of the loan amount requested (up 
to 74% of the requested amount), or a firm refuses the loan because of unacceptable cost or 
terms. There is a slight semantic nuance in these two outcomes. According to the survey design, 
it is implied that a firm with insufficient loan amount accepts the loan, whereas a firm with 
high cost refuses the loan. In both cases these firms are considered credit constrained in the 
third stage. There are two situations that do not fall into this category. First, a firm that accepts 
the loan in spite of the unfavorable terms is not considered credit constrained because the 
acceptance of the terms implies a rational decision of a firm that the terms are acceptable. 
Second, a firm that refuses the loan due to an insufficient loan amount is not observed, however, 
it may belong to a small group of non-applicable responses that represent less than 1% of 
observations in the third stage. These two cases are not expected to have an influence on the 
overall outcome. All three stages document firms’ bank loan experience within the past 6 
months. I exclude observations where the outcome from the lending stage is not applicable or 
is invalid. Figure 3.1 depicts the conditional stages of credit constraints.  
To explain the variation of the stages of credit constraints across countries, I use three 
sets of explanatory variables: firm, bank, and country-characteristics. The firm-level data 
allows me to observe indicators that reflect the extent of the information asymmetries, firm 
risk, economic activity of firms, and their credit demand. I separate the firm-level credit 
demand factors from the bank loan supply factors.  
The firm-level explanatory variables include the number of employees, age, annual 
turnover, industry, ownership, gender of the owner/director, and individual firm outlook. Firm 
size is related to the information asymmetries and higher obstacles in accessing credit. 
Although the sample consists mainly of SMEs with up to 250 employees, there are marked 
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differences within this size classification. I control for firm age as a proxy for the information 
asymmetries and the availability of public information about a firm. Annual turnover is a proxy 
for the current activity of a firm, whereas ownership status reflects the differences in the legal 
forms and their implications for financial contracting. Limited liability protection, or the 
absence of it, influences the implicit collateralization of bank financing, which affects credit 
access. Gender of the owner or director controls for the unobserved firm heterogeneity related 
to the gender gap in SME financing. Overall credit risk of a firm is measured by the change in 
credit history over the past 6 months. All firm characteristics are measured as categorical 
variables.  
The bank-level supply-side factors are represented by bank lending standards. ECB 
(2014b) defines bank lending standards as “the internal guidelines or criteria which reflect a 
bank’s loan policy”. Bank lending standards encompass lending terms and conditions, as well 
as written and unwritten practices and criteria for granting a loan. In the empirical analyses I 
implement three sets of bank lending standards. First, I examine the overall indicator of bank 
lending standards as a measure of change in the tightness of bank policies for granting loans. 
Second, I decompose bank lending standards by loan terms into interest margins, loan size, 
maturity, collateral, covenants, and non-interest margins. Third, I check the variation in bank 
lending standards due to the availability and accessibility of non-bank finance for firms and 
banks. Bank lending standards are set by banks and are measured as diffusion indices at the 
country-level. Diffusion indices are derived from the survey questions that use a 5-point scale 
to estimate the extent of a change in the standards from “tightened considerably” to “eased 
considerably”. Each observation covers the period over the past 6 months (I aggregate the 
observations over the two quarters).  
A limitation in using diffusion indices is that there is no reference level. This limita t ion 
affects the interpretation of results. Instead of estimating the effect of different levels of bank 
lending standards, I can estimate the marginal effect of the relative differences in changes in 
bank lending standards (e.g. an increase in lending standards in Germany vs. a decrease in 
France). In my empirical analyses I interpret bank lending standards in their literal sense. Van 
der Veer and Hoeberichts (2013) propose a solution to estimate the level of lending standards, 
but the solution is de-based to a unitless scale within a country. This means that it is less 
applicable in a cross-country context. Another concern is raised by Del Giovane et al. (2011) 
who note that questions in the survey collect data about a change in a degree of tightness to 
some (undefined) benchmark in a preceding period, but not specifically about a change in 
lending standards relative to a specific point in time or benchmark in the previous period. This 
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might influence longitudinal analyses, but in my empirical setting I do not analyze the time 
dimension and, instead, exploit the cross-sectional variation in the relative changes in lending 
standards.  
Finally, I use the country-level variables to control for the heterogeneity of banking 
sectors and economic environments across countries. Bank concentration is used as a proxy of 
the competitiveness of a banking sector. I measure bank concentration by assets of the three 
largest commercial banks relative to total commercial banking assets. I test alternative proxies 
for bank competition and market power in the robustness checks. Bank z-score and bank returns 
on assets approximate the strength of a banking sector in an economy. I measure the efficiency 
of a banking segment by net interest margin (efficiency of financial intermediation) and by 
bank overhead costs over total assets (efficiency of bank operations).  
I model the differences in economic environments by the development of the financ ia l 
system (share of private credit to GDP, stock market capitalization), expected aggregate credit 
demand (expected economic activity), legal system and property rights (overall property rights 
index), information environment (credit information depth index), regulation (composite 
business regulation index), and macro-economic environment (level of GDP, inflation).  
 
3.3.3 Empirical strategy 
The aim of the empirical strategy is to investigate the occurrence of the conditional stages of 
credit constraints. My empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I quantify the prevalence 
of the stages of credit constraints across countries. Next, I explain their occurrence in a 
multivariate setting. I focus on the role of bank lending standards and investigate the 
transmission mechanisms through which bank lending standards affect the occurrence of credit 
constraints in each conditional stage.  
In the empirical setup I address two econometric issues. First, the process of loan 
granting consists of sequential selection steps. In each stage, the sample is a non-random sub-
sample from the previous step (e.g. the sample of firms that need a loan is a non-random sub-
sample of all firms; the sample of firms that apply for a loan is a non-random sub-sample of 
those firms that need a loan, etc.). This is the case of an incidental truncation (Greene, 2003), 
which may lead to a bias due to some underlying systematic factors that drive the sample 
selection at each stage. To address this issue, I implement the Heckman procedure (Heckman, 
1979). A good identification requires at least one exclusion restriction at each stage. At the first 
stage (discouraged lending), the exclusion restriction should affect the need for a loan directly, 
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but only indirectly affect the decision of a firm to apply. As the exclusion restriction I use the 
firm’s changes in the need for fixed investment. I assume that firms base their need for fixed 
investments primarily by their business operations. It is not likely that the firm’s loan 
application would drive the need for fixed investment. At the second stage (rejection), the 
exclusion restriction should directly affect the firm’s decision to apply, but only indirect ly 
affect the bank’s decision to approve a loan. For the identification I use regulation index. 
Higher obstacles to business operations in the form of more burdensome regulation might 
negatively influence the decision of a firm to apply for a loan. However, a bank is not likely to 
base its decision to approve the loan directly on the level of regulation. Finally, at the third 
stage (unfavorable terms), the exclusion restriction should directly affect the bank’s loan terms, 
but only indirectly affect the firm’s decision to accept unfavorable terms or refuse a loan. At 
this stage the exclusion restriction is bank overhead costs / total assets. The level of bank 
efficiency is likely to influence the loan terms or the quality of the bank services, but this 
information does not seem to be the primary reason for firms to accept the loan terms. 
A related concern is that the changes in bank lending standards may be endogenous ly 
determined with the credit demand. For example, given a limited funding liquidity of a bank, 
an increase in lending standards might be determined by an increase in the existing or expected 
credit demand. Although this pattern is not present in the sample, I assert that there is a causal 
link between lending standards and credit constraints. In fact, the purpose of lending standards 
is to define the terms, conditions, and rules that directly affect the decision of a bank to approve 
a loan. Accordingly, the relationship is causal. Alternatively, it is possible that there is a 
feedback effect between lending standards and lending outcomes. If lending standards are not 
effective in achieving their goals (as observed by lending outcomes), banks may respond to 
this situation by changing their lending standards. Even though such relationship is sequentia l, 
in this case the bank lending standards are not fully independent from the lending outcomes 
within a given time period. The solution lies in isolating the endogenous component of the 
credit demand effect. Since the credit demand overlaps with the need for a loan, the common 
underlying problem is the same as in the sample selection bias in the first step and the 
endogeneity of the relationship is rooted in the same latent variables that drive the sample 
selection.  
The second econometric issue relates to the distinction between the credit supply effect, 
credit demand effect, and the repricing of credit risk. The composition of borrowers and the 
demand for various financing instruments varies with the business cycle. Further, in economic 
downturns, agency costs of firms and banks increase at the same time (Gertler and Gilchr ist, 
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1994; Popov, 2013), leading to time-varying risk premia. To address this issue I include in the 
model separate firm-level factors of credit demand and credit supply composition, bank lending 
standards, as well as country-level indicators of the economic activity.  
The dataset does not allow for matching banks with firms. This means that I cannot 
analyze separately the effect of bank relationships and bank characteristics that are specific to 
the bank-firm relationships. Taking this limitation into account, the empirical findings can be 
interpreted at the aggregate country level. 
I estimate the results with probit models where the dependent variable is the stage of 
credit constraint. All models are estimated with the industry and year-fixed effects. I report the 
results using robust standard errors. The findings are consistent when I use standard errors 
clustered at the country level. However, because the number of clusters is low and the 
observations within the clusters are unbalanced, these estimates are likely to be less efficient.  
 
3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Cross-country evidence on credit constraints 
In the first step of the empirical analysis I estimate the prevalence and the composition of credit 
constraints. Figure 3.2 provides an overview of the absolute and relative levels across countries. 
The figure shows a large variation in the 14 Euro area economies. While in Malta and Austria, 
around 5% of all firms are credit constrained, in Ireland and Spain the figure reaches, 
respectively, 19% and 16% of all firms in the sample. In most countries, discouragement is the 
most important component of the overall credit constraints. On average, the discouragement 
proportion is about twice as large as rejections and unfavorable terms combined.  
The sample period 2009-2013 spans the financial crisis and the European sovereign 
debt crisis. The developments in credit markets in this period are marked by policy measures 
aimed at the economic recovery and the mobilization of credit. Figure 3.3 shows the 
development of the stages of credit constraints over time. It also shows the changes in bank 
lending standards and the demand for loans. Throughout the whole period, banks constantly 
tightened their bank lending standards, whereas the demand for loans declined on average. The 
contrast is particularly apparent in the crisis year 2009. These developments are likely related 
to the macro-economic conditions and the policy measures, which motivated banks to decrease 
their risk exposure amidst the declining credit demand (Wehinger, 2013). The composition of 
credit constraints remained relatively stable over time with the exception of year 2009, when 
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rejection rates increased and unfavorable terms decreased. The overall level of credit 
constraints remained at around 10%. The figure documents the importance of separating credit 
demand and supply factors. For example, high level of rejections may be a manifestation of 
low credit supply, or high demand. In 2009, the effect is likely to be supply-driven. The figure 
also shows that the changes in bank lending standards are not positively correlated with the 
changes in the credit demand.  
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 raise a number of questions, which I address in the subsequent 
analyses. What drives the large cross-country variance? How do the credit demand and supply 
factors influence the outcome, and how do the institutions and the structure of the financ ia l 
markets affect the occurrence of credit constraints?  
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics of the main variables. Firms included in the 
survey are mainly SMEs. 90% of all firms have less than 250 employees, and 70% report up to 
€10 million in annual turnover. A stylized typical company in the sample is a private, family-
owned small firm with around 30 employees, and older than 10 years. During the sample 
period, most firms reported neutral or negative economic outlook, but at the same time, their 
credit history improved or remained unchanged.  
The country-level summary statistics, reported in Table 3.1, Panel B, show that the 
average level of credit constraints is 11%, but a large variation exists (standard deviation of 
32%). On an unconditional basis, the overall constraints consist of 5.9% discouragement, 2.8% 
rejections, and 2.7% unfavorable terms. Bank lending standards increased on average during 
the sample period, especially for long-term loans. For this asset class, the bank lending 
standards increased by 76% more compared to short-term loans. Banks tightened all 
components of the lending standards, with the most tightening occurring (in the order of 
magnitude) in the interest margins, collateral, and maturity. Lowest increase is reported for the 
non-interest margins and covenants. While the changes in bank capital positions contributed 
most to the increase in the lending standards, bank competition was the only supply-side factor 
that helped to loosen the overall lending standards. Regarding the landscape of the banking 
sector, the three largest commercial banks accounted for 70% of all bank assets across the 
countries (ranging from 30% in Luxembourg to 99.64% in Estonia). The banks made a small 
loss of -0.02% ROA throughout the period, but held a moderately optimistic outlook on the 
expected economic activity. On average, the banks charged net interest margin of 1.34% and 
maintained bank z-score at 14.48.  
Table 3.2 breaks down the aggregate level and the composition of credit constraints by 
countries. The table distinguishes between the unconditional and conditional relative 
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frequencies. The former measure reports the ratio of constrained firms relative to all firms, the 
latter one takes into account the conditionality of the stages of credit constraints. Highest levels 
of discouragement are reported in Ireland and the Netherlands where, respectively, 46% and 
40% of firms needing a loan are discouraged from applying. There is a large variation across 
the countries in the prevalence of rejections and unfavorable terms. The relative outcome 
depends on the conditionality of the measurement. 26% of firms that apply are rejected in 
Estonia and 22% in the Netherlands, compared to only 1.5% in Luxembourg and 2% in Malta. 
Of all approved firms, 22% receive unfavorable terms on average, but the figure is significantly 
lower in France where only 6% of approved firms obtain unfavorable terms. Clearly, there is a 
considerable heterogeneity across countries in terms of the firm risk, the structure and the 
development of the economic environments and banking sectors. In addition, there are regional 
differences in the propensity of firms to apply for loans and the conditional likelihood of banks 
to approve the applications or to offer favorable loan terms. Hence, taking into account the 
conditionality of credit constraints in all three stages increases the accuracy of the estimated 
true credit constraints. 
To gain further insights on the firm-level relationship between the firm risk and the 
stages of the credit constraints, I sort firms into 4 groups by annual turnover and plot the 
distribution of firms against the stages of credit constraints (Figure 3.4). The distribution 
represents a relative proportion of credit constraints by country. I select the annual turnover 
because it contains information about the firm size, risk, and the economic activity. The figure 
shows that the stages of credit constraints are related to the firm turnover, but the relationship 
depends on the stage of credit constraints. There is an inverse relationship between the firm 
turnover and the relative level of discouragement. Smaller and more risky borrowers are more 
likely to be discouraged. On the other hand, the relationship is opposite in the third stage, as 
larger borrowers are more likely to obtain less favorable terms, mainly lower loan amount than 
requested. Rejection rates are relatively constant across the levels of annual turnover, but in 
some countries larger companies experience more rejections. The figure documents that firm 
characteristics are important in explaining the cross-sectional variation in credit constraints, 
but the analyses need to distinguish among the individual stages in order to estimate more 
precisely the direction and the size of the effect.  
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3.4.2 Differential determinants of the stages of credit constraints  
In this section I explain the occurrence of the stages of credit constraints in a multivar iate  
setting. The main goal of the following analyses is to disentangle the differential effect of the 
key determinants on the individual stages. Table 3.3 reports the baseline results. In models (1-
3) the dependent variable is a binary indicator corresponding to each stage. In models (4-5) I 
break down the third stage, unfavorable terms, into two outcomes: either the amount of a loan 
is insufficient, or the cost of a loan is too high. All of the model specifications correct for the 
sample selection bias. The first stage function of the sample selection correction estimates the 
loan demand. In the subsequent stages the procedure uses recursively the inverse Mills ratios 
from the previous steps.  
I find that credit constraints vary with the firm, bank, and country characteristics, but 
the direction and the magnitude of the effect depends on the stage of credit constraints. Firm 
characteristics explain a large portion of the overall variation. Firms with negative changes in 
credit history over the past 6 months are more likely to be discouraged or rejected. This implies 
that banks screen applicants using the information in credit history records and that borrowers 
anticipate this screening. Another significant factor is the individual firm outlook. This variable 
is a joint proxy for the firm risk and business prospects. As the firm outlook deteriorates, a firm 
is more discouraged or rejected. Interestingly, firms with negative changes in both, credit 
history and firm outlook, are less likely to obtain unfavorable terms. It is possible that this 
effect arises due to the role of lending relationships (or the banks’ expertise in borrower 
screening) if banks collect more private information in the presence of more hard information 
that is available through credit history records. Relationship lenders may further support 
borrowers throughout the business cycle by inter-temporal smoothing of the loan terms. 
Another possibility is that discouragement in the first stage eliminates some borrowers that 
would otherwise qualify for favorable terms in the third stage. Conversely, lower 
discouragement may induce adverse selection in the second stage as low quality borrowers 
attempt to pool with high quality borrowers. Smaller firms, measured both by the number of 
employees and by the annual turnover, are more likely to be discouraged or rejected, but high 
turnover firms tend to obtain an insufficient amount if they are approved. This is likely because 
these firms also request larger loan amounts whereas banks might not have sufficient funding 
capacity or are not willing to provide sufficiently large loans. The results also indicate a 
potential existence of the hold-up problem. Assuming that the firm age correlates with the 
length of a lending relationship, young firms are less discouraged or rejected, but older firms 
obtain less favorable terms. The relationship appears to follow an upward sloping concave 
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curve. The contrast is greatest between the group of the youngest firms (up to 2 year old) and 
medium-aged firms (2-5 years), but less pronounced for the older group of firms relative to the 
medium-aged firms. Firm ownership is not significant, but there is an indication that female 
owners/directors tend to be more discouraged.  
On the supply side, I find that an increase in bank lending standards is related to more 
discouraged borrowers and higher rejection rates. However, approved borrowers are less likely 
to obtain unfavorable terms. This effect is mainly due to a larger loan volume, rather than a 
lower cost of loans or more favorable other terms and conditions. Lower credit constraints in 
the second and the third stage are observed in countries with less risky banking systems (higher 
bank z-score), and in countries with an optimistic economic outlook and lower interest margins.  
Firms are more likely to be discouraged when the stock market capitalization is high, 
suggesting that there might be a substitution effect between the bank and the market finance. 
Further analyses below reveal that this relationship is more complex and depends on the source 
and the uses of market finance. Regarding the information environment, the results indicate 
that greater scope of information in credit registries is associated with higher discouragement 
and higher cost of loans. This finding raises two conjectures. On the one hand, deep credit 
information reduces the adverse selection in the first stage since lower quality borrowers do 
not apply if they are aware of their poor credit record. On the other hand, the existence of 
detailed credit information may lead to banks’ over-reliance on hard information, resulting in 
relatively more costly loans in countries where credit information is deep and available, as 
opposed to countries where banks rely more on their private information. As a proxy for the 
financial system development I use private credit to GDP. This proxy also reflects the supply 
of credit in the market. Surprisingly, there is no evidence that the amount of private credit 
relative to GDP is related to any of the stages of credit constraints.  
Overall, I find that higher discouragement and rejection rates are associated with higher 
firm risk, tighter lending standards, and weaker banking sectors. Discouragement and 
rejections generally show similar patterns. This is likely because banks are effective in 
screening borrowers and, at the same time, borrowers correctly anticipate the screening 
outcome. Conditional on the approval, borrowers obtain more favorable terms, mainly higher 
loan volume, when lending standards are high. These findings point to a possibility of an 
inefficient lending. The inefficiency arises from the frictions in the conditional progression 
through the stages of the loan application process. The logic is as follows. For a margina l 
increase in lending standards, banks tend to reject more borrowers, but approved borrowers 
obtain larger loans. If banks realize the changes in their lending policies through loan rejections 
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rather than loan terms, they may exclude from lending some borrowers that would otherwise 
qualify for a loan. In this sense, banks substitute higher rejection rates in the second stage for 
higher loan volume in the third stage. In addition, higher lending standards (and rejections) are 
associated with higher discouragement in the first stage, further exacerbating the problem. This 
process might lead to a distorted loan allocation. As a counterfactual, a more efficient outcome 
would be a non-significant or positive relationship between the tightness of lending standards 
and the occurrence of unfavorable terms (as measured by the loan volume or the cost of a loan). 
Such result would indicate that, for a given level of bank risk aversion, banks reject an optima l 
level of borrowers (non-significant outcome), or that banks adjust their lending terms in line 
with their lending standards (significant positive coefficient). It is also possible that the result 
is optimal for banks as they internalize the screening and the information production costs by 
creating economies of scale in the loan application process. In such case banks may prefer to 
approve a smaller number of larger and higher quality borrowers as opposed to a larger number 
of smaller and more risky borrowers.  
 To investigate further the role of bank lending standards, I decompose the lending 
standards by individual loan terms. The loan terms in the sample are interest margins, loan size, 
maturity, collateral, covenants, and non-interest margins. The purpose of this analysis is to 
examine how the loan terms relate to the stages of credit constraints and to examine the 
transmission channels through which banks implement the changes in their lending policies.  
Table 3.4 shows that the transmission effect operates mainly through the collateral 
requirements and covenants. The two components have opposing sign across the stages. This 
finding is in line with the borrower signaling. If collateral requirements increase, low-quality 
borrowers are less likely to pool with high-quality borrowers. Consequently, a lower number 
of borrowers apply for a loan and borrowers that do apply are less likely to be rejected. 
However, approved borrowers are more likely to obtain insufficient loan amount. It is possible 
that this outcome is due to differing views between lenders and borrowers on the value of 
collateral or the firm risk. Unfortunately, this information is not observed in the survey. In 
contrast, the effect of covenants operates in the opposite direction. Higher covenants lead to 
more discouragement and rejection, but post-approval, higher covenants are related to lower 
likelihood of unfavorable terms. Borrowers are further more discouraged in the presence of 
tighter lending standards for obtaining loans with longer maturity. Surprisingly, there is no 
significant relationship between the changes in the interest margins and the occurrence of credit 
constraints. Controlling for the changes in loan size, I find that the loan size is negatively related 
to the occurrence of unfavorable terms (both in terms of the insufficient amount and the high 
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cost of a loan), implying that banks may be trading-off stricter lending standards for larger 
loans with lower cost.  
This analysis suggests that collateral requirements and covenants are the main factors 
that influence, in the opposing directions, the occurrence of credit constraints in all three stages. 
I find consistent results using nested models and including one loan term at a time. One concern 
is that loan terms and lending outcomes are determined simultaneously. While studies on this 
topic report mixed findings (Brick and Palia, 2007; Dennis et al., 2000), banking practice 
documents that the process of loan term determination is in fact sequential (Bharath et al., 2009; 
Kirschenmann and Norden, 2012; Standard & Poor’s, 2011).  
 
3.4.3 Do credit constraints exist at the borrower level or at the loan level? 
Bank loans represent one of several credit instruments available to a firm. Accordingly, a firm 
that needs external finance may choose to apply for different credit instruments or adjust its 
financing mix in response to various factors specific to a given instrument. It is not clear 
whether credit constraints are specific to a credit instrument or whether they exist at the firm-
level consistently across different credit instruments. In the latter case, analyzing credit 
constraints in the context of bank loans would have limited interpretation. The following 
analysis investigates the boundaries of credit constraints by checking the consistency of credit 
constraints across 4 credit instruments: bank loans, credit lines, trade credit, and other loans , 
including loans from friends, family, or other company.  
Further, I examine the consistency of bank lending policies. Bank lending standards 
may affect borrowers’ choices of credit instruments. If credit constraints arise at the loan level 
independently from other credit instruments, then bank lending standards will have a 
differential impact on the occurrence of credit constraint in relation to a particular credit 
instrument. In contrast, if credit constraints arise at the borrower level, bank lending standards 
will have joint effect on the stages of credit constraints of other instruments.  
To address these questions, I analyze the relationships among the stages of credit 
constraints of all types of credit instruments. Table 3.5 shows that the stages of credit 
constraints are strongly related at each stage, signifying that credit constraints exist at the firm 
level. The results are reported in reference to firms that applied for a given credit instrument. 
Credit constraints of other instruments are consistently positively related to the bank loan credit 
constraints. The relationship holds at each stage. These results signify that the boundaries of 
credit constraints encompass the whole firm regardless of the credit instrument.  
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Further, firms and banks use consistent set of criteria in evaluating financing options 
and determining the lending outcomes. I also find an association between the stages of credit 
constraints across credit instruments. For example, firms with rejected credit line applications 
are more likely to be discouraged from applying for bank loans and vice versa. However, firms 
with rejected trade credit applications are more likely to apply for bank loans. The effect of 
bank lending standards remains significant in the second and the third stage, which suggests 
that there is a spillover effect. It is not significant at the discouragement stage. This result is in 
line with a notion that firms submit their loan application strategically according to the 
availability of other instruments. I confirm the robustness of the results using nested models.  
While the previous analyses use backward-looking information about the credit 
availability, it is not known whether firms take into account the future outlook on financ ing 
availability. Controlling for the macro-economic environment, banks might react to the 
borrower expectations by adjusting future bank lending standards. The presence of strategic 
behavior from both firms and banks might obscure the true occurrence of credit constraints and 
the effect of bank lending standards. The following analysis examines the relationship between 
firm expectations of the financing availability and the stages of credit constraints. I include in 
the models the expectations of the availability of 7 sources of financing: bank loans, interna l 
finance, credit line, trade credit, equity, debt securities, and other loans. I decompose lending 
standards into forward and backward looking values. The time horizon of the expectations are 
6 months. While the actual loan application (or discouragement) is a manifestation of a firm’s 
intent to obtain external finance, the underlying cause is the loan demand. In the following 
table I also report an estimation where the dependent variable is the categorical indicator of a 
change in the loan demand. Table 3.6 reports the results.  
I do not find evidence that firms time strategically their loan demand or loan 
applications according to their expectations of future bank loan availability. Firms are more 
discouraged when they expect less bank loan availability in the future. They are even more 
discouraged when they expect an increase in bank lending standards. The results indicate that, 
at the application stage, firms trade-off bank loans with trade credit. If firms expect less 
availability of trade credit in the future, they are more likely to apply for a bank loan now. They 
are also more likely to apply if they do not have a credit line. Effects of the firm expectations 
are less pronounced at the bank application stage, likely because they are not observable by 
banks. However, there is an indication that firms that expect less future bank loan availability 
are more likely to be rejected, suggesting that negative firm expectations might contain 
information content about the firm quality. Conversely, firms are less likely to be rejected if 
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they do not use other credit instruments. As in the previous analysis, I check the robustness of 
the results with nested models.  
 
3.4.4 Credit constraints and the availability of alternative finance 
The presence of non-bank financing options might affect the occurrence of credit constraints 
and influence the transmission of bank lending standards. Greater availability of non-bank 
finance may reduce the overall financing constraints, but the relationship depends on a number 
of factors, such as the type and the composition of borrowers, risk levels, and strategic choices 
of borrowers and banks. In the following analysis I investigate the impact of non-bank 
financing options through the effect of changing bank lending standards. The main explanatory 
variables represent the variation in lending standards due to the changes in the availability of 
non-bank finance. I examine separately the effects of non-bank competition and the availability 
of market finance. Non-bank competition represents all non-bank financing options that 
compete with bank lending services. I further decompose the market financing options into two 
components. First, bank market finance represents the ability of a bank to obtain market 
financing. Second, firm market finance represents the availability of market financing to firms. 
Table 3.7 presents the results.  
I find that firms are less discouraged from applying for a loan in countries with a 
relatively greater increase in non-bank competition. I do not observe a significant association 
between non-bank competition and the other stages of credit constraints. There is an opposing 
effect of bank market finance and firm market finance in the first and the second stage. Higher 
bank lending standards due to the availability of market financing are related to lower 
discouragement and lower rejection rates. I surmise that the effect is likely driven by the 
demand side. The availability of market financing might exert some disciplining effect on 
prospective borrowers or improve the bargaining position of borrowers vis-à-vis banks. In 
contrast, higher bank lending standards due to the ability of banks to obtain market finance are 
related to higher discouragement and higher rejection rates. This effect is likely driven by the 
supply-side since the ability of banks to obtain market financing facilitates larger loan volumes 
(lower likelihood of obtaining insufficient credit).  
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3.4.5 Tests of robustness 
In this section I summarize additional empirical tests. First, I estimate the sensitivity of my 
results to the specification of the sample period. Within the available period, year 2009 is 
marked by an ongoing financial crisis. In all previous specifications I use time-fixed effects. In 
the additional tests, I separate the sample into observations from 2009 and post-2009 periods. 
I find that in the crisis year, the firm level factors are strongly associated with credit constraints. 
Borrowers are likely to be more discouraged in this period, but credit constraints in the second 
and the third stages do not exhibit significant relationship with lending standards. It is 
interesting to note, that the explanatory power of the model is higher in the crisis year, driven 
mainly by the firm-level characteristics.  
 In another set of tests, I examine the role of foreign banks. A large presence of foreign 
banks influences the occurrence of credit constraints through the differential effects of business 
models, tendencies to risk-taking in foreign markets, regulation and domestic supervis ion 
(Barth et al., 2004; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Ongena et al., 2013). If the regulation in a foreign 
bank’s home country is strict, a bank might have incentives to increase its risk exposure by 
lowering lending standards abroad. The sample does not allow matching data on individua l 
foreign banks that operate in a particular market, but I can observe the aggregate effect of all 
foreign banks in a country. Controlling for the foreign bank presence (as a percentage of all 
bank assets), I do not find a differential effect of foreign banks. Holding the other factors fixed, 
the effect of lending standards on credit constraints is consistent regardless of the structure of 
the banking sector by bank origin. In addition, I find that larger presence of foreign banks is 
associated with relatively higher discouragement.  
I further examine whether foreign banks apply differential lending standards by 
including interaction terms for foreign bank assets and lending standards. I find that borrowers 
in countries with more foreign banks and higher lending standards are associated with less 
likelihood of unfavorable terms, and borrowers in these countries obtain larger credit volume.  
Because foreign banks might be less likely to lend to small local borrowers (Berger et al., 
2001), I estimate the models with two-way interactions between the foreign ownership, lending 
standards, and firm size. I find that, relative to large firms, smaller firms with 10-50 employees 
are more likely to obtain unfavorable terms in countries with higher presence of foreign banks, 
but this effect is reversed if bank lending standards are high.  
 Since the credit constraints boundaries encompass the whole firm, as shown above, I 
test the spillover effect of bank lending standards across credit instruments. I estimate whether 
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lending standards influence the outcomes of the stages of credit constraints, particularly for 
credit lines and trade credit. I find positive relationship between the lending standards and the 
first and the second stage of credit constraints for trade credit. For credit lines the relationship 
holds for the first stage. These results suggest that bank lending standards implemented for 
bank loans spill over to credit lines and trade credit through discouragement and rejections, but 
do not affect the loan terms applied for other instruments.  
 I conduct additional analyses to study the robustness of the results to alternative 
definitions of country-level proxies. Specifically, I estimate the models by using alternative 
proxies for bank concentration (Lerner index, H-statistic), bank efficiency (bank cost to income 
ratio), bank interest margins (bank lending-deposit spread), market capitalization (turnover 
ratio), legal system and property rights (rule of law index), banking system development (bank 
deposits to GDP). I confirm the main findings using these alternative variables.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this paper I investigate the conditional nature of credit constraints in a cross-country context. 
Credit constraints occur in sequential, conditional stages. I define three stages of credit 
constraints: discouragement, rejection, and unfavorable terms. I estimate the prevalence of 
credit constraints at each stage and examine whether and how the likelihood of the occurrence 
depends on firm, bank, and country characteristics. I base the analysis on micro-data of over 
58,000 SMEs in the Euro area in the period 2009-2013.  
My main findings reveal the differential effects of the key determinants on the 
likelihood of the occurrence of credit constraints.  
First, I find that credit constraints vary with the firm, bank, and country characterist ics, 
but the direction and the magnitude of the effect depends on the stage of credit constraints. 
Firms are more likely to be discouraged or rejected if they are smaller, more risky, or if they 
are based in the economies where the banking sector is more risky. Discouragement and 
rejection rates are higher if bank lending standards are high, but conditional on approval, 
borrowers are less likely to obtain unfavorable loan terms. The effect is mainly due to a higher 
loan volume, but not due to a lower cost of bank loans. I show evidence that the transmiss ion 
channel of bank lending standards to credit constraints operates mainly through collateral 
requirements and covenants.  
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Second, I analyze the boundaries of credit constraints. I find that credit constraints exist 
at the firm level and are consistent across various credit instruments. The individual stages of 
credit constraints are strongly related to the stages of credit constraints reported for other credit 
instruments. Bank lending standards applied for bank loans tend to spill over to other credit 
instruments.  
Third, I document that the availability of market financing for firms is associated with 
lower discouragement and rejections while the ability of banks to access market finance is 
associated with higher loan volume for approved borrowers. There is a limited evidence that 
borrowers behave strategically in response to the expectations of the availability of finance in 
time and across credit instruments.  
This study has important implications for banks, firms, and policymakers. In the 
conditional framework of credit constraints, I document more fully the extent of credit 
constraints. To put the problem in perspective, in countries with the highest levels of credit 
constraints, 40% or more of SMEs are discouraged from applying for bank loans even though 
they need credit. In these economies, even if firms do apply, 20% are rejected and of those that 
are approved, 20% obtain unfavorable terms. These numbers represent a significant portion of 
the productive economy. As a result, credit constraints lead to a large loss of the economic 
output and welfare. I show that there is a more complex relationship among the key 
determinants and credit constraints within and across the conditional stages. I find that the 
direction of the key determinants depends on the stage of credit constraints. Not accounting for 
these relationships might have ramification for the credit availability and loan allocation. For 
instance, bank lending policies aimed at increasing credit availability by reducing rejection 
rates might create unintended consequences of increasing the occurrence of unfavorable terms. 
Because credit constraints exist at the firm level, strategies aimed at promoting availability of 
a specific credit instrument need to be formulated in context of other credit instruments. This 
study opens questions about the marginal effect that the changes of bank lending policies have 
on the efficiency of loan provision. If banks that increase lending standards substitute higher 
rejection rates with higher loan volumes, the overall effect might result into the lower credit 
availability to smaller and more risky borrowers and a potentially distorted loan allocation. The 
paper also shows how the structure of the financial markets and the availability of other 
financing instruments interacts with the bank loan provision and the occurrence of credit 
constraints.  
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Discouraged 
 
Rejected 
 
Unfavorable terms 
 
Figure 3.4 Stages of credit constraints by firm turnover  
This figure shows the frequency distribution of observations by the stage of the credit constraints and firm annual turnover.  
The values are aggregated at the country level. The composition of the stages of credit constraints (left -axis) represents the 
proportion of credit constrained firms in a particular stage relative to all credit constrained firms per country. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
<2 2-10 10-50 50<
D
is
co
u
ra
ge
d
 f
ir
m
s 
(%
 o
f 
al
l 
co
n
st
ra
in
ed
 p
er
 
co
u
n
tr
y)
Firm annual turnover (EUR millions)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
<2 2-10 10-50 50<
R
ej
ec
te
d
 f
ir
m
s 
(%
 o
f 
al
l 
co
n
st
ra
in
ed
 p
er
 
co
u
n
tr
y)
Firm annual turnover (EUR millions)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
<2 2-10 10-50 50<U
n
fa
v.
 t
er
m
s 
(%
 o
f 
al
l 
co
n
st
ra
in
ed
 p
er
 c
o
u
n
tr
y)
Firm annual turnover (EUR millions)
87_Erim Vlado BW stand.job
 
73 
3.8 Tables  
Table 3.1 Summary statistics  
This table represents the summary statistics. The values are based on the full sample of firms from 14 countries in the period 
2009-2013. Firm characteristics in Panel A come from the ECB Survey on the Access to Finance of SMEs. Bank lending 
standards in Panel B come from the ECB Bank Lending Survey and are reported as diffusion indices.  
 
Panel A. Firm characteristics (frequency distribution)                   
Size (# emp) Age (years) Turnover  
(€ m) 
Ownership Gender Industry Firm 
outlook 
Credit 
history 1-9  19,117 10< 43,322  <2 27,190 Shareholders 2,167 M 45,714 Minin
g 
14,209 + 11,628 + 12,329 
10-49  18,955 5-10 7,620  2-10 14,896 Family/entre
p. 
28,597 F 6,713 Constr
. 
5,680 0 27,149 0 34,820 
50-250 15,811 2-5 4,174  10-50 10,251 Other firms 7,012 N/r 6,418 Manuf
. 
14,004 - 16,957 - 8,449 
250<  4,962 <2 1,241  50< 4,812 Venture cap. 615   Trade 19,990 N/r 3,111 N/r 3,247 
  N/r 2,488   N/r 1,696 Nat. person 13,230   N/r 4,962     
      Other 1,092         
            N/r 592                 
Total 58,845   58,845   58,845   53,305   58,845   58,845   58,845   58,845 
 
Panel B. Country characteristics           
    Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max 
Credit constraints      
 Overall credit constraint 
indicator 
58,845 0.11 0.32 0 1 
 Dis ouraged 58,845 0.06 0.24 0 1 
 Rejected 15,664 0.03 0.17 0 1 
 Unfavorable terms 13,985 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Bank lending standards      
 Lending standards SMEs 59,013 16.46 27.94 -40 135 
 Lending standards LT loans 59,013 23.23 36.62 -40 190 
 Lending standards ST loans 59,013 13.19 26.48 -42 130 
 Overall Lending standards 59,013 18.41 30.53 -42 150 
Loan supply terms      
 Collateral 58,845 14.09 23.57 -32 140 
 Covenants 58,845 8.75 17.85 -32 120 
 Interest margins 58,845 20.11 34.26 -50 160 
 Maturity 58,845 13.31 25.03 -12 160 
 Non-interest margins 58,845 6.86 15.90 -25 110 
 Loan size 58,845 10.58 21.28 -20 130 
Factors affecting lending 
standards 
     
 Impact of bank competition 58,845 -4.11 10.88 -44 42 
 Capital position 58,845 13.29 24.91 0 130 
 Liquidity 58,845 6.88 24.44 -50 120 
 Non-bank competition 58,845 0.30 3.06 -10 30 
Banking sector      
 Bank concentration 34,006 70.10 10.01 29.74 99.64 
 Bank z-score 34,006 14.48 6.30 -0.005 35.77 
 Bank net interest margin 34,006 1.34 0.50 0.54 4.50 
 Bank overhead costs/total 
assets 
34,006 1.14 0.36 0.26 2.55 
 Bank ROA 34,006 -0.02 0.85 -4.49 4.39 
Country-level variables      
 Private credit / GDP 34,006 147.48 47.75 48.18 284.62 
 Stock market capitalization 34,006 47.52 26.08 4.78 169.25 
 Log of GDP 34,006 27.83 1.13 22.82 28.91 
 Expected economic activity  58,845 26.01 33.23 -15.14 160 
 Inflation 46,030 1.73 1.17 -4.48 4.98 
 Protection of property rights 46,030 7.18 1.11 5.10 8.70 
 Regulation index 46,030 6.94 0.38 5.4 7.8 
  Depth of credit information 58,645 5.00 0.82 0.00 6.00 
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Table 3.3 Differential impact of the key determinants on the stages of credit constraints 
This table reports the results of probit regressions to estimate the probability of the occurrence of credit constraint. The 
dependent variable is a binary indicator of credit constraints equal to 1 if a firm is constrained. In models (1-3) the dependent 
variable corresponds to the conditional stages of credit constraints. Models (4-5) decompose the third stage of credit constraints 
(unfavorable terms) into insufficient amount and high cost of a loan. Omitted category variables are as follows: size=1-9 
employees, age>10 years, turnover<2m, owners=shareholders, gender=male, firm outlook=improved, credit 
history=improved. Each specification accounts for the sample selection bias. All regressions include time fixed effects and 
industry fixed effects. Z-values are based on robust standard errors, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 
5% level, and * at the 10% level. Variable definitions are described in the Appendix table A3.1.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Dep. var.:  Discouraged Rejected Unfav. terms Unfav. terms  
(small amt) 
Unfav. terms  
(high cost)     Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z 
Bank lending standards           
 Bank lending standards 0.0034** (2.01) 0.0049** (2.26) -0.007** (-2.53) -0.01*** (-3.54) 0.0030 (0.65) 
Firm characteristics           
 Size=10-49emp -0.18*** (-3.84) -0.23*** (-3.23) 0.041 (0.38) 0.12 (1.00) -0.077 (-0.50) 
 Size=50-249emp -0.13** (-1.97) -0.21** (-2.35) 0.038 (0.33) 0.11 (0.86) -0.085 (-0.52) 
 Age=<2y 0.095 (0.83) 0.15 (1.00) 0.11 (0.63) -0.018 (-0.080) 0.23 (1.01) 
 Age=>2y & <5y 0.30*** (4.93) 0.48*** (5.50) -0.40* (-1.87) -0.48** (-2.00) -0.13 (-0.41) 
 Age=>5y & <10y 0.073 (1.43) 0.25*** (3.86) -0.37*** (-2.91) -0.40*** (-2.81) -0.25 (-1.33) 
 Turnover=>2m & <10m -0.32*** (-6.39) -0.14* (-1.66) 0.11 (1.39) 0.23*** (2.58) -0.20* (-1.65) 
 Turnover=>10m & <50m -0.57*** (-7.59) -0.41*** (-3.11) 0.26 (1.56) 0.44** (2.32) -0.13 (-0.51) 
 Turnover=>50m -0.85*** (-5.26) -0.63*** (-2.87) 0.71*** (2.65) 0.93*** (3.17) 0.11 (0.28) 
 Owners=Fam/entrep -0.11 (-0.96) -0.077 (-0.54) 0.013 (0.084) 0.067 (0.35) -0.087 (-0.39) 
 Owners=Other firms -0.047 (-0.39) 0.047 (0.31) -0.083 (-0.49) -0.0094 (-0.046) -0.26 (-1.07) 
 Owners=VC/angels 0.14 (0.74) 0.56** (2.50) -0.47 (-1.34) -0.60 (-1.48) -0.087 (-0.18) 
 Owners=One nat person -0.012 (-0.10) 0.14 (0.97) -0.20 (-1.17) -0.17 (-0.81) -0.23 (-0.97) 
 Owners=Other 0.021 (0.12) 0.055 (0.24) -0.20 (-0.82) -0.023 (-0.085)   
 Owners=Na 0.34 (0.43) 1.64*** (2.79)       
 Gender=Female 0.17*** (3.29) 0.083 (1.13) -0.14* (-1.66) -0.16* (-1.71) -0.057 (-0.48) 
 Firm  outlook=Unchngd -0.082 (-1.60) -0.14** (-2.16) 0.0012 (0.013) 0.039 (0.41) -0.066 (-0.50) 
 Firm outlook=Detertd 0.13*** (2.58) 0.14** (1.96) -0.030 (-0.34) -0.070 (-0.71) 0.029 (0.21) 
 Firm outlook=Na -0.20* (-1.66) 0.078 (0.57) -0.18 (-1.18) -0.42** (-2.20) 0.30 (1.52) 
 Credit  hist=Unchanged 0.18*** (3.71) 0.24*** (3.15) -0.22** (-2.02) -0.27** (-2.19) -0.10 (-0.60) 
 Credit hist=Deteriorated 0.45*** (7.18) 0.68*** (7.84) -0.38 (-1.36) -0.58* (-1.87) 0.039 (0.098) 
 Credit history=Na 0.35*** (3.20) 0.60*** (3.58) -0.40 (-1.35) -0.58* (-1.79) -0.072 (-0.16) 
Banking sector           
 Bank  concentration -0.0029 (-0.64) 0.0067 (1.15) 0.0063 (1.17) 0.010* (1.65) -0.007 (-0.81) 
 Bank z-score -0.04*** (-5.46) -0.03*** (-3.22) 0.020 (1.33) 0.042** (2.57) -0.028 (-1.27) 
 Bank net interest margin 0.13 (1.08) 0.53*** (3.71) -0.77*** (-2.80) -1.14*** (-3.65) 0.18 (0.43) 
 Bank ROA -0.023 (-0.57) -0.085 (-1.61) -0.10 (-1.62) -0.089 (-1.30) -0.11 (-1.22) 
 Bank overhead costs -0.18 (-1.24) -0.49** (-2.43)       
Economic environment           
 Private credit/GDP 0.00039 (0.26) 0.00054 (0.33) 0.00013 (0.061) -0.00069 (-0.26) -0.001 (-0.21) 
 Stock market cap 0.0061** (1.98) 0.0023 (0.58) -0.0028 (-0.63) -0.0061 (-1.20) 0.0093 (1.54) 
 ln(GDP) -0.11* (-1.86) 0.039 (0.53) -0.13 (-1.47) -0.18* (-1.69) -0.045 (-0.42) 
 Expected econ act -0.004** (-2.14) -0.0035 (-1.55) 0.00020 (0.10) 0.00078 (0.32) -0.001 (-0.33) 
 Inflation 0.077* (1.68) -0.037 (-0.68) 0.39*** (4.29) 0.44*** (3.49) 0.16 (1.35) 
 Property rights 0.090 (1.55) -0.031 (-0.40) -0.22*** (-2.99) -0.32*** (-3.88) 0.042 (0.41) 
 Credit info depth 0.19*** (3.02) 0.11 (1.38) 0.016 (0.19) -0.084 (-0.80) 0.26** (2.21) 
 Regulation  index -0.19** (-2.11)         
Inverse Mills ratios           
 IMR  (need credit) 0.58*** (7.52)         
 IMR (discouraged)   0.18 (0.89)       
 IMR (rejected)     -1.41*** (-2.73) -1.75*** (-3.03) -0.38 (-0.51) 
Constant 1.69 (0.82) -3.22 (-1.30) 6.27* (1.67) 5.50 (1.24) -0.98 (-0.20) 
Observations 7,581   6,056   5,370   5,370   5,278   
Pseudo R2 0.12  0.11  0.10  0.13  0.074  
Time fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
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77 
Table 3.5 Consistency of credit constraints across credit instruments 
This table reports the results of probit regressions to estimate the probability of the occurrence of credit constraint. The 
dependent variable is a binary indicator of credit constraints equal to 1 if a firm is constrained. In models (1-3) the dependent 
variable corresponds to the conditional stages of credit constraints. Explanatory variables for credit lines, trade credit, and 
other loan, represent a binary variable that measure the lending outcome for a given credit instrument. The definition of the 
lending outcomes for these instruments are equivalent to the definitions used for the bank loans. The lending outcomes for 
credit lines, trade credit, and other loans are unconditional. Each specification accounts for the sample selection bias. All 
regressions include firm and country characteristics, time fixed effects, and industry fixed effects. Z-values are based on robust 
standard errors, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. Variable definitions 
are described in the Appendix table A3.1 
  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  
Dep. var.:  Discouraged (bank loan) Rejected (bank loan) Unfav. terms (bank loan) 
    Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z 
Bank lending standards       
 Bank lending standards 0.00035 (0.16) 0.0079** (2.48) -0.0075** (-2.33) 
Credit line       
 Cred line-discouraged 1.82*** (25.5) 0.76** (2.05) 0.27 (0.98) 
 Cred line-no need 0.015 (0.22) 0.10 (1.05) 0.068 (0.82) 
 Cred line-no app other reason 0.17** (2.36) 0.38*** (3.57) -0.0064 (-0.046) 
 Cred line-na 0.43 (1.41)     
 Cred line-rejected 0.23** (2.25) 2.39*** (18.7) -0.32 (-0.53) 
 Cred line-unfav.terms 0.15 (1.59) 0.75*** (6.62) 1.10*** (4.72) 
Trade credit       
 Trade cred-discouraged 0.94*** (9.70) 0.42* (1.71) 0.16 (0.79) 
 Trade cred-no need 0.034 (0.45) 0.12 (1.15) 0.016 (0.17) 
 Trade cred-no app  other reason 0.14** (2.02) 0.22** (2.07) -0.0010 (-0.010) 
 Trade cred-na 0.069 (0.37) -0.20 (-0.71) 0.25 (1.07) 
 Trade cred-rejected -0.35** (-2.00) 1.28*** (6.05) -0.38 (-1.01) 
 Trade  cred-unfav.terms 0.13 (1.10) 0.0029 (0.018) 0.89*** (6.94) 
Other loan       
 Other loan-discouraged 0.70*** (6.97) -0.0027 (-0.012) 0.33** (2.13) 
 Other loan-no need 0.12 (1.54) -0.40*** (-3.34) 0.15 (0.98) 
 Other loan-no app other reason 0.024 (0.32) -0.089 (-0.93) 0.18** (2.02) 
 Other  loan-na 0.086 (0.48) 0.39 (1.54) -0.017 (-0.070) 
 Other loan-rejected -0.23 (-1.10) 0.81*** (3.75) 0.57* (1.76) 
 Other loan-unfav.terms 0.073 (0.43) 0.074 (0.39) 0.68*** (3.47) 
Observations 6,284  4,940  4,420  
Pseudo R2 0.41  0.45  0.27  
Correction for sample selection Yes  Yes  Yes  
Controls for firm, country characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
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Chapter 4 
 
Credit Information Sharing and Financing 
Constraints* 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Financing constraints arise due to information asymmetries if finance providers cannot 
accurately assess the true position of a firm. Credit information sharing systems can mitigate 
information asymmetries and thereby reduce financing constraints. But an increase in credit 
information sharing may lead to rationing if, due to greater credit information transparency,  
more financing gets allocated to a smaller number of higher quality firms at the expense of 
smaller and more risky firms. In this paper I investigate the relationship between credit 
information sharing systems and financing constraints. In particular, I disentangle the effect of 
credit information scope (depth, content, and accessibility) from credit information scale 
(coverage).  
 Credit information sharing systems help to reduce the adverse selection, mitigate the 
hold-up problems, and align interests between finance providers and firms (e.g., Klein, 1992; 
Padilla and Pagano, 1997; Pagano and Jappelli, 1993). Empirical evidence shows that greater 
credit information sharing is associated with larger credit volume and lower defaults (e.g., 
Djankov et al., 2007; Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). By reducing uncertainty and facilita t ing 
accurate pricing of capital, information sharing should be particularly beneficial for smaller 
and informationally opaque firms and in countries with weak legal systems where the 
                                                                 
 
* This chapter is based on Beck, Kysucky and Norden (2015) 
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enforcement of contracts is more costly. Accurate and deep information further facilitates the 
screening of borrowers by finance providers (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). It is not known how 
firms’ ability to access financing depends on the credit information content, depth of the 
information, its accessibility and coverage.  
 In this paper I focus on the differential effect of credit information scope and scale. I 
decompose credit information scope by depth (amount of information), content (type of 
information), and accessibility. I investigate how credit information sharing affects the 
relationship between financing constraints on the one hand, and firm characteristics and 
economic environment on the other hand.  
 The empirical analysis is based on the firm-level survey from 45 emerging economies 
from the period 2006-2012. My key findings are as follows. First, credit information scope is 
associated with lower financing constraints. Deeper, more complete information is benefic ia l 
for the provision of finance, but firms are more financially constrained in countries where credit 
information is more easily accessible by borrowers. Second, credit information scale is 
associated with higher financing constraints. This finding implies that greater information 
coverage may lead to a redistribution of financing from smaller firms to larger firms. Third, 
smaller firms benefit from greater access to financing in countries with higher scope of credit 
information. This effect is mainly due to more financing provided by non-bank users of credit 
information. Fourth, financing constraints are less likely in countries with lower credit 
regulation, safer and more competitive banking systems, and higher economic growth.  
 The results suggest that credit information sharing systems play an important role in 
alleviating financing constraints. Deep and comprehensive firm information, rather than the 
coverage alone, contribute to greater access to finance, especially for small firms.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the 
related literature. Section 4.3 describes the data and the empirical strategy. Section 4.4 presents 
the results and robustness checks, and section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Credit information sharing mechanism  
Financing constraints have a negative impact on growth, new business creation, and economic 
activity (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 
2005a). In the presence of financing obstacles, some desirable projects are not funded (e.g., 
Fazzari et al., 1988). This has adverse effects on corporations, and, in aggregate, leads to 
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inefficient resource allocation with macro-economic and welfare implications (Lamont et al., 
2001). Financing constraints are more acute for small firms and in developing countries where 
access to finance is particularly critical for growth (Beck, 2007). 
Credit information sharing can help mitigate financing constraints through 4 channels 
(Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). First, credit information sharing reduces the adverse selection by 
improving lenders’ knowledge about borrowers (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993). The improved 
knowledge facilitates more accurate pricing of the financing products. Second, sharing credit 
information among finance providers reduces the ‘hold up’ problem of a single lender that has 
private information about a borrower (Sharpe, 1990; von Thadden, 2004). Credit information 
sharing allows a borrower to switch to an uninformed competitor with relatively lower 
switching costs. Third, information sharing motivates borrowers to exert effort to mainta in 
good financial standing, because negative information is visible to other prospective finance 
providers, potentially increasing financing costs and limiting alternative sources of outside 
financing (Klein, 1992; Padilla and Pagano, 1997; Vercammen, 1995). Fourth, credit reporting 
agencies keep records on the financial positions of borrowers and therefore reduce their 
incentives to over-borrow from multiple sources (Bennardo et al., 2014).  
 Credit information sharing systems are operated by two types of credit reporting 
agencies. First, public credit registries are government-operated institutions typically managed 
by central banks. Information reporting to credit registries is mandatory and the information 
collected serves to support the regulatory role of central banks and financial supervisors. Credit 
registries tend to collect data only on specific financing instruments that are relevant to policy 
measures and with values exceeding a certain threshold. All banks within a country are required 
to report information to credit registries. These characteristics of credit registries imply that the 
information (collected and retrieved) tends to concentrate primarily on financial institut ions 
and larger financing instruments.  
Second, private credit bureaus are privately operated organizations with the mission of 
facilitating the information exchange among finance providers. Information reporting to credit 
bureaus is voluntary and is based on the principle of reciprocity. This means that credit bureaus 
grant access to information providers in exchange for the information supplied. Credit bureaus 
tend to collect more data across a wider range of entities and financing instruments, includ ing 
individuals and small companies.  
 Theoretical models predict that credit information sharing tends to result in lower 
defaults and interest rates at the individual firm level (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993). Padilla and  
Pagano (2000) show that the information content affects lending outcomes. However, an 
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increase in credit information sharing may also lead to lower availab ility of finance. If banks 
exchange more information about borrowers while the quality of the borrowers remains the 
same, the overall increase in lending due to better information may be a redistribution effect 
from lower-quality borrowers to higher-quality borrowers (Jappelli and Pagano, 2000).  
Empirical evidence confirms that credit information sharing is generally associated 
with higher credit volumes, better credit market performance, and greater access to finance 
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine, 2005b; Beck et al., 2007; Beck and Levine, 2005; Brown et 
al., 2009; Djankov et al., 2007; Haselmann et al., 2010; Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Visaria, 
2009). In a cross-country study in Latin America, Galindo and Miller (2001) show that, not 
only the information content, but also the quality of the information matters for reducing 
financing constraints. Love and Mylenko (2003) study the effects of different types of credit 
reporting agencies. They find that the existence of private registries lowers financ ing 
constraints and increases the share of banking financing, but the presence of public registr ies 
does not have significant effect on financing constraints.  
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the relationship between 
financing constraints and credit information scope and scale. Using detailed firm-level data 
from 45 countries, the empirical analysis disentangles the effect credit information scope by 
information content and accessibility, and examines the redistribution effect of credit 
information scale. The paper sheds new light on the relationship between the components of 
credit information and financing constraints. 
 
4.3 Data and methodology 
4.3.1 Data sources 
The empirical analysis is based on 28,651 firm-year observations from 45 emerging economies 
over the period 2006-2012. The firm-level data comes from the World Bank’s Enterprise 
Surveys. The dataset contains firm-level data about operations and financing. The sampling 
procedure is based on the randomized selection of firms with replacement and ensures that the 
firms are stratified representatively by size, industries, and geographic regions. The surveys are 
administered in a standardized format to business owners and managers of mainly small and 
medium-sized enterprises.  
Data on credit information sharing systems comes from the World Bank Credit 
Reporting Database. The dataset contains information about the ownership, corporate structure, 
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content, and information distribution by public credit registries and private credit bureaus. The 
data is collected in three stages. First, data is collected from public sources. Second, a detailed 
survey is administered to the management of a public credit registry or a private credit bureau. 
Third, the dataset is verified by following-up with the reporting entity and by consulting third 
parties and public sources.  
Data on the economic and legal environment is obtained from the World Bank 
databases (Doing Business Database, Development Indicators, Global Financial Development 
Database). I merge the firm-level data with the country-level data for each country and the year 
of the survey. From the merged sample I remove records with missing values and those survey 
responses, which do not contain valid responses. 
 
4.3.2 Main variables and methodology 
The main variable of interest is the occurrence of financing constraints. This measure is a firm’s 
assessment of obstacles to its operations due to difficulties of accessing finance. It refers to 
both the availability of finance and the cost of finance. I transform the ordinal scale from the 
survey (0 = “no obstacle”, 4=”very severe obstacle”) into a binary variable, which takes the 
value of 1 if a firm reports financing constraints that fall into categories 3 or 4. Using the binary 
variable imposes a less restrictive functional form on the estimations to isolate the presence of 
financing constraints.   
While most of the empirical studies use various measures of financing constra ints 
derived from the optimal investment patterns, or from the relationship between the cash-flows 
and investments (Fazzari et al., 1988), the self-reported estimate is obtained directly from a 
firm’s management. The advantage of using this measure is that it is a direct representation of 
financing constraints rather than a proxy and it is not endogenous to other firm characterist ics. 
However, because it is reported by a firm itself, it might be biased in the sense that firms are 
more likely to report that they are financially constrained when they are not. The problem is 
mitigated by the fact that the surveys are anonymous and in the empirical analyses I control for 
the trustworthiness estimate of the interviewees.  
I focus on two main variables that estimate the extent of credit information sharing in 
an economy. First, the scope of credit information is an index that measures the depth of the 
information and its accessibility in both public credit registry and private credit bureau. The 
scope of credit information consists of 6 components: data on both firms and individuals is 
distributed; both positive and negative credit information is available and distributed; data from 
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retailers and utility companies is distributed in addition to data from financial institutions; at 
least 2 years of historical data is distributed; data on loan amounts below 1% of income per 
capita is distributed; by law, borrowers have the right to access their data in the largest credit 
bureau or registry in the economy. Second, the scale of credit information represents the 
coverage of the credit reporting agencies measured as a percentage of adults and firms relative 
to the adult population. This variable reports the number of individuals and firms listed in a 
public credit or private registry with current information on repayment history, unpaid debts, 
or credit outstanding.  I calculate the overall scale as the maximum of the scale of credit registry 
and credit bureau.  
I include firm-level variables to control for the heterogeneity in firm size, age, growth, 
transparency (presence of audited statements), government ownership, and the legal form of 
an establishment. At the country level I control for the overall growth options in an economy 
(using a proxy GDP per capita growth), pricing stability (inflation rate), financial development 
(stock market capitalization), and the quality of the institutional and legal environment. I use 
four variables related to the structure of banking systems that might influence the access to 
finance: prevalence of bank finance (proportion of firms using banks to finance investments), 
bank concentration, riskiness of the banking sector (bank z-score), and credit market regulat ion.  
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics of the main variables. On average, 26% of all 
firms are financially constrained across all countries in the sample, but there is a large variation 
in the presence of financing constraints (44% standard deviation). The mean coverage of credit  
information sharing systems is 36% of firms and individuals as a proportion of population in a 
country. The majority of the credit registries and bureaus capture at least 4 out of the 6 
dimensions of credit information sharing. The most frequent users of credit information data 
are banks, followed by non-bank financial institutions, and retailers/traders. Private credit 
bureaus tend to collect a greater amount and more detailed information compared to public 
credit registries. The largest difference is apparent in the availability of data about liabilit ies 
and financial positions of borrowers where private credit bureaus exert considerably more 
ongoing effort in data collection on current financial standing of borrowers. A typical company 
in the dataset is a small, privately held, limited liability company with less than 50 employees 
and with average age of around 10 years.  
 The purpose of the empirical analysis is to explain the cross-sectional differences in the 
relationship between credit information sharing systems and the occurrence of financ ing 
constraints. In particular, I investigate whether and how the credit information scope and scale 
relate to a firm’s perceived obstacles in accessing external finance. The empirical analysis is 
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based on a repeated cross-sectional setup with probit estimations where the dependent variable 
is the binary indicator of financing constraints. Each estimation includes industry and year-
fixed effects to isolate the time-invariant component in cross-country differences. Because the 
characteristics of credit information sharing systems are fairly stable over time, I do not include 
country-fixed effects in the baseline analyses. I report results using robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the country-level. In each estimation I control for the perceived 
truthfulness of the interviewee. 
 
4.4. Empirical results 
4.4.1 In which countries are firms more likely to experience financing constraints? 
In the first step of the analysis, I estimate the prevalence of financing constraints across the 
countries. Table 4.2 shows the distribution of countries by financing constraints and credit 
information sharing systems. The values are reported in a descending order by the extent of 
financing constraints. In absolute terms, the most financially constrained firms reside in four 
African countries (66% of all firms in Ghana are financially constrained, 54% in Uganda, 51% 
in Mozambique, 50% in Senegal). The least proportion of financially constrained firms are in 
Panama (9%), South Arica (10%), Hungary (10.1%), and Philippines (12%). While the large 
majority of all countries maintain either public credit registry or private credit bureau or both, 
surprisingly, none of the least constrained countries have public credit registry. Only two  
countries in the sample have neither credit registry nor credit bureau (Sierra Leone and 
Moldova). Over 90% of all firms reside in countries with a credit bureau and 62% of all firms 
reside in countries with a credit registry. The table shows that there is a large heterogene ity 
across the countries in financing constraints and the credit information sharing systems.  
To investigate further the systematic differences in firms’ perceptions of financ ing 
constraints across the countries, I split the sample 2-way by country-level factors and firm size. 
Table 4.3 shows that small firms (bottom tercile by number of employees) are consistent ly 
more financially constrained compared to large firms (top tercile). The difference is statistica l ly 
significant at 1% confidence level. Firms are relatively less constrained in countries where the 
scope of credit information is high, but they are more constrained when the scale of credit 
information is high. The difference is larger, both in absolute and relative terms, for small firms. 
On average, 19% of large firms are constrained in countries where the scope of information is 
high, as opposed to 35% of small firms that are constrained in countries where the scope of 
information is low. The greatest contrast is manifested by the information content. In countries 
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where neither credit registry nor credit bureau report positive and negative information, 44% 
of all firms are financially constrained, relative to 25% of firms in countries where this 
information is available from at least one of the agencies. There is no significant difference in 
the mean values of financing constraints of firms based in countries with a different quality of 
the legal system. However, the values differ by legal origin. The least financially constrained 
firms are in German-based legal systems, whereas the largest proportion is in countries with a 
socialist legal origin. In countries with English origin, 41% of small firms are financia l ly 
constrained. This table indicates that the firm size, together with the characteristics of credit 
information sharing systems, are important factors in explaining the occurrence of financ ing 
constraints.  
 
4.4.2 Differential effect of credit information scope and scale  
In this section I investigate the relationship between the occurrence of financing constraints 
and the characteristics of credit information sharing systems using probit estimations. I analyze 
the differential effect of credit information scope and scale, and the effect of the institutiona l 
environment. Table 4.4 reports the results.  
The multivariate analyses show that higher scope of credit information (deeper and 
more accessible credit information) is associated with lower financing constraints, whereas 
higher scale of credit information (greater coverage of credit information) is associated with 
higher financing constraints. These results are in line with two of the theoretical propositions 
described above. First, the theories on information asymmetries and the alignment of incentives 
state that greater depth of accurate and accessible information is beneficial for the provision of 
external finance. Second, the positive relationship between the information scale and financ ing 
constraints implies that the information coverage might lead to aggregate redistribution of 
financing.  
 Further, financing constraints are lower in countries with high GDP growth per capita, 
low level of credit markets regulation, and safe and competitive banking systems. As expected, 
smaller firms are more likely to be financially constrained. Credit information sharing as a tool 
for financing provision crucially depends on the legal system. This follows from the quality of 
the legal framework that defines possible contractual recourse in which reliable information 
plays a crucial role. The results in Table 4.4, Model 2 do not support the view that greater scope 
of credit information is more important in countries with weak legal systems. The table shows 
that there is little difference between English, French and German systems, but firms in 
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countries with socialist origin are more likely to be constrained. The structure of banking 
systems influences the access to finance and the incentives of banks to share information about 
borrowers. However, Model 4 shows no evidence that firms in more competitive banking 
systems benefit more from the scope of credit information. In Model 5, I decompose the overall 
level of bank loan financing into loans provided by domestic and foreign banks. I find that 
larger volume of lending by domestic banks (measured as a percentage of GDP), but not by 
foreign banks, is associated with lower constraints. This result supports the view that foreign 
banks are more likely to focus on larger clients or specialized financing instruments. In 
unreported analyses I interact the extent of foreign loans in a country with large firms and 
confirm the result. Since foreign lenders might be relatively less informed about local 
borrowers, they may benefit more from greater scope of credit information. To check this 
proposition, I interact the information scope with the presence of foreign lenders, but do not 
find a significant relationship.  
 
4.4.3 The components of credit information scope 
The scope of credit information is a multi-dimensional variable. The overall measure might 
conceal the differential effect of its components. In the following analysis I decompose the 
scope of credit information into its sub-components related to the information content and 
accessibility2.  
 Table 4.5 shows that financing constraints are lower if credit information agencies 
distribute information on both firms and individuals, and when the distributed content contains 
both positive and negative information about borrowers. Information about firms and 
individuals helps finance providers to assess more completely the true financial position of a 
borrower beyond a firm boundary, and to detect a possible moral hazard of a borrower. Positive 
and negative information is further useful in well-rounded screening. The presence of negative 
information, in the absence of positive information, might overestimate borrower risk and lead 
to greater adverse selection problem.  
Credit information might be more accurate if borrowers have the right to investigate the 
records and request corrections if some information is not correct. On the other hand, 
guaranteed inspections might alter the incentives of reporting entities to provide information 
                                                                 
 
2 In this analysis I skip the component on loan amount threshold due to limited data availability.  
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(if the provision is voluntary as in the case of private credit bureaus). Model 4 shows that the 
latter effect prevails. Firms are more likely to be financially constrained if borrowers have the 
right to inspect their credit records. Regarding the source of the information, banks remains the 
most relevant source for the occurrence of financing constraints. The information content from 
retailers and traders does not appear to be related to financing constraints. Adding all 
components together, I find that the existence of secrecy laws is associated with higher 
constraints. Apparently, secrecy is an obstacle that inhibits effective reduction of information 
asymmetries. The coefficient on information content for firms and individuals is not significant 
when controlling for positive and negative information, suggesting that the type of information 
(positive and negative) is an important factor that encompasses the type of the information 
subject (firm and individual) 
 These results imply that deeper information content is associated with lower financ ing 
constraints, but the accessibility of information by borrowers may have an opposing effect. For 
given information content, lower secrecy restrictions on information sharing is associated with 
lower financing constraints.  
 
4.4.4 Types of information content 
To gain further insights on the role of credit information content, in the following analysis I 
decompose credit information by the type and the source. I analyze three types of credit 
information: personal information, loan information, and information on liabilities and 
financial positions. Each measure is constructed as an index that estimates the amount 
information about the credit behavior of a borrower available either through a credit registry, 
credit bureau, or both.  
 The results are reported in Table 4.6. I do not find evidence of a differential effect of 
the information type. Namely, the marginal amount of information collected about individua ls, 
loans, and liabilities, is not individually related to the occurrence of financing constraints. In 
unreported analyses I find that credit information types collected by credit registries and credit 
bureaus are complementary. Credit information agencies are more likely to collect and 
distribute information that is not already present in the other source.  
If the type of distributed information is systematically different between credit registr ies 
and credit bureaus, then it is possible that the information content type from each source has a 
differential association with financing constraints. Table 4.6 shows that greater depth of 
personal information and information on liabilities of the borrowers in credit registries are 
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associated with lower constraints. The results for credit bureaus are not significant except for 
a weakly positive association between financing constraints and personal information.  
 In the next analysis I investigate how financing constraints depend on users of credit 
information sharing systems. Finance providers can directly influence financing outcomes. 
Therefore the usage of credit information systems by finance providers provides insights on 
the transmission channels of credit information sharing effect. In Table 4.7, I whether the 
occurrence of financing constraints is systematically related to the use of credit information by 
a specific type of entity. I focus on three types of information users: banks, non-bank financ ia l 
institutions, and retailers and traders. The results show that financing constraints are higher in 
countries where non-bank financial institutions are more frequent and heavy users of credit 
information sharing systems (relatively greater amount of credit information is distributed to 
non-bank financial institutions as measured by the information distribution index). Since the 
models control for the prevalence of bank finance, the effect is not likely due to the aggregate 
amount of non-bank finance provision. The coefficient on bank users is insignifica nt, 
suggesting that, in relative terms, banks rely primarily on their own proprietary information. 
The findings from the two previous analyses reveal an interesting pattern. While banks are the 
main providers of credit information, the use of the information by non-bank financ ia l 
institutions influences the financing constraints at the margin.  
   
4.4.5 Additional results 
Firm size is an important determinant of financing constraints. Since the information 
production about borrowers has fixed costs, finance providers are not willing to extend 
financing to smaller firms if the cost of information production does not justify expected 
payoff. Sharing the information collection costs among multiple finance providers can 
therefore help smaller firms to access finance. Results in Table 4.8 confirm this proposition. 
While small firms are more financially constrained on average, they benefit more from larger 
scope of credit information. The effect is not significant for credit information scale, suggesting 
that greater credit information coverage of small firms does not necessarily translate into 
greater access to finance. Further, I interact the small firm dummy with the credit information 
users. To the extent that non-bank finance providers might have different requirements or focus 
on specific clientele, the overall effect might reflect greater barriers to access financ ing by 
larger fraction of small companies. The purpose of this analysis is to uncover whether there is 
a clientele effect among credit information users driven by firm size. The results in Table 4.8 
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indicate that smaller firms are more likely to be less constrained if non-bank financ ia l 
institutions or retailers/traders retrieve their credit information. However, the effect is only 
marginally significant.  
 A significant fraction of the firms in the sample do not have any outside financ ing. 
There are systematic unobserved differences between these two groups of firms in terms of 
their quality, operations, or growth options. Moreover, firms that do not have external financ ing 
also do not have current (or past) credit records and therefore cannot benefit directly from credit 
information sharing mechanism. In Table 4.9, I analyze separately firms with an existing bank 
loan or credit line (Model 1) and those firms without any credit facility (Model 2). The 
estimations confirm the baseline results on the beneficial effect of credit information scope. In 
the sub-sample of firms with no credit, the coefficient on credit information scale is not 
significant. This is likely due to the fact that firms that are already excluded from the financ ing 
market are not affected by the redistribution effect of greater credit information scale.  
 Finally, I investigate how credit information sharing relates to loan terms. In Models 3-
5 as the dependent variables I use, respectively, loan size, collateral, and maturity. I find that 
greater credit information scope is associated with lower collateral requirements, supporting 
the hypothesis that credit information can substitute collateral. The scale of the information is 
positively related to the collateral, which is consistent with the redistribution theory, but there 
is no significant relationship with the loan size.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Credit information sharing can help firms to reduce financing constraints. However, it is not 
known whether and how credit information scope and scale affect financing outcomes. Using 
a comprehensive database of over 28,000 firm-year observations from 45 countries, I 
investigate in detail the relationship between credit information sharing systems and financ ing 
constraints. I disentangle the effect of the credit information scope (depth, content, and 
accessibility) from the credit information scale (coverage). The former measure is a policy 
variable with a direct relationship to the credit information sharing system design. The latter 
variable is an intermediated outcome of credit information sharing systems.  
I find that credit information scope is associated with lower financing constraints, but 
credit information scale is associated with higher financing constraints. This effect implies that 
greater information coverage may lead to a redistribution of financing among firms. Smaller 
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firms benefit more from greater scope of credit information, especially in obtaining non-bank 
finance. These findings suggest that credit information systems provide beneficia l mechanisms 
to alleviate the financing constraints, but the effects depend on credit information content, 
accessibility, and usage.  
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4.7 Tables 
Table 4.1 Summary statistics 
This table shows the summary statistics. The values refer to the full sample of firms from 45 countries in the period 2006-
2012. “CR” stands for public credit registry, “CB” stands for private credit bureau. Mean values are pooled across all countries 
and periods. Definitions of the variables are in Appendix A4.1. 
 
    Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Financing constraints      
 Constrained 28,651 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Credit information sharing      
 Scope of credit information 28,651 4.33 1.79 0 6 
 Scale of credit information 28,651 35.71 29.33 0 100 
 Information on firms and individuals 28,651 0.58 0.49 0 1 
 Positive and negative information 28,651 0.95 0.21 0 1 
 Guaranteed  inspection by borrowers 27,339 0.79 0.41 0 1 
 Secrecy law 27,640 0.60 0.49 0 1 
 Users = banks 28,090 1.17 0.54 0 2 
 Users = non-banks 28,090 0.87 0.63 0 2 
 Users = retailers and traders 28,090 0.48 0.60 0 2 
 CR - Personal information 28,651 0.30 0.27 0 0.83 
 CR - Loan information 28,651 0.33 0.31 0 0.95 
 CR - Liabilities and financial positions 28,651 0.20 0.20 0 0.89 
 CB - Personal information 28,090 0.40 0.28 0 0.83 
 CB - Loan information 25,533 0.48 0.31 0 1.00 
 CB - Liabilities and financial positions 28,090 0.43 0.30 0 0.89 
Firm characteristics      
 Ln firm age 28,651 2.77 0.72 0 5.35 
 Direct  exports (% of sales) 28,631 8.95 23.68 0 100.00 
 Ln number of full time employees 28,651 3.51 1.44 0 10.54 
 2-year firm growth ln(t-1/t-3) 28,651 0.34 0.98 -11.74 11.84 
 Government ownership (>20%) 28,159 0.01 0.08 0 1 
 Audited   financial statements 28,428 0.52 0.50 0 1 
 Legal form = publicly listed company 1,635     
 Legal form = privately held, limited liability  17,661     
 Legal form = sole proprietorship  5,860     
 Legal form = partnership 1,662     
 Legal form = limited partnership  739     
 Legal form = other 634     
Economic environment      
 GDP per capita growth 28,651 2.53 4.69 -17.55 13.04 
 Inflation rate 28,651 7.30 5.46 -3.71 46.68 
 Prevalence of  bank finance 28,374 27.75 14.25 1.15 60.00 
 High bank concentration 28,651 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 Bank z-score 27,799 16.36 9.00 2.34 36.80 
 Credit market regulation index 28,651 8.60 0.96 5.70 10.00 
 Loans from domestic banks 28,208 53.85 33.59 7.51 195.34 
 Loans from foreign banks 28,651 16.00 39.27 0.32 359.30 
 Stock market capitalization 25,607 43.44 48.75 1.08 265.68 
Legal environment      
 Weak legal system 28,651 0.51 0.50 0 1 
 Legal  origin = English 4,726     
 Legal  origin = French 18,576     
 Legal origin = German 3,252     
  Legal origin = Socialist 2,097       
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Table 4.2 Credit information sharing systems by countries 
This table reports the distribution of financing constraints and credit information systems by countries. The mean values are  
equal-weighted averages across countries. Start year for the credit registries or credit bureaus represents the start year of the 
operations, which is typically later than the year of the establishment. If a registry/bureau exists but it is not in operation or the 
data is not available, the information is blank. Information distribution index is a measure of the number of the types of 
information distributed. The values range from 0 (low information distribution) to 1 (high information distribution). Definit ions 
of the variables are in Appendix A4.1. 
     Public credit registry   Private credit bureau 
Country Obs. 
Financially 
constr. 
firms (%) 
Scope of 
credit info. 
Scale of 
credit info. Exists 
Start 
year 
Info. 
distr
. 
inde
x 
  Exists 
Start 
year 
Info. 
distr. 
index Ghana 436 66.06 0.00 0.00 No  0.00  Yes 2010 0.04 
Uganda 505 54.26 0.00 0.00 No  0.00  Yes 2009 0.75 
Mozambique 426 51.41 3.00 0.70 Yes 1997 0.30  Yes   
Senegal 410 50.49 1.00 4.70 Yes 1962 0.18  No  0.00 
Brazil 1,447 49.58 5.00 59.20 Yes 1987 0.55  Yes 1968 0.68 
Russia 603 45.03 4.00 14.30 No  0.00  Yes 2006 0.68 
Costa Rica 333 42.77 5.00 64.80 Yes 1996 0.50  Yes 1992 0.82 
Ukraine 451 40.41 0.00 3.00 No  0.00  Yes 2007 0.18 
Kenya 574 38.15 2.00 1.50 No  0.00  Yes 2008 0.71 
Moldova 328 37.58 0.00 0.00 No  0.00  No  0.00 
Georgia 213 36.71 4.00 4.50 No  0.00  Yes 2005 0.79 
Argentina 1,566 36.30 6.00 100.00 Yes 1991 0.36  Yes 1957 0.11 
Rwanda 157 34.39 2.00 0.10 Yes 1990 0.68  Yes 1990 0.21 
Kazakhstan 351 32.07 5.00 29.50 No  0.00  Yes 2006 0.89 
Romania 264 30.58 5.00 30.20 Yes 2000 0.46  Yes 2004 0.43 
Bosnia and H. 234 29.91 5.00 64.30 Yes 2007 0.30  Yes 2001 0.50 
Armenia 198 28.43 5.00 34.50 Yes 2003 0.52  Yes 2007 0.75 
El Salvador 785 27.76 5.33 84.63 Yes 1996 0.48  Yes 1967 0.68 
Lithuania 203 26.63 6.00 18.40 Yes 1996 0.63  Yes 2009 0.68 
Latvia 211 25.60 4.00 3.50 Yes 2008 0.39  No  0.00 
Paraguay 593 25.25 6.00 51.46 Yes 1995 0.30  Yes 1963 0.00 
Bangladesh 1,432 25.07 2.00 0.60 Yes 1992 0.48  No  0.00 
Colombia 1,623 24.46 5.00 46.10 No  0.00  Yes 1981 0.79 
Ecuador 735 24.18 4.80 44.22 Yes 2008 0.57  Yes 2005 0.61 
Fyr Macedonia 257 23.53 4.00 6.50 Yes 1997 0.45  Yes 2010 0.64 
Bolivia 533 23.31 5.27 23.25 Yes 1988 0.38  Yes 2003 0.54 
Albania 121 23.08 0.00 0.00 Yes 2008 0.46  No  0.00 
Poland 236 22.67 4.00 68.30 No  0.00  Yes 2001 0.46 
Mexico 2,301 20.33 6.00 70.61 No  0.00  Yes 1995 0.39 
Sierra Leone 35 20.00 0.00 0.00 No  0.00  No  0.00 
Croatia 488 19.78 0.00 72.40 No  0.00  Yes 2007 0.61 
Czech Rep. 170 19.64 5.00 73.10 Yes 2002 0.21  Yes 2002 0.43 
Chile 1,600 19.62 5.00 29.65 Yes 1977 0.52  Yes 1928 0.32 
Dominican 
Rep. 
278 19.49 6.00 47.30 Yes 1993 0.36  Yes 1997 0.57 
Guatemala 828 19.46 5.45 12.70 Yes 2004 0.29  Yes 1975 0.61 
Pakistan 701 18.83 4.00 1.40 Yes 1993 0.57  Yes 2001 0.21 
Namibia 234 18.80 5.00 35.20 No  0.00  Yes 1990 0.57 
Bulgaria 1,083 17.69 5.19 22.55 Yes 2000 0.36  Yes 2005 0.64 
Slovenia 228 17.54 4.00 2.70 Yes 1993 0.20  No  0.00 
Slovak Rep. 151 15.23 4.00 44.00 Yes 1997 0.66  Yes 2004 0.54 
Peru 1,351 14.70 6.00 31.41 Yes 1984 0.43  Yes  0.00 
Turkey 613 14.50 5.00 26.30 Yes 1951 0.34  Yes 1999 0.50 
Indonesia 1,069 13.88 4.00 26.10 Yes 1988 0.75  Yes  0.00 
Venezuela 136 13.33 0.00 0.00 Yes  0.00  Yes   
Philippines 997 12.16 3.00 6.10 No  0.00  Yes 1990 0.00 
Hungary 259 10.16 5.00 10.30 No  0.00  Yes 1995 0.25 
South Africa 813 9.96 5.00 52.10 No  0.00  Yes 1901 0.54 
Panama 469 8.86 6.00 41.59 No   0.00   Yes 1957 0.57 
Total 29,029           
Average  26.31 4.33 35.71   0.28    0.39 
Proportion all obs (%) 
  
      62.43       90.44     
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Table 4.3 Cross-tabulation of financing constraints  
This table reports the distribution of financing constraints by credit information sharing scope, firm and country -level 
characteristics. ‘Low’ and ‘High’ threshold refers to the sample median of a given country  variable and a firm indicator. Small 
and large firm represent, respectively, the bottom and the top tercile, of the firm size distribution. Mean financing constraints 
represent the fraction of firms that are financially constrained within a given group below or over the median (except for legal 
origin and the developed status, which are determined by the World Bank income group category). Definitions of the variables 
are in Appendix A4.1. 
 
  Mean financing constraints 
    Large firms Small firms All firms 
Scope of credit information High 0.19 0.27 0.24 
 Low 0.23 0.35 0.29 
  All 0.20 0.31 0.26 
Scale of credit information High 0.23 0.29 0.28 
 Low 0.19 0.32 0.25 
  All 0.20 0.31 0.26 
Positive and negative information Yes 0.20 0.29 0.25 
 No 0.37 0.54 0.44 
  All 0.20 0.31 0.26 
Information on firms and individuals Yes 0.21 0.31 0.27 
 No 0.20 0.31 0.25 
  All 0.20 0.31 0.26 
Guaranteed  inspection by borrowers Yes 0.21 0.31 0.26 
 No 0.15 0.19 0.19 
  All 0.20 0.28 0.25 
Secrecy law Yes 0.21 0.30 0.26 
 No 0.18 0.30 0.25 
  All 0.20 0.30 0.26 
Audited statements Yes 0.19 0.29 0.23 
 No 0.24 0.32 0.29 
  All 0.20 0.31 0.26 
Government ownership Yes 0.21 0.31 0.27 
 No 0.20 0.31 0.26 
  All 0.20 0.31 0.26 
Bank concentration High 0.19 0.34 0.26 
 Low 0.21 0.29 0.26 
  All 0.20 0.31 0.26 
Legal system Strong 0.22 0.29 0.26 
 Weak 0.19 0.32 0.26 
  All 0.20 0.31 0.26 
Legal origin English 0.34 0.41 0.30 
 French 0.27 0.29 0.25 
 German 0.20 0.22 0.19 
 Socialist 0.37 0.35 0.38 
  All 0.28 0.31 0.26 
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*
*
*
 
(-5
.1
7
) 
-0
.2
6
*
*
*
 
(-8
.7
4
) 
 
W
eak
 legal sy
stem
 
0
.0
6
3
 
(0
.5
9
) 
0
.0
6
2
 
(0
.6
3
) 
0
.2
5
*
*
 
(2
.2
4
) 
0
.0
0
7
3
 
(0
.0
6
6
) 
-0
.0
5
6
 
(-0
.5
1
) 
0
.2
1
*
 
(1
.7
9
) 
  
C
o
n
stan
t 
2
.3
2
*
*
*
 
(3
.9
2
) 
2
.3
1
*
*
*
 
(4
.0
0
) 
1
.2
8
*
*
*
 
(2
.9
2
) 
1
.9
1
*
*
*
 
(3
.3
6
) 
2
.2
4
*
*
*
 
(3
.9
4
) 
2
.5
1
*
*
*
 
(5
.4
0
) 
 
N
 
2
1
,2
7
7
 
 
2
1
,2
7
7
 
 
1
9
,9
8
2
 
 
2
1
,2
7
7
 
 
2
0
,4
1
8
 
 
1
9
,9
8
2
 
 
  
P
seu
d
o
 R
2
 
0
.0
5
2
 
  
0
.0
5
3
 
  
0
.0
5
3
 
  
0
.0
4
9
 
  
0
.0
5
0
 
  
0
.0
5
9
 
  
   
115_Erim Vlado BW stand.job
  
T
a
b
le
 4
.6
 In
fo
rm
a
tio
n
 c
o
n
te
n
t ty
p
e
 a
n
d
 in
fo
rm
a
tio
n
 p
ro
v
id
e
r 
T
h
is tab
le rep
o
rts th
e estim
ates o
f p
ro
b
it regressio
n
s w
h
ere th
e d
ep
en
d
en
t v
ariab
le is th
e m
easu
re o
f fin
a
n
cin
g
 co
n
stra
in
ts. “
C
R
” refers to
 p
u
b
lic cred
it registry
, “
C
B
” refers to
 p
riv
ate cred
it b
u
reau
. 
E
ach
 regressio
n
 in
clu
d
es d
u
m
m
ies fo
r th
e legal 
fo
rm
 o
f th
e firm
s in
 th
e sam
p
le, secto
rs, y
ears, an
d
 p
ercep
tio
n
s o
f tru
th
fu
ln
ess o
f th
e su
rv
ey
 in
terv
iew
ees. T
h
e m
o
d
els are estim
ated
 w
ith
 ro
b
u
st 
stan
d
ard
 erro
rs ad
ju
sted
 b
y
 clu
sterin
g b
y
 co
u
n
tries. T
h
e d
efin
itio
n
s o
f th
e v
ariab
les are in
 A
p
p
en
d
ix A
4
.1
. Z
 v
alu
es are rep
o
rted
 in
 b
rack
ets. *
, *
*
, *
*
*
 in
d
icate resp
ectiv
ely
 sign
ifican
ce 
at 1
0
%
, 
5
%
, an
d
 1
 %
 lev
el. 
  
M
o
d
el: 
(1
) 
 
(2
) 
 
(3
) 
 
  
D
ep
 v
ar: fin
an
cin
g co
n
strain
ts 
  
  
  
  
  
  
C
red
it in
fo
rm
a
tio
n
 sh
a
rin
g
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
erso
n
al in
fo
rm
atio
n
 
-0
.1
0
 
(-0
.5
2
) 
 
 
 
 
 
L
o
an
 in
fo
rm
atio
n
 
0
.2
2
 
(1
.1
8
) 
 
 
 
 
 
L
iab
ilities an
d
 fin
an
cial p
o
sitio
n
s 
-0
.0
7
1
 
(-0
.2
3
) 
 
 
 
 
 
C
R
 - P
erso
n
al in
fo
rm
atio
n
 
 
 
-0
.6
5
*
*
 
(-2
.1
9
) 
 
 
 
C
R
 - L
o
an
 in
fo
rm
atio
n
 
 
 
0
.3
5
 
(1
.3
5
) 
 
 
 
C
R
 - L
iab
ilities an
d
 fin
an
cial p
o
sitio
n
s 
 
 
-0
.4
4
*
 
(-1
.7
3
) 
 
 
 
C
B
 - P
erso
n
al in
fo
rm
atio
n
 
 
 
 
 
0
.5
8
*
 
(1
.8
7
) 
 
C
B
 - L
o
an
 in
fo
rm
atio
n
 
 
 
 
 
0
.3
0
 
(0
.9
6
) 
 
C
B
 - L
iab
ilities an
d
 fin
an
cial p
o
sitio
n
s 
 
 
 
 
-0
.4
0
 
(-1
.3
5
) 
F
irm
 ch
a
ra
cteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L
n
 firm
 age 
-0
.0
3
5
 
(-1
.3
5
) 
-0
.0
3
7
 
(-1
.6
2
) 
-0
.0
3
2
 
(-1
.2
2
) 
 
D
irect  exp
o
rts (%
 o
f sales) 
-0
.0
0
0
7
0
 
(-0
.9
4
) 
-0
.0
0
0
4
2
 
(-0
.6
1
) 
-0
.0
0
0
3
9
 
(-0
.5
7
) 
 
L
n
 n
u
m
b
er o
f fu
ll tim
e em
p
lo
y
ees 
-0
.0
7
7
*
*
*
 
(-4
.4
7
) 
-0
.0
6
6
*
*
*
 
(-4
.9
0
) 
-0
.0
7
7
*
*
*
 
(-4
.9
6
) 
 
2
-y
ear firm
 gro
w
th
 ln
(t-1
/t-3
) 
-0
.0
0
4
3
 
(-0
.3
7
) 
-0
.0
1
1
 
(-1
.0
7
) 
-0
.0
1
3
 
(-1
.0
5
) 
 
G
o
v
ern
m
en
t o
w
n
ersh
ip
 (>
2
0
%
) 
0
.2
6
*
 
(1
.9
0
) 
0
.2
1
 
(1
.5
4
) 
0
.2
4
*
 
(1
.8
6
) 
 
A
u
d
ited
 fin
an
cial statem
en
ts 
-0
.0
7
1
*
 
(-1
.8
1
) 
-0
.1
1
*
*
*
 
(-2
.9
1
) 
-0
.0
7
7
*
*
 
(-1
.9
9
) 
L
eg
a
l a
n
d
 eco
n
o
m
ic en
v
iro
n
m
en
t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G
D
P
 p
er cap
ita gro
w
th
 
-0
.0
0
9
6
 
(-0
.6
5
) 
-0
.0
2
2
*
 
(-1
.7
5
) 
-0
.0
1
3
 
(-0
.7
7
) 
 
In
flatio
n
 rate 
0
.0
2
0
 
(1
.4
0
) 
0
.0
1
5
 
(1
.2
3
) 
0
.0
2
2
*
 
(1
.6
7
) 
 
P
rev
alen
ce o
f  b
an
k
 fin
an
ce 
-0
.0
0
6
3
 
(-1
.3
6
) 
-0
.0
0
2
2
 
(-0
.5
6
) 
-0
.0
0
7
1
*
 
(-1
.7
8
) 
 
H
igh
 b
an
k
 co
n
cen
tratio
n
 
0
.0
5
7
 
(0
.5
3
) 
0
.1
2
 
(1
.1
9
) 
0
.0
6
8
 
(0
.6
3
) 
 
B
an
k
 z
-sco
re 
-0
.0
0
8
0
 
(-1
.5
7
) 
-0
.0
1
0
*
*
 
(-2
.0
8
) 
-0
.0
1
1
*
*
 
(-2
.3
2
) 
 
C
red
it m
ark
et regu
latio
n
 in
d
ex 
-0
.2
2
*
*
*
 
(-4
.3
4
) 
-0
.2
9
*
*
*
 
(-5
.8
7
) 
-0
.2
2
*
*
*
 
(-5
.3
4
) 
 
W
eak
 legal sy
stem
 
-0
.0
0
1
0
 
(-0
.0
0
9
0
) 
0
.0
6
7
 
(0
.6
6
) 
-0
.0
2
7
 
(-0
.2
4
) 
  
C
o
n
stan
t 
1
.7
0
*
*
*
 
(3
.2
0
) 
2
.5
6
*
*
*
 
(4
.3
6
) 
1
.5
8
*
*
*
 
(3
.4
6
) 
 
N
 
1
9
,1
1
5
 
  
2
1
,2
7
7
 
  
1
9
,1
1
5
 
  
  
P
seu
d
o
 R
2
 
0
.0
4
8
 
  
0
.0
5
8
 
  
0
.0
5
3
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T
a
b
le
 4
.7
 In
fo
rm
a
tio
n
 u
s
e
rs 
T
h
is tab
le rep
o
rts th
e estim
ates o
f p
ro
b
it regressio
n
s w
h
ere th
e d
ep
en
d
en
t v
ariab
le is th
e m
easu
re o
f fin
a
n
cin
g
 co
n
stra
in
ts. E
ach
 regressio
n
 in
clu
d
es d
u
m
m
ies fo
r th
e legal fo
rm
 o
f th
e firm
s in
 th
e 
sam
p
le, secto
rs, y
ears, an
d
 p
ercep
tio
n
s o
f tru
th
fu
ln
ess o
f th
e su
rv
ey
 in
terv
iew
ees. T
h
e m
o
d
els are estim
ated
 w
ith
 ro
b
u
st stan
d
ard
 e
rro
rs ad
ju
sted
 b
y
 clu
sterin
g b
y
 co
u
n
tries. T
h
e d
efin
itio
n
s o
f th
e 
v
ariab
les are in
 A
p
p
en
d
ix A
4
.1
. Z
 v
alu
es are rep
o
rted
 in
 b
rack
ets. *
, *
*
, *
*
*
 in
d
icate resp
ectiv
ely
 sign
ifican
ce at 1
0
%
, 5
%
, an
d
 1
 %
 lev
el. 
  
M
o
d
el: 
(1
) 
 
(2
) 
 
(3
) 
 
(4
) 
 
  
D
ep
 v
ar: fin
an
cin
g co
n
strain
ts 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
C
red
it in
fo
rm
a
tio
n
 sh
a
rin
g
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
co
p
e o
f cred
it in
fo
rm
atio
n
 
-0
.1
2
*
*
*
 
(-4
.3
0
) 
-0
.1
5
*
*
*
 
(-4
.4
3
) 
-0
.1
2
*
*
*
 
(-4
.3
9
) 
-0
.1
5
*
*
*
 
(-4
.1
8
) 
 
S
cale o
f  cred
it in
fo
rm
atio
n
 
0
.0
6
0
*
*
 
(2
.1
6
) 
0
.0
6
4
*
*
 
(2
.5
7
) 
0
.0
6
1
*
*
 
(2
.1
2
) 
0
.0
6
4
*
*
 
(2
.2
2
) 
 
U
sers - b
an
k
s 
0
.0
8
7
 
(1
.1
9
) 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
3
6
 
(-0
.4
0
) 
 
U
sers - n
o
n
-b
an
k
s 
 
 
0
.2
4
*
*
 
(2
.4
3
) 
 
 
0
.2
5
*
*
 
(2
.2
3
) 
 
U
sers - retailers an
d
 trad
ers 
 
 
 
 
0
.1
1
 
(1
.2
4
) 
0
.0
4
3
 
(0
.4
7
) 
F
irm
 ch
a
ra
cteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L
n
 firm
 age 
-0
.0
1
9
 
(-0
.8
7
) 
-0
.0
1
8
 
(-0
.7
9
) 
-0
.0
2
0
 
(-0
.9
1
) 
-0
.0
1
8
 
(-0
.8
1
) 
 
D
irect  exp
o
rts (%
 o
f sales) 
-0
.0
0
0
9
5
 
(-1
.2
1
) 
-0
.0
0
0
6
3
 
(-0
.9
2
) 
-0
.0
0
0
8
4
 
(-1
.1
1
) 
-0
.0
0
0
5
8
 
(-0
.8
6
) 
 
L
n
 n
u
m
b
er o
f fu
ll tim
e em
p
lo
y
ees 
-0
.0
8
0
*
*
*
 
(-4
.9
2
) 
-0
.0
7
6
*
*
*
 
(-5
.1
1
) 
-0
.0
8
2
*
*
*
 
(-5
.0
6
) 
-0
.0
7
7
*
*
*
 
(-5
.2
4
) 
 
2
-y
ear firm
 gro
w
th
 ln
(t-1
/t-3
) 
-0
.0
0
5
2
 
(-0
.4
5
) 
-0
.0
1
2
 
(-0
.9
9
) 
-0
.0
0
6
4
 
(-0
.5
6
) 
-0
.0
1
2
 
(-1
.0
7
) 
 
G
o
v
ern
m
en
t o
w
n
ersh
ip
 (>
2
0
%
) 
0
.1
4
 
(1
.0
5
) 
0
.1
4
 
(1
.0
2
) 
0
.1
5
 
(1
.1
1
) 
0
.1
4
 
(1
.0
5
) 
 
A
u
d
ited
 fin
an
cial statem
en
ts 
-0
.0
5
2
 
(-1
.3
2
) 
-0
.0
6
1
 
(-1
.5
8
) 
-0
.0
5
9
 
(-1
.4
7
) 
-0
.0
6
4
 
(-1
.6
4
) 
L
eg
a
l a
n
d
 eco
n
o
m
ic en
v
iro
n
m
en
t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G
D
P
 p
er cap
ita gro
w
th
 
-0
.0
3
0
*
*
*
 
(-2
.6
4
) 
-0
.0
2
7
*
*
 
(-2
.4
1
) 
-0
.0
3
1
*
*
*
 
(-2
.8
1
) 
-0
.0
2
7
*
*
 
(-2
.5
0
) 
 
In
flatio
n
 rate 
0
.0
1
5
 
(1
.5
0
) 
0
.0
0
5
5
 
(0
.5
4
) 
0
.0
1
2
 
(1
.1
2
) 
0
.0
0
4
0
 
(0
.3
9
) 
 
P
rev
alen
ce o
f  b
an
k
 fin
an
ce 
-0
.0
0
1
9
 
(-0
.6
1
) 
-0
.0
0
3
4
 
(-1
.1
6
) 
-0
.0
0
2
1
 
(-0
.6
4
) 
-0
.0
0
3
5
 
(-1
.1
4
) 
 
H
igh
 b
an
k
 co
n
cen
tratio
n
 
0
.1
1
 
(1
.3
9
) 
0
.0
6
4
 
(0
.8
9
) 
0
.1
2
 
(1
.4
2
) 
0
.0
6
5
 
(0
.9
0
) 
 
B
an
k
 z
-sco
re 
-0
.0
1
1
*
*
*
 
(-2
.8
7
) 
-0
.0
1
4
*
*
*
 
(-4
.1
1
) 
-0
.0
0
8
9
*
*
 
(-2
.1
6
) 
-0
.0
1
3
*
*
*
 
(-2
.9
6
) 
 
C
red
it m
ark
et regu
latio
n
 in
d
ex 
-0
.1
8
*
*
*
 
(-3
.4
0
) 
-0
.1
3
*
*
*
 
(-2
.6
1
) 
-0
.1
7
*
*
*
 
(-3
.3
5
) 
-0
.1
3
*
*
 
(-2
.5
3
) 
 
W
eak
 legal sy
stem
 
-0
.0
6
0
 
(-0
.6
3
) 
-0
.1
7
 
(-1
.6
2
) 
-0
.0
7
8
 
(-0
.7
2
) 
-0
.1
8
 
(-1
.6
3
) 
  
C
o
n
stan
t 
1
.9
7
*
*
*
 
(3
.3
4
) 
1
.8
1
*
*
*
 
(3
.3
0
) 
1
.9
8
*
*
*
 
(3
.4
1
) 
1
.8
1
*
*
*
 
(3
.3
2
) 
 
N
 
2
0
,8
5
1
 
 
2
0
,8
5
1
 
 
2
0
,8
5
1
 
 
2
0
,8
5
1
 
 
  
P
seu
d
o
 R
2
 
0
.0
6
1
 
  
0
.0
6
4
 
  
0
.0
6
1
 
  
0
.0
6
4
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T
a
b
le
 4
.8
 D
iffe
re
n
tia
l e
ffe
c
t o
f firm
 s
ize
 
T
h
is tab
le rep
o
rts estim
ates o
f p
ro
b
it regressio
n
s w
h
ere th
e d
ep
en
d
en
t v
ariab
le is th
e m
easu
re o
f fin
a
n
cin
g
 co
n
stra
in
ts. E
ach
 regressio
n
 in
clu
d
es d
u
m
m
ies fo
r th
e legal 
fo
rm
 o
f th
e firm
s, secto
rs, 
y
ears, an
d
 p
ercep
tio
n
s o
f tru
th
fu
ln
ess o
f th
e su
rv
ey
 in
terv
iew
ees. T
h
e m
o
d
els a
re estim
ated
 w
ith
 ro
b
u
st stan
d
ard
 erro
rs ad
ju
sted
 b
y
 clu
sterin
g b
y
 co
u
n
tries. S
m
all 
firm
 is a d
u
m
m
y
 v
ariab
le
 
rep
resen
tin
g th
e b
o
tto
m
 tercile o
f th
e firm
 siz
e d
istrib
u
tio
n
. T
h
e d
efin
itio
n
s o
f th
e v
ariab
les are in
 A
p
p
en
d
ix A
4
.1
. Z
 v
alu
es are rep
o
rted
 in
 b
rack
ets. *
, *
*
, *
*
*
 in
d
icate resp
ectiv
ely
 sign
ifican
ce 
at 
1
0
%
, 5
%
, an
d
 1
 %
 lev
el. 
  
M
o
d
el: 
(1
) 
 
(2
) 
 
(3
) 
 
(4
) 
 
(5
) 
 
  
D
ep
 v
ar: fin
an
cin
g co
n
strain
ts 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
C
red
it in
fo
rm
a
tio
n
 sh
a
rin
g
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
co
p
e o
f  cred
it in
fo
rm
atio
n
 
-0
.0
8
0
*
*
*
 
(-3
.5
1
) 
-0
.0
9
5
*
*
*
 
(-4
.0
9
) 
-0
.1
2
*
*
*
 
(-4
.3
2
) 
-0
.1
5
*
*
*
 
(-4
.4
9
) 
-0
.1
2
*
*
*
 
(-4
.3
9
) 
 
S
cale o
f cred
it in
fo
rm
atio
n
 
0
.0
5
7
*
*
 
(2
.1
2
) 
0
.0
6
6
*
*
 
(2
.2
0
) 
0
.0
5
9
*
*
 
(2
.1
1
) 
0
.0
6
1
*
*
 
(2
.5
1
) 
0
.0
5
9
*
*
 
(2
.0
8
) 
 
U
sers - b
an
k
s 
 
 
 
 
0
.1
1
 
(1
.4
7
) 
 
 
 
 
 
U
sers - n
o
n
-b
an
k
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.2
7
*
*
*
 
(2
.7
6
) 
 
 
 
U
sers - retailers an
d
 trad
ers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.1
3
 
(1
.4
4
) 
F
irm
 ch
a
ra
cteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L
n
 firm
 age 
-0
.0
4
1
*
 
(-1
.9
4
) 
-0
.0
4
2
*
*
 
(-1
.9
8
) 
-0
.0
3
8
*
 
(-1
.7
5
) 
-0
.0
3
7
 
(-1
.6
2
) 
-0
.0
3
9
*
 
(-1
.7
9
) 
 
D
irect  exp
o
rts (%
 o
f sales) 
-0
.0
0
1
8
*
*
 
(-2
.2
1
) 
-0
.0
0
1
8
*
*
 
(-2
.2
0
) 
-0
.0
0
1
8
*
*
 
(-2
.1
8
) 
-0
.0
0
1
4
*
*
 
(-2
.0
2
) 
-0
.0
0
1
7
*
*
 
(-2
.0
2
) 
 
L
n
 n
u
m
b
er o
f fu
ll  tim
e em
p
lo
y
ees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
-y
ear firm
 gro
w
th
 ln
(t-1
/t-3
) 
-0
.0
0
4
4
 
(-0
.4
1
) 
-0
.0
0
3
7
 
(-0
.3
4
) 
-0
.0
0
7
6
 
(-0
.6
5
) 
-0
.0
1
4
 
(-1
.1
6
) 
-0
.0
0
8
6
 
(-0
.7
5
) 
 
G
o
v
ern
m
en
t o
w
n
ersh
ip
 (>
2
0
%
) 
0
.1
3
 
(0
.9
7
) 
0
.1
2
 
(0
.8
9
) 
0
.1
1
 
(0
.8
0
) 
0
.1
1
 
(0
.8
1
) 
0
.1
2
 
(0
.8
9
) 
 
A
u
d
ited
 fin
an
cial statem
en
ts 
-0
.1
0
*
*
 
(-2
.5
4
) 
-0
.1
0
*
*
 
(-2
.5
2
) 
-0
.0
8
8
*
*
 
(-2
.3
4
) 
-0
.0
9
7
*
*
*
 
(-2
.6
1
) 
-0
.0
9
5
*
*
 
(-2
.4
6
) 
 
S
m
all firm
 
0
.3
4
*
*
*
 
(3
.3
9
) 
0
.1
4
*
*
*
 
(3
.1
0
) 
0
.2
3
*
*
 
(2
.2
2
) 
0
.2
2
*
*
*
 
(2
.7
6
) 
0
.1
8
*
*
*
 
(3
.5
5
) 
 
S
m
all firm
 *
 S
co
p
e o
f cred
it in
fo
rm
atio
n
 
-0
.0
5
3
*
*
*
 
(-2
.6
2
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
m
all firm
 *
 S
cale o
f cred
it in
fo
rm
atio
n
 
 
 
-0
.0
4
0
 
(-1
.1
4
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
m
all firm
 *
 U
sers - b
an
k
s 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
8
4
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Chapter 5 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
Access to finance is crucial for firms’ operations and growth. New investment projects 
frequently require financing that is greater than internally available resources. The role of 
financial intermediaries is to allocate capital to its most productive use. However, financ ia l 
markets pose a number of frictions that inhibit the efficient capital allocation. The most 
significant frictions include information asymmetries and agency costs. If investors or financ ia l 
intermediaries cannot accurately assess the prospects of a firm, they tend to tighten financ ing 
terms. Tighter financing terms attract lower quality firms – an adverse selection problem. The 
problem of agency costs relates to diverging incentives between finance providers and firms. 
Since firms have control over the use of the capital, finance providers undergo the risk that 
firms will engage in activities that are not in their interest – moral hazard. The existence of 
these frictions leads to financing constraints. Financially constrained firms have to forego 
profitable investment opportunities because they cannot access external finance or the 
financing terms are unfavorable. Financing constraints are greater for smaller firms due to 
larger information asymmetries and due to higher fixed screening costs of a larger number of 
smaller firms. The question of financing constraints belongs to the most important problems of 
corporate finance, which continues to severely impact firms worldwide.  
 This dissertation investigates financing constraints in a cross-country context. We 
examine three core subjects related to financing constraints: i) the costs and benefits of 
relationship lending; ii) the conditional occurrence of credit constraints; and iii) the role of 
credit information sharing systems.  
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In chapter 2, we focus on relationship lending as the most important financ ing 
technology for SMEs. Both lenders and borrowers can benefit from close lending relationships. 
Through repeated interactions lenders obtain more private information about borrowers. With 
lower information asymmetries lenders can offer better lending terms to borrowers. However, 
the accumulated private information makes switching to competition costly. Therefore, lenders 
have an incentive to informationally capture borrowers. First, a lender can offer favorable terms 
in the beginning of the relationship, but later extracts additional rents, such as higher interest 
rates, when the switching to a competitor becomes costly for a borrower – a hold-up problem. 
The empirical literature on the costs and benefits of relationship lending is widely mixed due 
to different samples, periods, and measures. In this chapter we use meta-analysis to quantify 
the overall effect of relationship lending and to explain the differences in the results. Lending 
relationships operate through multiple channels and lending outcomes occur through different 
lending terms. We develop a multidimensional conceptual framework by combining four 
dimensions of the relationship strength (time, distance, exclusivity, and cross-product 
synergies) with four lending outcomes (cost of credit, volume, collateral, and maturity). First, 
we estimate the overall effect of relationship lending for each category of relationship lending 
dimensions and lending terms. Next, we use meta-regressions to explain the heterogeneity in 
the studies by differences in lending environments. The empirical analysis is based on 2,979 
effects from 101 studies. The datasets from the original studies encompass more than 4.1million data 
observations from 28 countries. The results show that relationship lending is generally benefic ia l 
for borrowers, but lending outcomes differ across the relationship dimensions. For instance, 
interest rates are lower in longer and more exclusive relationships, but higher if firms are 
located in a close proximity to a lender. Borrowers in exclusive relationships are also required 
to post more collateral. In meta-regression analyses we find that relationship lending benefits 
are more likely in countries with more competitive banking systems. Surprisingly, they are not 
related to the importance of SMEs in an economy, suggesting that prevalence of relationship 
lending does not necessarily come along with borrower benefits. 
In chapter 3, I investigate credit constraints in a sample of small firms from 14 Euro-
area countries in the period 2009-2013. Economic literature considers credit constraints in the 
context of credit rejection rates. However, the problem is significantly larger. Borrowers may 
be discouraged from applying for credit because they anticipate that they will rejected (Brown 
et al., 2011; Cole, 2008; Popov and Udell, 2011). Moreover, approved borrowers may also be 
credit constrained if the loan amount is insufficient or if the credit terms are unfavorable for 
the full execution of an intended investment project. Accounting for these instances, the total 
number of credit constrained firms in the sample is four times as high in absolute terms 
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compared to the credit rejections (over 10% of all firms). The large prevalence of credit 
constraints is largely undocumented and not explained in the literature. In this chapter I develop 
a more complete framework of credit constraints. I decompose the credit constraints into three 
conditional stages: discouragement, rejections, and unfavorable terms. The occurrence of credit 
constraints is conditional because the outcome at each stage is conditional on the result from 
the previous stage. I document the prevalence of each stage and explain the cross-country 
differences by firm, bank, and country characteristics. I find large variation in the likelihood of 
credit constraints across countries and across the individual stages of credit constraints. The 
variation cannot be explained by firm risk characteristics alone. The results show that cross-
sectional differences are related to bank lending environment and, in particular, to bank lending 
standards. I find that tighter lending standards are associated with higher discouragement and 
rejection rates, but, conditional on approval, tight lending standards make unfavorable loan terms to 
borrowers less likely. The effect is mainly due to higher loan volume rather than lower loan rates. 
Borrowers are more likely to be discouraged or rejected in countries with risky banking sectors. In 
the additional tests, I examine the consistency of the stages of credit constraints across various credit 
instruments and test the effects of the alternative financing options. The empirical analysis suggests 
that bank lending standards may induce inefficient lending. If banks substitute higher rejection rates 
with higher credit volume, the overall outcome may lead to lower credit availability to smaller and 
more risky borrowers.  
In the last chapter, we analyze the role of credit information sharing systems in 
alleviating financing constraints. Credit information sharing systems can reduce information 
asymmetries between finance providers and firms by pooling private information about firms 
from multiple sources. This mechanism can reduce the impact of several market frictions. By 
making information about financing behavior accessible to other parties, credit information 
sharing systems allow finance providers to reduce uncertainty and set more accurately the 
financing terms for firms. It can also mitigate the hold-up problems by reducing the switching 
costs. If information is shared and readily available, firms can more easily switch to a competition if 
financing terms are not favorable. Finally, credit information sharing systems incentivize firms to 
honor their financial obligations and maintain their good standing since the information is visible to 
other parties. On the one hand, greater credit information sharing can lead to greater availability of 
finance. On the other hand, the aggregate increase in credit information sharing can lead to credit 
rationing. If banks exchange more information about borrowers while the quality of the borrowers 
remains the same, the overall increase in lending due to better information may be a redistribution 
effect from lower-quality borrowers to higher-quality borrowers (Jappelli and Pagano, 2000). In this 
chapter we disentangle the effect of credit information scale (credit information coverage) from credit 
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information scope (depth of credit information). In a large sample of companies from 45 developing 
economies in the period 2006-2012, we examine the components of credit information sharing 
mechanisms and information content. We present evidence of a dichotomous effect of credit 
information sharing. While information scope is associated with lower financing constraints, 
information scale is associated with higher financing constraints. Greater credit information scope is 
more beneficial for small firms. The significance of credit information scope is unaffected by 
information sharing mechanism and content. We find that financing constraints are less likely in 
countries with lower credit regulation, safer and more competitive banking systems, and higher 
growth. Overall, these findings indicate that accurate and deep information, rather than information 
coverage alone, contribute to lower financing constraints. 
In summary, this dissertation examines the mechanisms that can help firms to lower the 
barriers in accessing finance. This study offers insights on the role of the institutional environment 
and policy interventions that can influence the outcomes of financial intermediation. The empirical 
results demonstrate that promising venues exist for increasing firms’ access to finance. It is the hope 
of the author that this study will open opportunities for developing and implementing new effective 
solutions for greater access to finance.  
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Nederlandse samenvatting 
(Summary in Dutch) 
Toegang tot financiering is cruciaal voor de activiteiten en groei van bedrijven. Nieuwe 
investeringsprojecten vereisen regelmatig meer kapitaal dan de intern beschikbare financ ië le 
middelen. De rol van financiële intermediairs is om kapitaal zo toe te wijzen dat het de 
productiviteit optimaal vergroot. Echter, financiële markten vertonen een aantal fricties die een 
efficiënte allocatie van kapitaal tegenwerken. Financieel beperkte bedrijven moeten van 
winstgevende investeringsmogelijkheden afzien omdat ze geen toegang hebben tot externe 
financiering of omdat de financieringsvoorwaarden ongunstig zijn. Financieringsbeperkingen 
zijn groter voor kleinere bedrijven als gevolg van meer informatie asymmetrie. Het onderwerp 
financieringsbeperkingen behoort tot de belangrijkste problemen van bedrijfsfinanciering, dat 
nog steeds een enorm effect heeft op bedrijven wereldwijd.  
In dit proefschrift worden in drie studies de mechanismes besproken die kunnen 
bijdragen aan het reduceren van financieringsbeperkingen voor bedrijven. In de eerste studie 
worden de kosten en baten van het hebben van kredietrelaties besproken. Een meta-analyse laat 
zien dat kredietrelaties over het algemeen gunstig zijn voor kredietnemers, maar dat resultaten 
van het lenen variëren over de dimensies van de relatie. De rente is bijvoorbeeld lager in langere 
en meer exclusieve relaties, maar hoger als zij zich dicht bij de uitlener bevinden. Ook wordt 
van kredietnemers in exclusieve relaties vereist om meer onderpand aan te bieden. Daarnaast 
zijn de voordelen van kredietrelaties waarschijnlijker in landen met meer concurrerende 
banksystemen. Verrassend is dat zij niet gerelateerd zijn aan het belang van het MKB in een 
economie, wat suggereert dat de prevalentie van relatie leningen niet per se overeenkomt met 
de voordelen van de kredietnemer. 
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In de tweede studie ontwikkel ik een completer kader van finacieringsbeperkingen. Dit 
nieuwe kader beschrijft het voorkomen van financieringsbeperkingen in sequentië le 
conditionele fases. De resultaten laten zien dat financieringsbeperkingen varieëren met het 
klimaat van bancaire kredietverlening bovenop bedijfsrisico. Strengere kredietvoorwaarden 
worden geassocieerd met meer financieringsbeperkingen, maar gegeven goedkeuring 
resulteren striktere kredietvoorwaarden in een lagere waarschijnlijkheid van ongunst ige 
leningsvoorwaarden voor de kredietnemers. Uit de empirische analyse blijkt dat 
kredietvoorwaarden inefficiënte kredietverlening kunnen veroorzaken. Als banken hogere 
afwijzingspercentages vervangen door meer kredietverstrekking, kan het algehele resultaat 
leiden tot een lagere beschikbaarheid van krediet voor kleinere en meer risicovo lle 
kredietnemers. 
In de derde studie analyseren we de rol van kredietinformatie uitwisselingssystemen in 
het verlichten van financieringsbeperkingen. Kredietinformatie uitwisselingssystemen kunnen 
de informatieasymmetrie tussen de financiers en de bedrijven verminderen door privé -
informatie over de bedrijven uit meerdere bronnen te bundelen. Aan de ene kant kan een hogere 
mate van het delen van kredietinformatie leiden tot een grotere beschikbaarheid van 
financiering. Aan de andere kant kan deze totale toename leiden tot rantsoenering van 
financiering. De analyse laat zien dat er een dichotoom effect is van krediet informatie -
uitwisseling; enerzijds via informatie detail en anderzijds via informatie hoeveelheid. Terwijl 
informatieomvang wordt geassocieerd met minder financieringsproblemen, wordt informatie 
schaal geassocieerd met meer financieringsproblemen. Deze bevindingen wijzen erop dat 
nauwkeurige en diepe informatie, in plaats van informatie over de dekking alleen, bijdragen 
aan de vermindering van financieringsbeperkingen. De bevindingen tonen aan dat er 
veelbelovende nieuwe mogelijkheden bestaan om voor bedrijven de toegang tot kapitaal te 
verbeteren. 
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Access to finance is one of the most serious obstacles faced by companies. Financing
constraints lead to large opportunity costs, which translate into negative consequences for
economic growth, productivity, and welfare. In three studies, this dissertation examines the
mechanisms that can help to reduce financing constraints. The first study investigates the
costs and benefits of relationship lending – an essential financing instrument of private
companies. Using meta-analysis, this study reveals that relationship lending is generally
beneficial for companies, but lenders and companies face trade-offs in lending relation -
ships and lending outcomes. Borrower benefits are more likely in the US and in countries
where bank competition is high. They are not related to the importance of small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in an economy, suggesting that prevalence of relationship
lending does not necessarily come along with borrower benefits. The second study
develops a more complete conceptual framework of credit constraints. The new framework
describes the occurrence of credit constraints in sequential, conditional stages. The results
show that credit constraints vary with bank lending environment beyond the firm risk.
Bank lending standards are strongly related to credit constraints, but the direction and the
magnitude of the effect depend on the conditional stage. The conditional nature and the
stage-specific differences in the determinants provide an important guidance for economic
policies aimed at efficient allocation of credit. The third study examines the role of credit
information sharing systems. The analysis documents dichotomous effects of the infor -
mation scope (depth of information) and scale (information coverage). While the
information scope is associated with lower financing constraints, the information scale is
associated with higher financing constraints. These findings suggest that accurate and
deep information sharing systems, rather than the information coverage alone, contribute
to lower financing constraints. The empirical results from the three studies demonstrate
that promising new venues exist for improving firms’ access to finance.
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